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Abstract
Populism has become the issue of comparative political science today. The rise and continuing success of populist par-
ties is by now evident across Europe, despite persistent cross-national variations. Populist parties’ electoral success and
their participation in government have raised questions about their impact: not just on established party systems, but also
on the systemic core of European democracies. In theory, this impact can be both beneficial for, as well as a challenge to
democracy in general, and the tenets of liberal constitutional democracy in particular. The presence of populist parties has,
in several cases, increased electoral turnout and public participation, which is generally seen as a positive effect whenmea-
suring the quality of democracy. However, populist parties’ rise also points to negative effects. In addition to profoundly
reshaping European party systems, they advocate what the populist Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán calls “illiberal
democracy”. Both as an ideal and as an institutional practice when in government, the illiberal remaking of democracy
implies eroding the separation of powers and subordinating constitutionally guaranteed individual civil and human rights
to an alleged “general will” and a particular conception of “the people”. The thematic issue explores the ideological supply,
favorable conditions, political contexts and dynamics, as well as the impact of the populist surge in Europe in relation to
the systemic consolidation of (il)liberal democracy on a theoretical and comparative empirical level.
Keywords
cleavages; discontent; Europe; ideology; illiberal; liberal democracy; nativism; party systems; populism; representative
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1. The Fourth Wave of Populism and the Rise of
Populist Parties in Europe: From Pariahs to Power
Brokers
Populismhas arguably become the issue of European pol-
itics and comparative political science today. The rise,
relevance, and continuing success of populist parties
is by now evident in party system change across Eu-
rope, despite persistent cross-national variations. This
ongoing development has been conceived as the “fourth
wave” of populism (Mudde, 2013).1 It is remarkably dif-
ferent, however, from the previous wave, which was
characterized by the initial breakthrough of new, mod-
ernized populist parties in themid-1980s (Abromeit, Nor-
man, Marotta, & Chesterton, 2015; Ignazi, 2003; Mudde,
2007). Almost exclusively carried by parties from the
1 Von Beyme (1985) distinguishes three successive ways preceding the current wave of populist parties.
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 4, Pages 106–111 106
right, it affected a more limited number of European
countries. These parties largely remained pariahs of Eu-
ropean politics and their electoral and political impact
remained rather limited (Mudde, 2013). Electoral suc-
cesses were often followed by failures, and fluctuating
parliamentary representations corresponded with a lim-
ited, mostly discursive or agenda-influencing political
footprint, even if populists did take public office (mostly
as junior partners) in government (Akkerman& de Lange,
2012; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015; Frölich-Steffen &
Rensmann, 2007; Minkenberg, 2001; Rovira Kaltwasser
& Taggart, 2016).
Observations that the electoral (and political) impact
of populist parties has been very limited may have been
valid in comparative terms until a few years ago (Mudde,
2013). They are, however, in need of re-assessment in
view of the scope and force of the fourth wave of pop-
ulism. After all, populist actors have improved their elec-
toral fortunes considerably and have left their marks in
party politics the world over. Indeed, they are in the pro-
cess of reshaping party competition and politics in estab-
lished Western liberal democracies. A steady, partly dra-
matic electoral rise enabled many of these parties to en-
ter parliaments and governments, in Central Eastern Eu-
rope even as governingmajorities. This includes the Hun-
garian Fidesz (governing continuously since 2010) and
the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS, governing with an
outrightmajority since 2015). And in Italy there is by now
a populist majority reflecting the collapse of the estab-
lished post-war party system in the political earthquake
of themani pulite corruption scandals in 1992–1993 and
subsequent political crises eroding trust in mainstream
parties (Bobba & McDonnell, 2015).2
In 2016, populists celebrated unexpected successes
in two of the oldest, most stable democracies: UKIP by
winning the Brexit referendum it fought for, and, across
the Atlantic, Donald Trump by winning the US presi-
dency. Since then, the populist phenomenon has fully
entered center stage of political debates and scholarly
interest. Although the 2017 election cycle was overall
perceived as producingmixed results—therewas no pop-
ulist sweep across Europe—populist parties gained votes
in the Netherlands, 10.6 million voters opted for radi-
cal right-wing populist Marine Le Pen (Front National)
in the 2nd round of the 2017 French presidential elec-
tions,3 while in Austria the populist FPÖ re-entered gov-
ernment after a successful xenophobic electoral cam-
paign. Even in Germany, a right-wing populist party—
the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)—entered parlia-
ment for the first time and immediately became the third
largest party. Moreover, the AfD and the left-wing pop-
ulist Linkspartei together received 21.8% of the popular
vote, profoundly challenging one of the hitherto most
stable party systems in Europe. Moreover, transnational
ideological, organizational and discursive similarities are
reinforced through mutual “learning effects” in a Euro-
peanized and globalized context (Akkerman, de Lange, &
Rooduijn, 2016).4
2. The Populist Challenge: Liberal Constitutional
Democracies and Dimensions of Populist Politics of
Discontent
The populist parties’ electoral success and their partici-
pation in government have raised questions about their
impact. Not just with regard to established party sys-
tems, but also in relation to the systemic core of Euro-
pean democracies. In theory, this impact can be both
beneficial for, as well as a challenge to democracy in
general, and the tenets of liberal constitutional democ-
racy in particular (e.g. Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013).
The presence of populist parties can increase electoral
turnout, public participation, and representation under
certain conditions (Huber & Ruth, 2017; Immerzeel &
Pickup, 2015). However, populist parties’ rise also points
to potential negative effects. In addition to profoundly
reshaping European party systems, they advocate what
the populist Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán calls
“illiberal democracy”. Both as an ideal and as an institu-
tional practice when in government, the illiberal remak-
ing of democracy implies eroding the separation of pow-
ers and subordinating constitutionally guaranteed indi-
vidual civil and human rights to an alleged “general will”
and a particular conception of “the people”. Recurring
strategies and features of populist political mobilization
appeal to these illiberal sentiments, alongside desires
to break the rules of civil society and discourses of fear
and crisis (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; Rensmann, 2017a;
Wodak, 2015).
The thematic issue explores the ideological supply,
favorable conditions, political contexts and dynamics,
as well as the impact of the populist surge in Europe
in relation to the systemic consolidation of (il)liberal
democracy on a theoretical and comparative empirical
level. Avoiding generic claims about the “end of poli-
tics” (Mouffe, 2005) that are difficult to test, the au-
thors engage with a dynamic, interactive understanding
of populist parties’ ideological changes and responses by
established parties (and liberal democracy) to the pop-
ulist challenge (Kriesi, 2014). Notwithstanding its con-
2 There is also a distinctly South European context and playing field. In Greece and Spain, where liberal democracy did not arrive until the 1970s, left-wing
populist parties like Syriza and Podemos recently emerged as the most succesful populist parties, in contrast to most other European countries. In Italy,
theMovimento Cinque Stelle, which is ideologically neither left nor right but populist, quickly became a major organization, adding to the already large
spectrum of populist parties.
3 The pro-European candidate Emmanuel Macron, to be sure, defeated her by a large margin (Rubin, 2017).
4 Radical right populist parties have recently also reinforced their cross-national organizational and political ties in the European Parliament and beyond.
The political group “Europe of Nations and Freedom” in the European Parliament, launched in 2015, prominently includes the AfD fromGermany, Geert
Wilders’ single-member party Partij voor de Vrijheit (PVV) from the Netherlands, the Front National (FN) from France, the Lega Nord from Italy, the
Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) from Austria, and Vlaams Belang (VB) from Belgium. Several of these actors also expressed support for US President
Trump whose success they explicitly see as a model.
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tested nature and presence as a fuzzy buzzword in po-
litical debates, “populism” has been successfully opera-
tionalized in systematic studies of contemporary actors
challenging established liberal-democratic politics in Eu-
rope and beyond (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). In-
deed, “populism” properly conceptualized, is especially
well suited to understand key features of the most sig-
nificant, electorally successful—new or transformed—
movement-party types and other political actors gaining
ground in European politics today. And while there is a
variety of challengers liberal and representative democ-
racy and party systems face (Pappas, 2016), themost suc-
cessful and relevant are populist parties.
To facilitate the discussions between the contribu-
tions in the issue and to be able to draw conclusion
on the basis of the separate studies, we present two
minimal definitions. We conceive of populism as a thin-
centered ideology (or discourse) “that considers society
to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and
antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the cor-
rupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an
expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the
people” (Mudde, 2004). Because of its nature, populism
can be combined with left- and right-wing, or other ide-
ologies. In addition, we conceive of liberal democracy as
consisting of two pillars: on the one hand, institutional-
ized forms of popular, democratic sovereignty (i.e. free
and fair elections among equal members, forms of rep-
resentative government, a free public sphere and me-
dia, and other democratic procedures of popular and plu-
ralistic will-formation and inclusion), and on the other
hand liberal constitutional rights and principles (i.e. in-
dividual civil, political and human rights and liberties, in-
cluding freedom of expression, separation of powers, an
independent judiciary; Plattner, 2010). Both constitutive
pillars, the exercise of democratic public autonomy and
the constitutionally guaranteed “private” autonomy of
individual rights and liberties, can work as mutually re-
inforcing (or “co-original”, in Habermas’ words [1998]),
but may also be in tension if output from the first pil-
lar, which points to the particular will-formation of a
particular political community, clashes with the inher-
ently universalistic norms and undercurrents of the sec-
ond (e.g. in a “tyranny of the majority”, or illiberal forms
of democracy, threatening the latter) (e.g. Kornhauser,
1959). However, countries regularly holding free and fair
democratic elections aremore likely to protect individual
rights, and vice versa (Plattner, 2010).
The debate about illiberal democracy thereby points
to nativist or exclusionary, particularistic critiques of lib-
eral democracy as well as to procedural criticisms of rep-
resentative democracy in the populist mobilization of
discontent. It points to a socio-cultural divide identified
by Bornschier (2010) affecting the character of liberal
democracies and to an actual crisis of liberal democracy
that is, however, simultaneously promoted, constructed
and reinforced by its populist critics.
3. Populism and the Remaking of (Il)liberal Democracy
in Europe: Findings
Based on cross-national studies, the thematic issue ex-
plores the relationship between populist discontent and
liberal democracy (and its cultural undercurrents). Exist-
ing studies indicate that the causes of the rise of populist
parties and the extent to which effects on liberal democ-
racies materialize depend on the characteristics of the
populist parties themselves (Akkerman et al., 2016) and
on those of the political systems and political cultures
in which these parties compete. The central question to
which the different contributions of this thematic issue
respond is two-fold: What are the political/cultural con-
ditions or crises within liberal democracies that are favor-
able to the current rise of populist parties, and how does
the emergence of populism impact on (the quality of) lib-
eral democracy in Europe? In other words, the contribu-
tions seek to unravel through whichmechanisms and un-
der which conditions the presence of European populist
parties and leaders, currently riding on a wave of elec-
toral success, are engendered in different political, cul-
tural, and media contexts, and have impact on various
key characteristics of liberal democracies, such as levels
of democratic inclusion and participation of citizens (and
denizens), democratic political culture, civil, social and
political civil rights, the separation of powers, an inde-
pendent judiciary, and a free, diverse and pluralistic pub-
lic sphere.
Theoretical reconceptualizations of conditions and
dynamics, as well as comparative empirical research in
this issue seek to rethink and systematize the extent
to which the causes and effects of populist actors are
conditional on certain factors, such as 1) the specific or
shared “modernized” political ideologies of “left-wing”
and “right-wing” or nativist populist parties, 2) the ex-
clusion or inclusion of populist parties from government,
3) the type of government in which populist parties par-
ticipate (i.e. type of coalition, formal or informal par-
ticipation), 4) historical legacies and the degree of con-
solidation of (il)liberal democracy (especially taking ac-
count of differences between Western liberal democra-
cies and post-Communist Eastern liberal democracies,
where populists are on average more successful today),
or 5) the contexts of political cultures and dominant so-
cial values in which populist parties operate (e.g. dynam-
ics of social value change and backlash, dominant cul-
tural/democratic self-understandings).
The studies show that the hitherto underexplored
relationship between populism and (il)liberal democracy
is more complex than initially conceived. Assessing the
scope of a multi-faceted challenge, they yield mixed find-
ings on the negative impact or threat to the future of
liberal democracy and its robustness. Approaching the
issue from both a comparative European perspective
and a more specific regional focus, studies vary in their
assessment of this relationship.While some suggest that
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the transformative impact may be more limited than
often claimed in recent public debates (especially on
Central Eastern Europe, where populist majorities gov-
ern and recently have been reprimanded by the Euro-
pean Union), others argue that populism’s negative im-
pact on democratic political cultures—and the quality of
democracy—in Europe is more profound and has rather
been underestimated. In light of broader long-term shifts
in cultural self-understandings and a traditionalist or au-
thoritarian social value backlash against globalization, di-
versity, and liberal democratic principles often promoted
or reinforced by populists, these studies diagnose an in-
creased readiness to suspend or break with established
norms and constitutional frameworks. This development
is likely to further transform liberal democracies and con-
solidate populist successes.
In his article, Benjamin Moffitt (2017) questions the
much-echoed equation of populismwith illiberalism. Tak-
ing cue from right-wing populist parties in Northern Euro-
pean countries (i.e. the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden,
Norway), Moffitt argues that the relationship between
populist politics and liberalism is more complicated than
usually assumed. Populism is not necessarily “profoundly
illiberal”. He makes the case for a mode of “liberal illib-
eralism”, a selective, nationalist liberalism that is discur-
sively employed to “put amore ‘acceptable’ face” on illib-
eral politics. In this way,Moffitt also implicitly shows that
hesitance with regard to generalizations about populist
politics allows for the articulation of regional variations
and differences throughout Europe.
While recognizing politico-cultural specificities and
significant cross-national variations, Lars Rensmann
(2017b) argues that the rise of populist parties is part of a
trans-national, illiberal backlash reflecting a deep cultural
divide within European democracies that is increasingly
reflected and mobilized in transformed political spaces.
In his reconceptualization of European populist parties,
he adds cultural dimensions that left- and right-wing pop-
ulists share. In order to understand and assess the scope
and origins of the fourth wave of populist politics in Eu-
rope, Rensmann proposes a cultural turn in the study of
populism beyond conventional political science frame-
works. His research takes this cultural turn into three
directions, integrating insights from three currently still
marginalized fields: political sociology, political psychol-
ogy, and media studies. They help illuminate, it is ar-
gued, the cultural conditions fromwhich today’s populists
benefit—a long lingering cultural counter-revolution, the
socio-psychological dynamics of an authoritarian cultural
revolt articulated by populists, and a transformed com-
municative environment shaped by social media.
Matthijs Rooduijn, Wouter van der Brug, Sarah de
Lange, and Jante Parlevliet (2017) examine in their article
whether exposure to populismmakes citizens more cyni-
cal about politics. More specifically, they assess whether
exposure to populist messages affect only those already
favourably predisposed towards populist parties or all
citizens, irrespective of their existing attitudes. On the
basis of survey experiment, in which a representative
sample of Dutch citizens had to read a newspaper arti-
cle containing either a populist or a non-populist mes-
sage, they study the impact of populism on political cyn-
icism. The authors find that the participants that read
the populist message weremore cynical afterwards than
the participants that were exposed to a “neutrally for-
mulated” message. Interestingly, they also conclude that
not all citizens exposed to the populist message are
equally affected. In fact, the effect of the exposure to
populism is only significant for participants that support
populist parties.
Robert Huber and Christian Schimpf (2017) empiri-
cally analyze differences and commonalities in the way
populist parties of the left and right relate to democ-
racy and democratic quality. They argue that populism
should not be considered in isolation from its (left or
right) host-ideology. Using data from 30 European coun-
tries between 1990 and 2012, Huber and Schimpf show
that populist parties can exert distinct influences on mi-
nority rights depending on their left or right orientation
while, however, the association between populist par-
ties and mutual constraints is a consequence of the pop-
ulist element.
Emphasizing Central Eastern European context speci-
ficity and differences within the region, Lenka Bustikova
and Petra Guasti (2017) investigate the democratic back-
sliding, and the extent to which it is the result of rising
populism, in the Visegrad countries. On the basis of a
comparison of developments in the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland and Slovakia they state that the notion of
democratic backsliding, which is often used in the lit-
erature on democracies in Central and Eastern Europe,
is flawed. The concept of backsliding suggests that in
the Visegrad countries a clear break exists from a lib-
eral trajectory to an illiberal one. The authors demon-
strate that the countries under investigation have not
gone through a linear process of democratization and
consolidation in the 1990s and early 2000s, nor have they
gone through a linear process of de-democratization and
de-consolidation in more recent years. Instead, they ob-
serve a sequence of “episodes” delineated by elections,
some of which can be characterized as “illiberal swerves”.
In Hungary, and to a lesser extent in Poland, the swerving
has persisted over multiple elections. In these countries
the “illiberal swerving” has resulted in an “illiberal turn”.
In his review, which concludes this thematic issue,
John Abromeit (2017) engages with five recent studies
that have intervened in the empirical, conceptual and
methodological debates on contemporary global pop-
ulism. As each of these studies claim to make an innova-
tive contribution to the field in their own right, Abromeit
prudently assesses their merits and shortcomings. In
doing so, his main criticisms revolve around construc-
tivist approaches to populism and the use of history in
some studies. Abromeit takes issue with the theoreti-
cal assumptions and (perceived) explanatory capacity un-
derlying constructivist (e.g. discursive, performative) ap-
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proaches to populism, but also hints at tendencies to-
wards historical reductionism in some of the studies un-
der review. Moreover, he acknowledges that the concep-
tual grammar of (group and social) psychologymight con-
tribute to the field, but in the same breath states that
the ways in which such angles are employed offer little
explanation for identification processes that are key to
populist politics at large.
Be that as itmay, the studies and new research all rec-
ognize that the current populist boom reflects a steady,
consolidated ascendancy over a decade or more. It indi-
cates that new and old populist actors maneuver more
successfully through a changing political and (social) me-
dia landscape and actor environments, often outflanking
the external supply side of established parties and ap-
peals. This fourthwave of populism hereby benefits from
what CasMudde (2004) once aptly called a “populist zeit-
geist” and profoundly transformed demand side condi-
tions in post-industrial, globalized societies: readjusted
political, cultural and social value cleavages in a rapidly
changing communicative social media environment as
well as lingering socioeconomic and cultural crises of lib-
eral representative democracy. It points to deep-seated
discontent and a declining stability and cultural appeal of
consolidated, representative liberal democracies. A cri-
sis which populists seem to both construct and effec-
tively exploit. While political scientists should be reluc-
tant to make long-term predictions, the thematic issue
suggests that there are few reasons that the populist phe-
nomenon within liberal democracies is a transitory chal-
lenge likely to disappear any time soon. Rather, it is likely
part of European liberal democracy’s future, thereby con-
tinuing to change the political cultures and party systems
that shaped Europe’s post-war horizon.
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1. Introduction
It is generally accepted that populism is an illiberal phe-
nomenon. While there is ongoing debate about pop-
ulism’s democratic credentials (see Mudde & Rovira Kalt-
wasser, 2012; Panizza, 2005), most scholars would not
object to characterising populism as antithetical to liber-
alism, whether it is right-wing, left-wing or another ideo-
logical variant of populism. Here, populism’s propensity
for constructing ‘the people’ as a homogenous group,
construing ‘the elite’ as a singular actor, for ignoring or
suppressing difference, and in the case of right-wing pop-
ulists, for actively targeting minority groups, are seen as
flying in the face of liberalism’s commitment to pluralism,
openness, and the protection of individual liberty.
However, recent high-profile cases of populist radi-
cal right (PRR) parties from Northern Europe complicate
this characterisation: rather than being directly opposed
to liberalism, these parties reconfigure traditional liberal
defences of discriminated-against groups in their own
populist image, characterising groups such as homosex-
uals and women as part of ‘the people’ who require pro-
tection from ‘the elite’ and associated dangerous Others.
They also invoke liberal defences of free speech, secu-
larism and individual freedom, and thus ‘display a more
‘civic’ and liberal democratic face’ (Pels, 2011, p. 27)
than older PRR parties. Against an elite that is allegedly
in thrall to cultural relativism and political correctness,
these populists present themselves as the true defend-
ers of liberty and ‘Enlightenment values’.
This article examines this situation by compara-
tively analysing five contemporary cases of PRR par-
ties in Northern Europe that have often utilised liberal
arguments—the Party for Freedom (PVV) and Lijst Pim
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Fortuyn (LPF) in the Netherlands, the Sweden Democrats
(SD) in Sweden, the Danish People’s Party (DF) in Den-
mark and the Progress Party (FrP in Norway)—and ex-
ploring what they reveal about the complicated relation-
ship between populism and liberalism. It argues that
these cases can be viewed as examples of ‘liberal illib-
eralism’, in which illiberal attacks on particular Others as-
sociated with ‘the elite’—in many of these cases, Mus-
lims and Islamists who are allegedly bringing about the
‘Islamisation’ of Europe—are couched in a liberal dis-
course.1 To do this, it first examines the extant literature
on populism’s relationship with liberalism, before turn-
ing to the question of how these parties invoke liberal-
ism in their policy platforms and public statements. Here,
it examines four themes core to the strand of ‘romantic
liberalism’ (Gustavsson, 2015) these parties draw upon:
the defence of gender and sexual minorities; individual
freedom; secularism; and free speech. It finds that these
parties selectively invoke liberalism, utilising it less as an
ideological compass than a discourse that is easily com-
bined with a nativist ideology and populist style. It then
examines the reasons why these PRR parties utilise lib-
eral illiberalism, as well as the repercussions of doing this
for the wider political landscape. With these findings in
mind, it then closes by considering whether the strict bi-
nary between liberalism and populism needs reconsider-
ing, given their intermingling is far more complicated in
practice than in theory.
It should be noted that this article is directed to-
wards and engages primarily with the literature on pop-
ulism (and PRR parties) in Western Europe. While other
relevant and adjacent literatures have explored simi-
lar themes, such as the tensions and challenges inher-
ent in combining liberal values with diverse models of
citizenship—see for example the literatures on civic inte-
gration (Joppke, 2005; Joppke & Morawska, 2003), con-
tested citizenship (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy,
2005) or multicultural citizenship (Kymlicka, 1995)—
these debates are beyond the limits of the article. PRR
parties are here understood via the influential definition
provided by Mudde (2007), whereby this party family
combines nativism, authoritarianism and populism (al-
though as shall be argued, the populist component of
the PRR party family is less a matter of ideology than a
discourse or political style).
2. Populism versus Liberalism
Before progressing, it is worth defining the key terms
being utilised in this article: populism and liberalism.
Both are contested concepts—some would say they go
so far as to fall into the category of being essentially
contested concepts (Abbey, 2005; Mudde & Rovira Kalt-
wasser, 2017)—but the limited focus of this article pre-
vents us diving too deeply into these conceptual argu-
ments. For our purposes, populism is here understood
as ‘a political style that features an appeal to ‘the people’
versus ‘the elite’, ‘bad manners’ and the performance of
crisis, breakdown or threat’ (Moffitt, 2016, p. 45). This is
somewhat different to Mudde’s (2007) influential defini-
tion of populism as a ‘thin-centered ideology’, reflecting
the fact that populism is difficult to conceptualize and
measure as a core ideological feature of a party family
(see Aslanidis, 2016) and the approach has been refuted
by the creator of the notion of ‘thin-centered ideology’
(Freeden, 2017). However, my chosen definition is co-
herent with Mudde’s definition of PRR parties, acknowl-
edging that populist style is a key feature of these par-
ties’ public expressions and discourse. Liberalism, mean-
while, here is understood in its ideological sense, as op-
posed to historical or philosophical senses, as laid out
by Freeden (2005, p. 5), in which it is seen as ‘an ideol-
ogy that contains seven political concepts that interact at
its core: liberty, rationality, individuality, progress, socia-
bility, the general interest, and limited and accountable
power’ (Freeden, 2015, p. 15). In the contemporary Euro-
pean context, these ideological components tend to be
reconfigured along a number of different subtypes of lib-
eralism, which Gustavsson (2015) labels as reformation
liberalism, enlightenment liberalism and romantic liber-
alism. These subtypes follow Locke, Kant or Mill in plac-
ing diversity, autonomy and self-expression as their pri-
mary values respectively.
What happens when we draw populism and liberal-
ism together? As noted, populism is generally seen as an-
tithetical to liberalism in the academic literature. The vo-
ciferousness of authors who make this argument varies:
on one side, we have those who see populism as not
only illiberal, but also as undemocratic; on the other, we
have authors who see populism as illiberal, but accept
its democratic credentials. In the former camp, authors
such as Müller (2014, p. 484) argue that populism ‘is
a profoundly illiberal and, in the end, directly undemo-
cratic understanding of representative democracy’. In
the latter camp, authors generally contend that populism
is ‘one form of what Fareed Zakaria has recently popu-
larized as ‘illiberal democracy’’ (Mudde, 2004, p. 561).
Switching the order of the syntagm, Krastev has argued
that populism ‘capture[s] the major political trend in our
world today: the rise of democratic illiberalism’ (Krastev,
2007a, p. 104), and notes that ‘populism is antiliberal but
it is not antidemocratic’ (Krastev, 2007b, p. 60).
Perhaps themost extensive exploration of populism’s
relationship to liberalism comes from Pappas (2014,
2016), who uses the same language as Krastev to provide
and defend a minimal definition of populism as ‘demo-
cratic illiberalism’, arguing that this definition is useful as
it ‘points directly to populism’s ‘negative pole’, namely,
political liberalism…populism, in short, may be demo-
cratic, but it is not liberal’ (Pappas, 2014, p. 3). Drawing
on Riker (1982) and Rawls (2005), Pappas argues that lib-
eralism and populism differ along three key lines: liberal-
1 I am not the first to note this situation—others have explored this contrast, but have focused on these parties’ nationalism rather than their populism
(Brubaker, 2017; De Koster, Achterberg, Van der Waal, Van Bohemen, & Kemmers, 2014; Halikiopoulou, Mock, & Vasilopoulou, 2013).
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ism’s multiple cleavages versus populism’s single cleav-
age between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’; liberalism’s
‘overlapping consensus’ that seeks moderation versus
populism’s adversarial politics; and liberalism’s constitu-
tionalism versus populism’s majoritarianism.2 More so,
Pappas (2016) argues that his definition of populism as
‘democratic illiberalism’ not only allows us to distinguish
it from political liberalism, but also autarchy, or as he re-
words it to explicitly demonstrate its difference from his
own concept, ‘nondemocratic illiberalism’. This clarifica-
tion is useful as it demonstrates where those who see
populism as both illiberal and non-democratic have gone
wrong—they conflate it with autarchy.
Yet as useful as Pappas’ populism/liberalism/autarchy
typology is, there are cases that fall ‘in between the
cracks’, rather than fitting neatly into one category. In
this regard, empirical reality is never as clear-cut as the-
ory, something that Pappas readily admits:
Some cases, to be sure, will be mixed bags, and there-
fore their inclusion in analysis, or exclusion from it,
will be assumed by how one defines ‘democracy’ or
‘illiberalism’. Should we, for instance, classify Hun-
gary’s Jobbik as a populist (i.e., illiberal but still demo-
cratic) party, or is it to be relegated to the category
of nondemocratic parties, which fall outside our re-
search concerns? Another example: Is the strong anti-
immigration discourse of the Danish Progress Party a
clear enough indication of ‘illiberalism’ (so that we
can classify this party as populist), or is it reckoned
simply as a set of ultra-conservative ideas, and pol-
icy proposals, of an otherwise perfectly liberal party?
(Pappas, 2016)
It is this set of ‘mixed bag’ cases that are of interest to this
article, which concerns itself not with the former cases
(where the border between democratic/nondemocratic
is in question), but rather with the latter cases, in which
the liberal/illiberal distinction is unclear.
There are precedents for trying to classify these
‘mixed bag’ cases. The terms ‘centrist populism’ (Učeň,
2004) and ‘new/centrist populism’ (Pop-Eleches, 2010)
have been used to classify parties in Eastern Europe
that combine populism with otherwise relatively liberal-
centrist positions, while Wolkenstein (2016, pp. 14–15)
has convincingly argued that the populism of the Scot-
tish National Party should be understood as a ‘liberal
populism’. The same term has also been used by Fella
and Ruzza (2013, p. 42) in the context of Italy: ‘while the
populism of the LN could be described as of radical right
or nativist in character, that of Berlusconi might be de-
scribed as closer to ‘liberal populism’’.
3. Illiberal Liberalism in Northern Europe
Yet one cannot use the same terminology—centrist or
liberal populism—to describe the Northern European
PRR parties explored here—the VVD, LPF, SD, DF and
FrP. These parties have been chosen as they are the
most prominent cases of PRR parties in Northern Eu-
rope (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014; Mudde, 2007, 2013) and
this study follows a similar regional-based approach put
forward by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2015).3 Each
of these parties combine policies that are undeniably
xenophobic and putatively anti-liberal with at times clas-
sically liberal positions in other policy areas. The for-
mer policies are well-documented in the academic liter-
ature, and thus do not require a lengthy analysis here:
in addition to the anti-liberal positions lay out by Pap-
pas above, they include racism (Widfeldt, 2015), nativism
(Hellström & Hervik, 2014), xenophobia (Rydgren, 2010)
and authoritarianism (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014). What is
of interest, however, are the latter policies, which have
been less explored. The liberal themes that these par-
ties tend to use to couch their otherwise relatively con-
sistent illiberalism coalesce around: 1) gender and sex-
uality; 2) individual freedom; 3) ‘Christian secularism’
(Brubaker, 2017); and 4) free speech. Given that liber-
alism is such a broad church, these specific areas have
been selected to examine as they broadly reflect the con-
cerns of the variant of ‘romantic liberalism’ put forward
by Gustavsson (2014, 2015)—a mode of ‘hard’ liberal-
ism that sees self-expression as the primary value that
justifies liberal rights rather than diversity, tolerance or
autonomy—that is relatively common in the discursive
and ideological platforms of many actors on the con-
temporary Western European (populist as well as non-
populist) right. More so, these themes firmly fit into the
sociocultural dimension of liberalism (rather than the so-
cioeconomic dimension),which is focused onhere due to
the increasing salience of sociocultural issues for PRR par-
ties inWestern Europe (Akkerman, de Lange, & Rooduijn,
2016a). In the following section, I draw on these par-
ties’ platforms and public statements to examine each
of these themes in turn. Taken together, I argue that
these parties articulate a ‘liberal illiberalism’, whereby
selective elements of liberal discourse and ideology are
utilised to defend an ultimately illiberal position.
The first liberal theme invoked byNorthern European
PRR parties revolves around the protection of sexual mi-
2 In a later article, Pappas modifies liberalism’s two latter features to read ‘the pursuit of political moderation, and the protection of minority rights’
(Pappas, 2016).
3 There is some debate about whether the FrP is a populist radical right party: Jungar & Jupskås (2014, p. 216) argue it is ‘less authoritarian and more
economically right-wing’ than other PRR parties, and thus ‘is probably best seen as a hybrid between a PRR party and a more traditional conservative
party’ although Jupskås (2016, p. 169) has elsewhere referred to the party as a ‘radical right-wing populist party’. Here I choose to include FrP in this
article, following the example set by Rydgren (2008, p. 738), who argues that despite the party’s toned-down ethno-nationalism/nativism, it operates
as something of a ‘functional equivalent’ to PRR parties, as ‘earlier research indicates that they are electorally successful for approximately the same
reasons and satisfy approximately the same political demand’, while other influential authors often include them in their studies of similarly-named
party families or groupings (e.g. Bale, Green-Pedersen, Krouwel, Luther, & Sitter, 2010; Norris, 2005).
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norities and gender equality. The former has been par-
ticularly pertinent in the Netherlands, where the LPF’s
leader, Pim Fortuyn, was keen to promote his social liber-
alness with pronouncements about his homosexuality—
as he once claimed to a critic who accused him of racism:
‘I have nothing against Moroccans. I’ve been to bed with
so many of them!’ (in Pels, 2003, p. 42). PVV leader
Geert Wilders has also been keen to paint himself as an
ally of the LGBTQ community, arguing that he is fighting
for ‘the freedom that gay people should have—to kiss
each other, tomarry, to have children—[which] is exactly
what Islam is fighting against’ (in Lester Feder, 2016),
and speaking at the ‘Wake Up’ LGBT Republican National
Convention event in 2016, alongside Milo Yiannopolous.
The Scandinavian PRR have been less enthusiastic about
LGTBQ rights: the DF are opposed to same-sex mar-
riage; the SD does not oppose it, but also does not re-
ally support it with any vigour in its manifesto or pub-
lic pronouncements; while the FrP only shifted its sup-
port behind same-sex marriage (and adoption by same-
sex couples) in 2013. Nonetheless, these parties do ar-
gue against discrimination against LGBTQ people in their
policy platforms, with the SD supporting legal prosecu-
tion against those who discriminate against people due
to sexual orientation, and the DF explicitly targeting Is-
lam as an enemy of the LGBTQ community, claiming that
‘in recent decades, homosexuals have come under pres-
sure from intolerant Islamic groups’ and arguing that the
party will ‘work determinedly against oppression and dis-
crimination against homosexuals’, encouraging the po-
lice to ‘take targeted action against specific groups that
may exhibit despicable intolerance against homosexuals’
(Dansk Folkeparti, 2009).
These parties have also positioned themselves as de-
fenders of gender equality, although this tends to be a
matter of discourse rather than policy. The Scandinavian
PRR parties tend to treat gender equality as an estab-
lished ‘fact’ in their countries, rather than a goal that still
needs dedicated work to be achieved. This framing of
gender equality allows these parties to appear to support
gender equality and simultaneously criticise measures
aimed at achieving further gender equality. In the first
regard, ‘conceiving equality as a matter of national pride,
something already or nearly achieved, enables belittling
gender discrimination and concealing power structures
that cause gender inequality because they cannot pos-
sibly exist in a country that ‘has gender equality’’ (Ylä-
Anttila & Luhtakallio, 2017, p. 44). This argument is par-
ticularly helped in the cases of the DF and FrP, where
the PRR parties have been or are led by women, Pia
Kjærsgaard and Siv Jensen. In the latter regard, it follows
that if gender equality has ‘been achieved’, then any fur-
ther work towards gender equality is akin to social engi-
neering by ‘the elite’ or ‘forcing’ men and women to be
the same, which is a form of discrimination in several of
these parties’ eyes. This manoeuvre is evident in the po-
sition of the DF, which states that it is ‘committed to full
and unreserved gender equality’, but notes that ‘equal-
ity should not be confused with positive discrimination’
(Dansk Folkeparti, 2009), as well as the position of the SD,
who see gender policies as highlighting difference rather
than equality (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2017). This ‘equal-
ity but not positive discrimination’ argument works for
both the more socially conservative populist right par-
ties (SD and DF) as well as the more neoliberal populist
right parties (FrP, PVV and LPF), in that the former can
oppose it on grounds of ‘natural’ differences between
the genders in line with their conservative preference for
so-called ‘traditional families’, and the latter can present
equality policies as interfering with individual and mar-
ket choice.
Where these parties truly invoke a strong defence of
gender equality is when it comes to the perceived sexism
andmisogyny of immigrants, who are seen as not sharing
the liberal gender attitudes of native Northern European
citizens. As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2015, p. 29)
argue, in the context of PRR parties, ‘gender issues have
become almost exclusively tied to the overarching issue
of immigration or, better, integration’. For the Northern
European PRR, this takes three tracks. The first is the
need to defend the aforementioned hard-won achieve-
ment of gender equality from the threat of the influx
of immigrants, whose presence will somehow dilute or
threaten the liberal status quo: asWilders puts it, the pro-
cess of Islamisation in the Netherlands ‘flushes decades
of women emancipation through the toilet’ (in Mudde &
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015, p. 29). The second is the need to
protect native-born women from the misogynistic prac-
tices of immigrants: the SD, for example, released a re-
port in 2010 entitled ‘Time to Speak Out About Rape!’, in
which they claimed that Sweden was undergoing a ‘rape
wave’ due to the high levels of immigrants allowed into
the country, and therefore the key way to reduce sexual
assault was to limit immigration (Sverigedemokraterna,
2010). The third is to ban misogynistic cultural practices
from immigrant communities, thus ‘freeing’ immigrant
women from their ‘cultural prisons’: here we can think
of the FrP proposing a ban on the ‘burkini’ and the head-
scarf in schools on the basis that Norwegians should not
‘tolerate that girls of such a young age are systematically
indoctrinated to accept that women are subordinate and
can be suppressed as adults’ (in Akkerman & Hagelund,
2007, p. 209). In all these cases, the allegedly cultural-
relativistic ‘elite’ are seen as abetting the destruction of
gender equality in allowing increasing immigration lev-
els from ‘unliberal’ cultures. As Akkerman notes, these
parties ultimately have a ‘Janus-faced’ approach to gen-
der issues:
principles like gender equality and freedom of choice
are emphasized in the immigration and integration
domain, while almost all the parties are conserva-
tive when they address issues related to the fam-
ily…[this] suggests that their commitment to liberal-
ism is merely instrumental to an anti-Islam agenda.
(Akkerman, 2015, p. 56)
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In short, it seems that these parties are attempting to
‘have their cake and it eat it too’ when it comes to gen-
der, with liberal notions of freedom of expression and
tolerance being invoked only when convenient.
The second liberal theme utilised by the Northern Eu-
ropean PRR revolves around individual freedom and lib-
erty. The Dutch PRR’s liberalness in this regard has been
particularly pronounced, with the LPF having promoted
policies such as allowing euthanasia and supporting the
legalisation of drugs and prostitution, and the PVV also
having ‘relatively libertarian views on a number of eth-
ical issues’, including ‘the right to abortion, embryo se-
lection and euthanasia’ (Vossen, 2016, p. 55).4 Cultural
attitudes towards drugs and prostitution are stricter in
Scandinavia than the Netherlands, and this is reflected
in the fact that the Scandinavian PRR parties tend to
have a more conservative approach to these issues. In-
deed, the SD and DF have adopted a hard-line stance
on drug policy, whereas there has been some debate
in the FrP about drug legalisation, and there is support
in the party for a more medicalised approach to drug
treatment rather than criminalisation (Fremskrittspar-
tiet, 2016). The same goes for euthanasia—while the FrP
is in favour of legalised euthanasia (Fremskrittspartiet,
2015a), the DF opposes it but supports more ‘end of
life’ solutions (Dansk Folkeparti, n.d.), while the SD has
tended to avoid the issue. When it comes to prostitution,
the SD and DP subscribe to the ‘Nordic model’ of crimi-
nalising the buying of sex, rather than the selling of it by
prostitutes, whereas the FrP is against the model, argu-
ing that it has made things more dangerous for sex work-
ers (Tjernshaugen, 2017).
The third liberal theme invoked by the Northern Eu-
ropean PRR is secularism, which at first glance may look
peculiar, particularly in the Scandinavian context given
the very high percentages of national church member-
ship. However, as Brubaker points out, this is a selec-
tive secularism:
today, secularist rhetoric in Northern andWestern Eu-
rope is directed against Muslim immigrants and their
descendants, whose religiosity is seen as threaten-
ing despite the fact that Islam has little institutional
power, political influence, or cultural authority in the
wider society. (2017, p. 1201)
Whilst membership in the national Christian churches is
seen as benign and borderline as a cultural membership
rather than a strict religious affiliation (van den Breemer,
Casanova, & Wyller, 2014), being a Muslim is seen as
a dangerous all-encompassing identity at odds with the
otherwise ‘secular’ society. These parties are thus advo-
cates of what Brubaker (2016) has called ‘Christian secu-
larism’, whereby Christianity—if not the church, then the
broader Christian tradition—‘is redefined as the matrix
of liberalism, secularity, gender equality, and gay rights’.
PRR parties’ conjoined defence of both secularism and
‘Judeo–Christian culture’ in this regard allows them to
specifically target Islam as their enemy. For example, the
DF argues that the ‘State and Church should not be sep-
arated. The Danish national church is part of Danish his-
tory and culture’ (in Restrup & Bech-Jessen, 2015), and
defends the ‘Judeo–Christian culture [that has] managed
to create the freedom and tolerance that is the founda-
tion for democracy’ against ‘fundamentalist religions—
especially Islam’ (Dansk Folkeparti, 2009). A similar po-
sition is put forth by the SD, who claim to promote reli-
gious freedom, but defend the Swedish Church and ex-
plicitly attack Islam as ‘difficult to harmoniously coex-
ist with Swedish and Western culture’ (Sverigedemokra-
terna, 2011, p. 27). While the FrP was very critical of the
Norwegian Church in the 1970s and 1980s, it has since
changed its tune to one similar to the DF and SD, arguing
that ‘Christian culture and ethics [are the] fundamental
values of the Norwegian society’ (Harry, 2014, p. 165).
Although church membership is far lower in the Nether-
lands, the PVV nonetheless takes a similar tack, defend-
ing Judeo–Christian values against the ‘totalitarianism’ of
Islam, which is seen not a religion but allegedly a ‘totali-
tarian ideology’—and even Pim Fortuyn, whose sexuality
would seemingly put him at odds with the conservative
sexual mores of the Christian Church, defended ‘Judeo–
Christian humanism’ against Islam (Kluveld, 2016).
The fourth liberal theme invoked by Northern Euro-
pean PRR parties is freedom of speech and expression.
While ‘the elite’ and those on the left are portrayed as
being in favour of political correctness and as wanting to
police speech, those on the PRR portray themselves as
the final defenders of free speech and artistic expression
in a world gone mad. In some cases, the PRR has indeed
experienced the reality of restrictions on free speech,
with several of the parties having hate speech charges
filed against them, but only the PVV being successfully
found guilty of such charges. In 2016, Wilders was found
guilty of inciting racial discrimination for calling for ‘fewer
Moroccans’ in the Netherlands, and he portrayed this
court battle as ‘the trial against the freedom of speech’,
framing it in populist terms by stating it was ‘against
a politician who says what the politically correct elite
does notwant to hear’ (Wilders, 2016). Such hate speech
laws, according to Wilders, made the Netherlands ‘a dic-
tatorship’, and like his forbearer, Fortuyn, he called for
the laws to be abolished (van Noorloos, 2014, p. 252).
The Scandinavian PRR parties have also portrayed them-
selves as victims of overzealous speech-policing and as
defenders of free speech. The FrP claims that freedom
of speech is ‘amongst the most fundamental freedoms’
(Fremskrittspartiet, n.d.) that human beings have, and
Siv Jensen has argued that ‘freedom of expression is
absolute’ (in Fremskrittspartiet, 2015b). The DF, mean-
while, has argued that ‘freedom of expression should
be as broad as possible’ (in Restrup, 2015). Indeed, the
path of free speech in the Netherlands is held up as a
warning by some Scandinavian populists: following the
4 The PVV’s position on drugs has oscillated between being against legalisation and avoiding the issue altogether (Vossen, 2016, p. 49).
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Muhammed cartoon controversy of 2005, then-leader of
the DF, Pia Kjærsgaard, brought up the murder of Theo
van Gogh and the dangers faced by Ayaan Hirsi Ali and
Geert Wilders as examples what happens when a coun-
try ‘compromises on freedom’ (Kjærsgaard, 2005). Per-
haps unsurprisingly, despite their claims of being defend-
ers of free speech, their passion for free speech depends
on who is doing the speaking—Geert Wilders has repeat-
edly called for the Koran to be banned, while the DF re-
cently clarified that they are ‘not freedom fundamental-
ists’ (in Ritzau, 2015) and wish to sanction the praising or
condoning of terrorism.
Drawing the brief examination of these parties’ os-
tensibly liberal sociocultural policies together, it be-
comes clear that their usage of liberalism is far from
consistent. Rather than unequivocally defending liberal
values, these parties tend to selectively pick-and-choose
the most appropriate and useful parts of liberalism and
refashion them for their own illiberal means. This is par-
ticularly clear when it comes to their defence of gender
equality and LGBTQ rights, which only seems to serve to
demonise Islam, and their defence of free speech, which
is targeted towards ‘the elite’. Apart from the case of the
LPF (and to a lesser extent, the PVV), the lukewarm ap-
proach to individual freedoms and the convenient usage
of ‘Christian secularism’ indicate that these parties’ com-
mitment to several core components of liberalism identi-
fied by Freeden (2015)—particularly those of liberty, ra-
tionality and progress—is weak. As such, it is worth ask-
ing where indeed they fit in the wider ideological span
of liberalism—if at all. Halikiopoulou et al. (2013, p. 112)
argue that these parties’ liberalism is not of a Millean va-
riety, but rather should be located within the lineage of
Lockean liberalism, in that their tolerance only runs so far
as to accommodate those who also tolerate others. Tri-
adafilopoulos (2011, p. 863) goes one step further and
calls their brand of liberalism ‘Schmittian liberalism’, in
that they aim ‘to clarify the core values of liberal societies
and use coercive state power to protect them from illib-
eral and putatively dangerous groups’. Yet these actors’
selective use of liberalism to serve illiberal ends should
not force us to call them liberals—the term ‘liberal illib-
eralism’ is more useful in this regard in that illiberalism
remains the subject of the paradoxical phrase, demon-
strating that exclusion is ultimately the primary logic at
play in these PRR parties’ ideology and discourse (Mudde
& Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013).
4. The Purpose and Repercussions of Liberal
Illiberalism
Having examined the selective use of liberalism by North-
ern European PRR parties—what I have labelled here
as ‘liberal illiberalism’—we can now turn to the impor-
tant questions of why they choose to articulate a ver-
sion of illiberal liberalism, and the potential repercus-
sions of doing so. First: why utilise liberal illiberalism?
One reason is the fact that cultural, linguistic and ideolog-
ical contexts that these parties are operating within are
not vacuums—the countries of Northern Europe are cel-
ebrated for their pluralism, liberal social values and pro-
gressiveness (see, for example, Ervasti, Fridberg, Hjerm,
& Ringdal, 2008; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Weldon,
2006), and thus it is unsurprising that these parties will
pull from the resources that are familiar and available
to them in this context. As Halikiopoulou et al. argue,
these parties are operating within a ‘civic zeitgeist’ char-
acterised by a ‘current towards tolerance, diversity and
rights’ (2013, p. 109), and ‘voters are more likely to sup-
port a radical right party if they perceive it as ‘normal’ or
‘legitimate’, which at least in part means democratic, ef-
fective and in line with baseline national values’ (2013,
p. 111). Even if their values are not particularly ‘in line’
with these baseline national values, it is strategically wise
to at least keep up appearances and couch them in such
a manner. This also ties in with PRR parties’ increasing
attempts to become more ‘acceptable’ and move closer
to the mainstream: the biological racism of older itera-
tions of such parties is no longer electorally successful
nor even ‘acceptable’ on the fringes of mainstream party
politics in Northern Europe, and as a result, these parties
have also had to streamline their message, learn to sell
it in a more sophisticated way, and adopt both language
and positions that bring them closer to electoral success
(see Akkerman, de Lange, & Rooduijn, 2016b).
A second reason for utilising liberal illiberalism is that
it presents Northern European PRR parties with an al-
legedly ‘honourable’ and ‘rational’ way to frame their
Islamophobia. As noted, the appeal to ‘Enlightenment
values’ and the cribbing of the discourse of liberalism
is far more appealing to audiences in these contexts
than outright xenophobia. This shift—from an ethno-
cratic nationalism which centres on a particular ethnic
group to a civic nationalismwhich centres on with those
with ‘shared values’ (Akkerman, 2005)—has been partic-
ularly evident in the Northern European PRR’s embrace
of philosemitism (Brubaker, 2017, p. 1202). A sharp con-
trast to the antisemitism of their forbearers, these par-
ties now see Jews as part of the ‘enlightened West-
ern’ civilisation that must be defended against Islam: in-
deed, Wilders has gone so far as to portray Jerusalem
as the ‘frontier’ for the West against Islam, arguing that
‘if Jerusalem falls into the hands of the Muslims, Athens
and Rome will be next’ (2010). The argument promoted
here is that ‘Western culture is essentially liberal, and lib-
eral values can only be defended against Islam by way of
a cultural war. As Islam is essentially an anti-liberal reli-
gion, in this view, it should be rejectedwholesale’ (Akker-
man, 2005, p. 348). This draws a clear line between
those in favour of liberal values and those opposed to
them—Muslims and ‘the elite’, the latter whom are not
only abetting but are often seen as being in favour of the
Islamisation of Europe: as Wilders argued in 2017, ‘al-
most all politicians of the established parties are promot-
ing Islamization’ and that ‘the establishment, the elite
such as universities, churches, unions, the media, politi-
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cians put our enforced freedoms at stake’ (in PVV Fractie
Noord-Brabant, 2017).
There are important repercussions for this refashion-
ing of illiberal policies in a liberal package. One is that it
contributes to the debasement and ‘emptying’ of liberal
tropes and arguments, which in turn makes it harder for
those who more clearly subscribe to liberal ideology to
defend their position, as it can gradually lose its credi-
bility. In his work on comparative uses of liberalism in
Europe, Freeden (2008, p. 26) shows that ‘the cachet of
liberalism in its thin sense as an ideology concerning lib-
erty hasmade it superficially attractive to thosewho free-
ride on its reputation. Although a thin liberalism is still
an adapted one, misappropriations go beyond that’. The
issue is that this ‘misappropriation’ still affects the repu-
tation and perceived ‘content’ of liberalism, and in doing
so can make it seem ‘thinner’ by the day. As ‘there can
be substantial morphological overlap between the con-
cepts and vocabulary of populism and liberalism’ (Free-
den, 2008, p. 26), PRR parties are in a particularly strong
position to ‘thin out’ liberalism in this regard—a develop-
ment that should concern those who identify as liberals.
The other related core repercussion of liberal il-
liberalism is the above-noted ‘mainstreaming’ of the
PRR in Northern Europe. While this article has already
noted how the PRR’s selective use of liberalism has
brought them closer—at least in rhetoric—to their main-
stream brethren, there is a perhaps another trend at
play here coming from the opposite direction: the fact
that the mainstream is also looking more like the pop-
ulist right. There is a reason that it has become easier for
PRR parties to cherry-pick liberal discourse and policies
from theirmainstream competitors: becausemanymain-
stream parties themselves have reconfigured liberal val-
ues and discourse in similar ways in Western and North-
ern Europe (see Bale, 2003; Mudde, 2013; Muis & Im-
merzeel, 2017; van Spanje, 2010). To only draw on a
few examples—when mainstream parties in France pass
a ban on religious attire; when mandatory integration
classes are introduced in a number of ‘progressive’ coun-
tries; when Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte tells immi-
grants to ‘integrate or leave’; and when putative liberal
and Christian democrats are happy to keep avowed ad-
vocates of illiberalism like Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz in their
European People’s Party group in the EU Parliament—
one should perhaps see PRR parties’ adoption of liberal-
ism not as an exception, but as a clear repercussion of
the increasing bankruptcy of the way that many main-
stream actors use liberalism themselves. Indeed, while
Northern European PRR parties may articulate a liberal il-
liberalism, Adamson, Triadafilopoulos and Zolberg (2011)
have argued that a number of ‘non-populist’ European
governments are increasingly putting forward an ‘illib-
eral liberalism’.While it is important to acknowledge that
the order of the modifier and the subject matters greatly
here—as noted earlier, liberal illiberalism indicates that
illiberalism still reigns supreme in this conjunction, while
illiberal liberalism indicates the opposite—the linewhere
one crosses over into the other is becoming less and
less clear.
5. Conclusion: Can Right-Wing Populism Be Liberal?
Having examined cases of PRR parties in Northern Eu-
rope that are characterised by a paradoxical liberal illib-
eralism, we can now return to interrogate the taken-for-
granted assumption in the literature: is populism really
the opposite of liberalism? The answer: perhaps in the-
ory, but not necessarily in practice. These ‘mixed bag’
cases display elements of liberalism as well as illiberal-
ism, and we cannot conveniently ignore the fact that
these parties employ some version of liberal discourse,
if not advocate liberal policies—whether this is disingen-
uous or not.
However, at the same time we cannot seriously call
these parties ‘liberal’, or even ‘liberal populists’. As long
as their core ideology is a form of nativism or civic
nationalism that seeks to exclude rather than include,
then these parties’ illiberalism still remains their core
ideological compass. As Müller notes, in these kinds of
cases, ‘liberal values essentially become nationalist val-
ues: they serve only to exclude. Liberal, ostensibly uni-
versalist rhetoric serves to extract the people from the
people and, de facto, create a kind of self-labelling lib-
eral aristocracy among the people’ (Müller, 2014, p. 489).
While left-wing forms of populism can make a more se-
rious case for incorporating elements of liberalism given
that their conception of ‘the people’ tends to be inclusive
rather than exclusive, the ultimate divide between ‘the
people’ and ‘the elite’ must eventually come into conflict
with the liberal acknowledgement of multiple cleavages
in society.
There are three important lessons here for reflect-
ing on the relationship between liberalism and populism.
The first is that it is somewhat misguided to portray
populism as the direct opposite of liberalism—populists
openly borrow, ape and utilise the language if not the
policies of liberalism, and it is increasingly the case that
it goes the other way as well, where putative liberals
do the same with populism. If they are truly ‘opposites’,
then it would follow that this would be either impossible
or extremely difficult to do, but this is obviously not the
case. The related second point is that ‘ideological purists’
are rare and often relegated to the electoral sidelines,
and as such, it is unsurprising that PRR parties are able
to mix their ideology, policy positions and discourse in
a way that confounds our neat theoretical categories—
in this regard, some populists are more liberal than oth-
ers. Third, the evidence of how these parties reconfigure,
adopt and utilise seemingly paradoxical ideological and
discursive positions lends credence to the position that
populism is less a world-view or ideology (even a thin
one, as in the work of Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017),
and more a discourse (Stavrakakis, Katsambekis, Nikisia-
nis, Kioupkiolis, & Siomos, 2017) or style (Moffitt, 2016):
as Brubaker (2017, p. 1210) notes, such ‘contradictions
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are not surprising: bound by no stable substantive ide-
ological or programmatic commitments, populism is dis-
tinctively and chronically eclectic, given to instrumental-
izing whatever issues seem exploitable at the moment’.
Today, those issues are most effectively exploited by
wrapping them in a liberal package. Ultimately, Northern
European PRR parties’ liberalism should not be taken at
face value, but rather understood as liberal illiberalism—
an illiberalism that selectively utilises liberal tropes, dis-
course and ideology to put a more ‘acceptable’ face on
otherwise illiberal politics.
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1. Introduction: Reframing Populist Politics within
Liberal Democracies
Populist actors have unsettled and begun reshaping Eu-
ropean party systems and democracy. In recent election
cycles, populist political parties like Fidesz—Hungarian
Civic Alliance (since 2010) and the PiS (Law and Jus-
tice) in Poland consolidated or gained government posi-
tions in Eastern Europe. Following West European elec-
tions in 2017, the French Front National, the Dutch Par-
tij Voor de Vrijheit (PVV) and the German Alternative
für Deutschland (AfD)—the latter entering parliament
for the first time and immediately becoming the third
largest party—are now main opposition parties, chal-
lengingmainstream competitors but also the very frame-
work of existing constitutional liberal democracies.
In response to their electoral performances and suc-
cesses, illiberal populist actors are the subject of schol-
arly interest that is growing on an almost exponential
scale. Yet, because such efforts are often confined to
examining agents, political opportunity structures, voter
preferences, and party system change, even innovative
research exploring causal mechanisms may miss the
scope and depth of cultural undercurrents driving pop-
ulist success. This article suggests that the puzzling cross-
national ascendancy of populist actors should be ex-
plored in the context of profound politico-cultural trans-
formations and conflicts within liberal democracies. Op-
posing established parties in both their formand content,
populist actors understand themselves as movement-
parties that primarily express—and often successfully ap-
peal to—cultural discontent and identity concerns rather
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than proposing specific political or economic goals. Re-
search thus needs to respond to this self-understanding
reflected in parties and their voters (Taub, 2017), and
theorize the broader underlying cultural conditions, con-
flicts, and dynamics at play in populist mobilizations.
The article argues for a “cultural turn” in the study of
contemporary populist politics. In so doing, it advances
a novel, expanded theoretical framework. It is based on
three interlinked components and claims that integrate
and build upon initial findings from three disciplinary
perspectives hitherto underrepresented in research on
populist politics in Europe: political sociology, political
psychology, and media studies. Such an expanded view
points to an interrelated set of theoretical arguments
on broader cultural—specifically socio-cultural, politico-
psychological, and communicative—conditions and dy-
namics we deem crucial for explaining the current suc-
cess of populist actors. The goal of this article is to
bring these perspectives into substantive conversation,
and to initiate a multi-disciplinary theoretical reframing
for the study of contemporary populism that expands
political science research by integrating insights from
the respective fields. Such a multi-disciplinary, theory-
guided perspective on populist politics in the context of
politico-cultural and societal undercurrents takes inspi-
ration from Frankfurt School critical theory, and espe-
cially their studies on authoritarianism, identity, and the
communication of prejudice. Their theoretical models fo-
cus on illuminating the societal reproduction of persis-
tent streaks of authoritarianism within the political cul-
tures of politicalmodernitywhich aremobilized time and
again and recurringly challenge the boundaries of mod-
ern constitutional democracies (Rensmann, 2017).1
Substantively, this article thereby aims to concep-
tualize the populist phenomenon as an authoritarian-
nativist cultural counter-revolution, as well as to theo-
rize both transformed and persistent politico-cultural ori-
gins of the recent electoral boost of populist parties. The
theoretical argument is three-fold: first, it is suggested
that populists can benefit from and mobilize a no longer
“silent” counter-revolution (Ignazi, 1992, 2003). The pop-
ulists’ appeal is primarily cultural: it thrives on a long
lingering, increasingly polarized “great divide”, or clash
within civilizations, based on social value and cultural
identity conflicts in post-industrial European societies.
This divide is arguably more profound than political so-
ciologists assume, who rightly diagnose a socio-cultural
backlash (Alexander & Welzel, 2017; Inglehart & Nor-
ris, 2016).
Second, the cultural counter-revolution is theorized
by employing new and classical authoritarianism theory,
especially political-psychological models of authoritarian
rebellion (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & San-
ford, 1950). The “noisy” counter-revolution is conceived
as a transgressive, authoritarian revolt directed against
liberal-cosmopolitan socio-cultural transformations and
culturally inclusive identities in globalized immigration
societies—and against immigrants and “the elite” iden-
tified with those changes.
Third, theorizing initial findings from media studies,
it is argued that the new social media culture and its dis-
intermediated political communication patterns have
helped erode boundaries of civil and factual discourse in
political culture, propelling populist actors, their claims,
and their authoritarian politics of transgression against
norms of liberal democracy.
After reconceptualizing the ideological core of Eu-
ropean populist movement-parties, each of the three
proposed arguments about cultural conditions for the
electoral success of populist politics is subsequently un-
packed and molded into substantiated, interrelated the-
oretical claims. In so doing, the article points to an inte-
grated new framework preparing a cultural turn in the
study of populism in Europe. Rather then isolating or op-
erationalizing specific hypotheses and testing them, ini-
tial research from three bodies of disciplinary literature
is critically synthesized to advance a novel cultural per-
spective and lay out potential lines for future inquiry.
2. Parties and Movements: Reconceptualizing Populist
Actors and their Cultural Appeal
Research has demonstrated that “populism” is well
suited to understanding key features of the most sig-
nificant movement-parties challenging European party
systems today (Mudde, 2005, 2007; Müller, 2016; Rens-
mann, 2006). Yet, conceptualizations of electorally rel-
evant European populist parties need to pay more at-
tention to the cultural core of their ideological appeal:
First and foremost, European populist parties—left and
right—express and articulate cultural discontent and par-
ticular(istic) notions of cultural identity, a widely shared
feeling of unease with globalized immigration societies
and their elites, rather than specific political goals or a
coherent ideology. These parties, it is argued here, ide-
ologically point to a cultural counter-revolution (Ignazi,
2003) against established politics and society as much as
a political one. A re-conceptualization of their ideologi-
cal core should build on previous ideational definitions,
but needs to further elaborate their cultural appeal, com-
monly categorized as authoritarian and nativist.
Following Cas Mudde (2005, 2007), populism func-
tions as a “thin-centered ideology” that almost always
appears attached to other ideological traits. Populism is
marked by constructing stark group dichotomies: It con-
siders society as separated into two antagonistic camps,
“the (pure) people” versus “the (corrupt) elite”, while the
latter allegedly victimizes the former (Mudde & Rovira
Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 6). Often employing a specific “im-
age of the vox populi” as a particular, sharply demar-
1 The proposed new framework advancing a ‘cultural turn’ in populism studies also builds on my previous research into the emergence and political
potential of the socio-cultural divide currently reshaping party politics in liberal democracies. Populist politics often failed only because of leadership
failures and organizational factors, not because of a lack of politico-cultural potential (Rensmann, 2006, 2011, 2012).
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cated, homogenous identity, populists argue that democ-
racy should be a direct expression of a presumed “gen-
eral will” (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 20). Thus
populism implies a distinct ideological contrast to plural-
ism; and, we would add, to liberal constitutionalismwith
its universalistic underpinnings, focus on separation of
powers, and individual civil rights.
While this ideological profile can apply to a variety of
political actors, movements or parties, it is not grasped
in formal conceptualizations of populism as a specific
type of mobilization, leadership style, or discursive strat-
egy (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 19). The con-
structed vertical dichotomy between “the corrupt elite”
and “the pure people”, which can be seen as populism’s
core feature, may also appear inmainstream politics. For
actors and parties which can be classified as populist,
this binary anti-elitism, or anti-pluralist dichotomy, is a
constitutive part of their ideology. Yet the implicitly anti-
universalistic, anti-pluralistic notion of “the good people”
as an homogenous identity also automatically carries cul-
tural weight that is overlooked byMudde and Rovira Kalt-
wasser: it presupposes the defense of cultural identity,
and appeals to cultural discontent with perceived liberal
rule. This includes “left” populist movement-parties like
La France Insoumise led by former socialist Jean-Luc Mé-
lenchon,who opposes refugees and reiteratedMarine Le
Pen’s claim that the French nation shares no responsibil-
ity for the Vichy regime’s crimes (Haaretz, 2017).2
Linked to this not quite as “thin” but implicitly
culturally charged ideological center, most European
populist parties also employ a second, horizontal di-
chotomy that is heavily culturally biased—an antago-
nism of “us” versus “the others”, the “nation” against mi-
norities, (im)migrants, refugees,Muslims, Jews, and “for-
eign powers” (Greven, 2016; Rensmann, 2006). Distinc-
tively nativist (Mudde, 2007), they employ a specific, ex-
clusionary conception of the people as a culturally or eth-
nically homogenous nation that is contrasted to antago-
nistic, demonized outgroups (Greven, 2016, p. 5). Who-
ever is construed as not “truly” belonging to “the peo-
ple” is blamed for its problems, if not viewed as an “en-
emy of the people”. While often migrants are targeted,
those constructed as “others” can vary. All populist ac-
tors have attacked the “globalist elite” and supported
some level of national economic protectionism, tradi-
tionally associated with “the left” (Kriesi, 2014; Rens-
mann, 2011). Our reconceptualization of populist par-
ties takes into account that this overtly cultural, hori-
zontal dichotomy between “the good people” and non-
native outgroups representing globalization is not lim-
ited to right-wing populists. Neither are conspiratorial
views of globalization as a zero-sum game favoring “the
global elite” and rendering “the people” as losers. In fact,
distinctions between left and right populism based on
the criterion nativism vs. cosmopolitanism are compli-
cated and difficult to empirically substantiate, at least
in the European context. Several left-wing populists in
Europe, from the German Left Party to La France In-
soumise, share nativist, anti-cosmopolitan sentiments,
advocate national protectionism, and target presumably
all-powerful external global forces for victimizing “the
nation” (Hartleb, 2017).3
Further complicating traditional left/right divides,
authoritarian features constitute a third ideological trait
displayed among most populist actors today (Mudde,
2007). Negative political communication (Greven, 2016,
p. 1) and apocalyptic crisis discourses, characteristic for
populists from the Movimento Cinque Stelle to the AfD
(Decker, 2016), are linked to calls for authoritarian so-
lutions. Authoritarianism as an ideological feature—in
contrast to political-psychological explanatory models,
to which we turn later—is hereby understood as sup-
port for illiberal, top-downdecision-making allowing for
measures such as suspending the rule of law or con-
stitutional rights, democratic deliberation, liberal pro-
cedural norms, and institutionalized separation of pow-
ers. The common support for authoritarianism has an
affinity to the populists’ anti-pluralistic, homogenized,
culturally biased concept of “the people”, as they claim
to represent “the people themselves”, understood as
a symbolic, fictional body constituted “outside existing
democratic procedures” (Müller, 2016, p. 27). To be
sure, seeking to mobilize bottom-up “movements” and
“culture” against an allegedly “broken” liberal govern-
ment rather than aiming to govern lawful institutions,
European populists thereby do not fashion themselves
as regular electoral competitors, but as agents of “true”
or “illiberal democracy” (Viktor Orbán). This may en-
tail granting unrestricted authority to a leader articu-
lating unfiltered sentiments of an imagined vox populi,
by virtue of a certain culture or group membership, or
the ratification of illiberal political measures by refer-
enda that suggest direct democratic mandates (Müller,
2016, p. 29).
Integrating Mudde’s ideational definition as a thin-
centered ideology based on an “elite–people” di-
chotomy, the proposed re-conceptualization of contem-
porary European populist actors, parties, and move-
ments views cultural underpinnings as crucial to under-
stand populist ideology and appeal: cultural bias, iden-
tity, and sentiments are a constitutive ideological un-
dercurrent.4 It largely suspends left–right distinctions—
despite their ongoing relevance in self-understandings
of different political milieus, and notwithstanding some
2 The case of Mélenchon shows that both anti-immigrant rhetoric and the revisionist downplaying of a national past tainted by Nazi crimes and col-
laborations (in order to absolve “the people” from criminal responsibility and to advance national myth-making) are not exclusive features of the
radical right.
3 Only Greek Syriza and the Spanish Podemos decidedly support immigration, and only the latter opposes Euro-scepticism, which cuts across left–right
divides (Teperoglou & Tsatsanis, 2011).
4 Hans-Georg Betz observed an “identitarian turn” and respective programmatic convergences of populist parties in the 1990s, if programmatic contrasts
among them were ever that stark as some early country-specific studies of opportunity sturctures had suggested (Betz, 2004; Bornschier, 2010b, p. 3).
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policy differences.5 Despite their cross-national distinc-
tions, however, all “right-wing” and most “left-wing”
populist actors share key common ideological denom-
inators shaped by authoritarianism, anti-liberal, anti-
pluralistic vertical and horizontal dichotomies, which im-
plicitly or explicitly endorse cultural exclusivity, identity,
and denigration of “others”. Conceptualizing European
populist parties this way, they can be understood as po-
litical articulations and mobilizations of an illiberal, cul-
turally charged authoritarian-nativist counter-revolution
against liberal democracy, inclusive cultural diversity,
and cosmopolitan social value change.6
3. A Silent Counter-Revolution Turned Noisy: Populist
Contestations of Cosmopolitan Value Change as
Expressions of a Socio-Cultural Divide
To better explain the origins and appeal of this politico-
cultural counter-revolution ideologically mobilized by
populist parties, it should be framed in the context of a
socio-cultural “great divide” restructuring political com-
petition in European democracies. The populist resur-
gence, it is argued here, points to deep-seated and now
salient cultural conflicts on collective identity and societal
values within society that have previously been underes-
timated in empirical research and theoretical models.
Structural/institutional approaches examining elec-
toral market competition and the erosion of “frozen”
party systems help address improved political opportu-
nity structures for newcomers in light of shrinking sup-
port for catch-all parties, especially on the center-left. Yet
they largely fail to grasp the specific causes that benefit
populist parties especially, as they pay too little attention
to ideological content. Why don’t they favor green, anti-
authoritarian, or new socialist parties (Kriesi, 2014; Muis
& Immerzeel, 2017)? Agency-centered supply-side ap-
proaches, which focus on party organization, agent strat-
egy, and platformmodernizations—or the lack thereof—
are good at explaining cross-national variation and
volatility (Art, 2011;Mudde, 2007; Rensmann, 2012), yet
add little to explain the largely synchronous success of
“fourth wave” populism (Mudde, 2013).
Demographic demand-side explanations face limita-
tions because support for populist actors tends to cut
across various groups, although there are some rele-
vant correlations. Male support for authoritarian pop-
ulist parties is generally stronger—according to research
by Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, the AfD received 16% of
the male but only 9% of the female vote (2017 over-
all: 12.6%). While there is little variation between young
and old voters, the AfD (and other populist parties) is do-
ing slightly better amongmiddle aged groups (Naumann,
2017).7 The most reliable demographic predictor is edu-
cation. Populist parties tend to do better among voters
with low levels of education. A striking example is the
French Front National, supported by up to 50% of likely
voters without high school degree, in contrast to 16%
with academic degree (Les Echos, 2015).
Explanations that focus on economic factors (relative
social deprivation, unemployment, and economic crisis,
etc.) largely fall short of yielding robust findings with-
out accounting for a variety of contextual and other fac-
tors (Arzheimer, 2009). Guiso, Herrera andMorelli (2017)
suggest economic security directly affects intentions to
vote for populist parties, though this is mitigated by eco-
nomic shocks, which tend to discourage actual voter
turn-out. KoenDamhuis’s study of PVV voters (2017) con-
firms that they include a broad spectrum of social strata.
Hence, the AfD is almost equally supported by all social
strata—with the exception, however, of blue-collar work-
ers, 19%ofwhomvoted for the populist party (compared
to 12.6% overall).8 Mirroring the results of the Frank-
furt School’s research on likely fascist voters in the 1920s,
some (though not all) studies also show that populist sup-
port tends to be disproportionately high among small
business owners and blue-collar workers, or economic
“globalization losers” (Kriesi et al., 2006). Be that as it
may, there are few indicators that such relative working
class support is based on economic issues—even though
neo-liberal austerity policies affect workers.
Rather, evidence from AfD voters indicates that cul-
tural issues—the protection of national cultural identity,
allegedly threatened by (Muslim) immigrants and the in-
flux of refugees, opposition to “cosmopolitan” elite cul-
ture, and the rejection of progressive social value change
—are salient among all AfD supporters (Taub, 2017). Only
14%of AfD voters prefer Germany to be an open-minded,
cosmopolitan country, in contrast to the majority among
voters of other parties (Naumann, 2017).9 Anti-cosmo-
połitan, authoritarian-nativist cultural attitudes are by
5 While radical right and left are still relevant analytical categories, the new patterns point to constitutive similarities among populist parties, rendering
these distinctions less relevant in view of ideological features, platforms, and voters.Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser’s distinctions between “exclusionary”
versus “inclusionary” populism (2013) may be more useful, though most populist parties in Europe are not inclusionary. When analyzing particularism–
universalism, nationalism–cosmopolitanism, authoritarianism–liberalism divides, most populist parties, “left” and “right”, are today linked to the first
side of these divisions, opposing, in the words of left-wing Brexit supporter Alan Johnson, the “Davos man” and “the globalist elite” (Johnson, 2017).
6 Jeremy Corbyn’s attempt to transform the British Labor Party, traditionally center-left, into a populist movement-party (with the support of “Momen-
tum”, a movement-organization within the party founded in 2015), is a case in point. He does not just consistently employ populist vertical anti-elite di-
chotomies (“themany” versus “the few”) but alsohorizontal dichotomies (e.g. blaming the EU for British neo-liberal policy and supporting anti-immigrant
policy to allegedly protect domestic wages; Chakelian, 2017). He also has a decidedly authoritarian streak, displayed in support for authoritarian regimes
in Venezuela, Iran and Russia and violent groups like Hamas, Hezbollah and the IRA (Hirsh, 2017).
7 An outlier is France: Only 20% of voters over 65, but 44% of 18 to 24-year-olds backed Front National leader Le Pen in the second round of the presiden-
tial election (Kentish, 2017). The data on the AfD are based on a combination of a telephone survey among 1,666 randomly selected eligible voters one
week before the 2017 national parliamentary election, and of a survey of 41,334 voters on the day of the election, both conducted by Forschungsgruppe
Wahlen. The French data are based on a survey among 2,797 eligible voters, conducted by IFOP in March 2015.
8 On the survey data see footnote 7.
9 See footnote 7.
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far the most reliable predictors of populist voting. This
is why political sociology that explores the evolution of
conflicts on cultural values and identities offers the most
promising direction to theorize populist success.
Four decades ago, Ronald Inglehart observed a
“silent revolution” of post-material social value change
as an effect of economic modernization and stability
(Inglehart, 1977). Overall, cultural change has further
progressed towards the increased acceptance of inclu-
sive liberal-cosmopolitan and individual self-expression
values (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), particularly striking
among younger generational cohorts in increasingly cul-
turally diversified, post-industrial democracies (Inglehart
& Norris, 2009). The social value revolution eventually
resonated in platforms and policies of mainstream par-
ties (even if to varying degrees cross-nationally), leading
to a recently accelerated cultural “cosmopolitanization
of European party politics” (Rensmann, 2014).
Yet this cultural change has not been uncontested.
Following the initial rise of “post-material” left and green
parties representing social value change, Piero Ignazi
suggests a wave of radical right success in the 1980s
and 1990s benefited from a “silent counter-revolution”
(1992, 2003), understood as a cultural backlash against
social value change and demographic shifts related to
immigration. Although it often became politically man-
ifest only in short-lived protest votes and fluctuating
performances of radical right populist parties, the so-
cietal undercurrent of the cultural counter-revolution
has lingered on. Rather than disappearing, it has now
fully translated from silent value opposition among rel-
evant segments of voters and non-voters into robust
support of outspoken, politically and electorally relevant
movement-parties.
Indeed, new research indicates that the backlash
stabilized and helped polarize political conflict along an
increasingly salient great cultural dividewithin European
democracies: a divide between liberal-cosmopolitan and
authoritarian-nativist social values, or cosmopolitanism
vs. nationalism, which largely trumps socio-economic
cleavages (Bornschier, 2010a; Inglehart & Norris, 2016;
Kaldor, 1997; Rensmann, 2011).10 Inglehart and Norris
demonstrate that populist support is primarily driven
by once culturally predominant groups’ cultural back-
lash against progressive social value change, or the dis-
placement of traditional cultural norms and privileges
(Inglehart & Norris, 2016, p. 3). The authors use expert
surveys of the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to
identify the ideological location of 268 political parties
in 31 European countries and combine these data with
national-level European party competition and the Euro-
pean Social Survey (2002–2014) to examine the cross-
national evidence at individual level for the impact of
the economic insecurity and cultural values as predic-
tors of voting for populist parties. While the economic
security theory, which views changes in the workforce
in post-industrial economies responsible for populist par-
ties’ rise, gets inconsistent support, they find consistent
evidence for the cultural backlash theory. Rising levels of
economic insecurity may have their share. Yet, populist
parties’ rise above all reflect “a reaction against a wide
range of rapid cultural changes that seem to be eroding
the basic values and customs of Western societies” (In-
glehart & Norris, 2016, p. 30).
While offering an important empirical account of
the cultural backlash, the authors fall short of further
theorizing its causes beyond suggesting that rapid cul-
tural change “catalyzed culture wars” (Inglehart & Norris,
2016). Within the context of modernization theory, the
backlash may then appear as a transitory phenomenon,
a temporary “bump in the road” of socio-cultural mod-
ernization expressed by what Inglehart and Norris see to
be an ethnocentric, partly agingwhite culturalminority—
rather than conceiving the backlash in the context of
reproduction of stable, resilient authoritarian legacies
and cultural undercurrents within liberal democracies.
A critical cultural theorizing of their empirical findings
would also have to thoroughly reflect on underlying
socio-economic origins facilitating wishes for cultural clo-
sure and exclusive identity—such as a structural crisis
of global capitalist economic modernization that may
undermine further socio-cultural modernization and de-
mocratization.11 Finally, the authors say little about the
depth of the divide fueling cultural value and identity
conflicts, and authoritarian populist challenges to liberal
democracy, which seems to currently have lost some of
its cultural appeal.12
Indeed, the forceful, noisy cultural counter-revolu-
tion seems to correlate with eroding trust in democratic
institutions and laws, and declining support for liberal
democracy. Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk view
an increasingly large pool for authoritarian populists as
a sign of “democratic deconsolidation” (Foa & Mounk,
2016).13 They suggest, contrary to Inglehart and Norris,
that such disaffection with liberal democracy (and its
culture) especially affects the youngest generational co-
horts. While, for instance, 55% of Dutch citizens born be-
fore WWII accredited maximum importance to living in
a democracy, only one in three millennials do so (Foa &
Mounk, 2016, pp. 7f.).
10 Simon Bornschier (2010a, p. 421) conceptualizes this new divide in terms of a salient conflict between libertarian-universalistic and traditional-
communitarian values.
11 To be sure, the authors call for additional robustness tests (Inglehart & Norris, 2016, p. 30). And they concede that the cultural backlash may also be
stimulated by heightened economic insecurity evoked by globalized market capitalism and its crises. Such interactive effects possibly make distinctions
between economic insecurity and cultural backlash somewhat artificial (Inglehart & Norris, 2016, p. 3).
12 Political psychologists Sniderman and Hagendoorn argue that rigid identity politics contributed to a “cultural conflict zone” in the Netherlands. They
point to actual collisions of ways of lives, norms, and values within immigrant societies (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007).
13 For a challenge on empirical grounds, see: Alexander & Welzel (2017); Norris (2017); Voeten (2017).
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 4, Pages 123–135 127
4. An Authoritarian Cultural Revolt? Explaining the
Populist Counter-Revolution in Context of the Political
Psychology of Authoritarianism
These empirical observations still leave much to be ex-
plained in terms of the underlying causes of the salient
cultural divide, and the genesis of the politico-cultural
backlash today. Which theoretical framework best ex-
plains the diagnosed noisy cultural counter-revolution,
and the acceleratedmomentumof today’s populist politi-
cization of cultural identity and value change? We be-
lieve theorizing and research on the political psychology
of authoritarianism, long ignored in studies on European
populism, can partly help fill this theoretical and empiri-
cal void.
Matthew MacWilliams demonstrates that only one
trait predicts if you are a Trump supporter. According to
MacWilliams, this is not class, race, or age but authoritar-
ianism. It is measured by responses to 4 questions per-
taining to child-bearing: whether it is “more important
for the voter to have a child who is respectful or indepen-
dent; obedient or self-reliant; well-behaved or consider-
ate; and well-mannered or curious” (MacWilliams, 2016).
A study by political psychologist Pettigrew (2017) adds so-
cial dominance and prejudice to authoritarianism as con-
stitutive for populist support. One initial, groundbreaking
work by Hetherington and Weiler traces the recent polit-
ical polarization in American politics to authoritarianism
as an “attractive” explanatory framework (Hetherington
& Weiler, 2009, p. 4). According to the authors, negative
views on issues like immigration and the use of force re-
flect individual levels of authoritarianismand have gained
salience through political decisions. However, while this
important study contributes to a promising, theoretically
grounded understanding of politico-cultural polarization
paving the way for populist politics, it does not engage
with populism, let alone populism in Europe. Moreover,
it draws major inspiration from Adorno and the Frankfurt
School (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, pp. 33–58), yet it
does not fully engagewith their critical-theoretical frame-
work explaining political-psychological dispositions and
dynamics of authoritarian politics.
Turning to the Frankfurt School’s older research on
the political psychology of authoritarianism, the populist
surge in Europe can be theorized as an authoritarian
cultural revolt. Authoritarianism is hereby understood
not just as an ideological feature of populist parties or
attitude among their voters, but also as a multi-faceted
political-psychological binding “glue” unleashed in polit-
ical group dynamics.14 Absorbing Frankfurt School the-
ory, the origins and interactive dynamics at play that
fuel the noisy counter-revolution point to a politically in-
stigated collective rebellion, supported by aggregate indi-
vidual attitudes and psychological dispositions, against
post-industrial liberal democracy and its universalistic,
inclusive, and non-authoritarian cultural underpinnings.
Such revolt may benefit from economic insecurity of vot-
ers and a crisis of legitimacy of established parties and
government, but cannot be reduced to either.
Adorno points to models of politically mobilized, col-
lectively amplified psychological discontent. Adorno’s
theory of the “authoritarian” or “anti-democratic” syn-
drome refers to a psychological disposition linking de-
sires for both authoritarian submission and aggression
to anti-egalitarian ideologies (e.g. antisemitism, nation-
alism, and sexism; Adorno et al., 1950; for a thorough
discussion, see Rensmann, 2017). This syndrome trans-
lates into susceptibility to fantasies of persecution and
conspiracy myths personifying social problems; binary
thinking attributing all personal or societal problems
to alleged “enemies”, in sharp contrast to narcissistic
gains through collective self-aggrandizement of one’s
own group and “cultural identity”; and projections on
perceived “others” of fantasies, anxieties, and social
transgressions otherwise taboo (e.g. viewing immigrants
as rapists)—all of which can be detected in current pop-
ulist mobilizations and their self-reinforcing performa-
tive dynamics (Rensmann, 2017, pp. 321–357; Wodak,
2015, p. 154).
Explaining the appeal of authoritarian-nativist dem-
agogues we find mirrored in today’s populists, Adorno
theorizes these dispositions in the context of a culturally
wide-spread ego weakness present even in consolidated
modern democratic cultures. He views it as being the
product of structural insecurity, social dependence, and
economic pressure experienced by many individuals in
modern societies, which are shaped by abstract forms
of societal domination and forceful socio-economic im-
peratives (Rensmann, 2017, pp. 215–230). According to
Adorno, these socio-cultural conditions engender feel-
ings of cultural alienation and reified, stereotypical per-
ceptions of the social world manifest in the authoritar-
ian syndrome. It implies submissiveness and aggression:
longing for subordinating under a strong, idealized col-
lective and authority figure alongside the denigration of
constructed “enemies” of the (national) group, as well as
the urge to break free from civil rules without breaking
with the social order. According to Adorno’s theory of
authoritarian rebellion (Rensmann, 2017, pp. 127–132),
populists may offer exactly these particular, tribalistic
and aggressive forms of emotional gratification and psy-
chological bonding that authoritarian subjects and mi-
lieus look for, rather than economic gains: Releasing ver-
bal authoritarian aggression by lashing out against those
seen as “different”, “alien”, “weak” or “dangerous” oth-
ers (all present in the imagery portraying refugees), while
14 A recent exploratory study by Rooduijn (2014) on Dutch voters confirms that authoritarianism is part of the attitudinal complex of radical right
populist voters, but does not employ authoritarianism as an explanatory theoretical framework.
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promising to restore forceful sanctioning authority and
elevate the in-group, “the good people”, by bringing back
past national collective glory and pride.15
Such critical theorizing of the populist surge as an
authoritarian cultural revolt against the alleged cultural
weakness of liberal democracy may help understand the
admiration for Putin’s autocratic leadership in Russia by
both populist voters and parties like the AfD or Front
National. It may also help explain why provocative vio-
lations of civil liberal norms, discursive boundaries, and
even legal ones by populists—their willingness to break
the rules and cultural taboos—do not seem to alien-
ate but rather attract populist core voters, as a study
of Trump loyalists shows (Carter & Johnston Conover,
2017). Benjamin Moffitt and Simon Tormey understand
this “coarsening of political discourse” in disregard of
“‘appropriate’ ways of acting in the political realm” as
a core element of what they conceptualize as “populist
political style” (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014, p. 392). Con-
stantly challenging the public “boundaries of the speak-
able” (Rensmann, 2006), the dynamics of a new type
of disruptive politics of transgression have already trans-
formed political cultures. For instance, the Dutch pop-
ulist Wilders provoked a ruling by a regional court that
found him guilty of inflammatory speech against Mus-
lims, only to enjoy media attention for blaming the le-
gal system and lamenting infringement of free speech
(Adam, 2016). In reference to chancellor Merkel, AfD
politicians proclaim “We’ll lock up the old bitch”, express-
ing vulgar authoritarian punishment fantasies against a
denigrated political elite and migrants.
Seen in this theoretical framework, the current immi-
gration crisis which has coincided with populist electoral
gains is less a cause for successful populist mobilization
than an opportunity for politically unleashing existing au-
thoritarian dispositions and anti-cosmopolitan cultural
identity constructs among significantmilieus. Since 2015,
the European refugee crisis in the wake of the civil war in
Syria helped further boost the authoritarian-nativist cul-
tural backlash, and publicly transform it into a noisy polit-
ical rebellion. This is especially the case in countries like
Germany, where many migrants were able to find refuge
(Ostrand, 2015).16 However, European surveys that in-
clude countries hardly affected by the refugee crisis, such
as Poland or the UK (Ostrand, 2015, p. 273), also show
wide-spread opposition to new migration. In a recent
PEW survey in 10 major European countries, 59% of re-
spondents are concerned that the influx of refugees “will
increase the threat of domestic terrorism”, with majori-
ties holding this view in 8 of 10 countries. Strikingly, only
aminority thinks that “growing diversity makes the coun-
try a better place to live”, including such culturally di-
verse countries like the Netherlands (17%), the UK (33%),
and France (26%) (Poushter, 2016).
Even though mass immigration matters, problems
with politico-cultural inclusion exist, and the threat from
Islamist terrorism is a serious policy issue, these cross-
national data indicate that underlying, authoritarian-
nativist cultural perceptions play a major role, partly in-
dependent of actual migration numbers and the pres-
ence of (Muslim) immigrants. Following our argument,
these data can serve as indicators of an affectively
charged politico-cultural divide in society on issues of
collective identity, diversity, and cosmopolitan social
value change—by now largely overshadowing other
cleavages among voters—and a consolidated, proliferat-
ing culture of authoritarian aggressions and transgres-
sions expressed by populist actors and other counter-
revolutionary groups on squares, demonstrations, and
social media. Indeed, the authoritarian backlash today
in defense of a particular, exclusive conception of na-
tional cultural identity is often articulated with regard to
fear of an increasing influence of Muslims and Islam—
and at times in apocalyptic terms. The populist wish to
“restore” a pure, ethnic national identity and to “take
back our country and Volk” (as cited in Cohen, 2017) is
thereby frequently linked to calls for “de-Islamization”
(Geert Wilders, as cited in Cannane, 2017)—if need be
by authoritarian measures. “Globalist” Jews also often
serve as imagined subversive “enemies” of cultural iden-
tity; occasionally they are construed as string-pullers
behind Muslim migration—the authoritarian populist
prime minister of Hungary makes this claim against the
Jewish billionaire George Soros (Gorondi, 2017; see also
Rensmann, 2011).17
5. Reconfigured Political Conflict in the Digital Age:
Post-Factual Transgressions on Social Media as Cultural
Facilitators of Populist Politics
The question about changing cultural conditions favor-
able for authoritarian populist mobilizations points to an-
15 Authoritarianism as an explanatory framework for populist success seems especially useful in view of the disproportionate success of populist parties
in post-authoritarian, post-Communist contexts, like PiS in Poland, Fidesz in Hungary. In the 2017 elections the AfD became the strongest party in Saxony
and generally considerably more electorally successful in former East Germany (21.5%), still shaped by authoritarian cultural legacies, than in former
West Germany.
16 In the 2017 elections, for instance, the new German populist party AfD gained massively among former non-voters across the country, and especially
in authoritarian-nativist strongholds in East Germany still marred by authoritarian, anti-democratic legacies. But it also collected large shares in some
West German towns locally dealing with the refugee crisis, where refugees became the no. 1 topic—such as Deggendorf in Bavaria, where 31.5% voted
for the right-wing populists (Osel, 2017).
17 It is noteworthy that there is some variation in the rhetoric mobilized by European populist parties on Islam. Some actors, like Geert Wilders, claim
that they in fact protect European liberal values and gender equality against an illiberal Islam (Zúquete, 2008). Rogers Brubaker calls this “civilization-
ism” (Brubaker, 2017). Yet such seemingly pro-liberal defenses of liberal-egalitarian norms are deceptive insofar as they are regularly intermingled with
ethnicized myths of cultural superiority and inferiority, and accompanied by racialized stereotypes of Muslims as essentially “culturally incompatible”
with European societies—labeling Muslims collectively as dangerous extremists or as rapists. This betrays the grounding of such populist rhetoric in
the authoritarian, anti-liberal and anti-cosmoplitan side of the cultural divide, rather than being an expression of a liberal-secular critique of politi-
cal Islam(ism).
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other interrelated field of inquiry beyond conventional
frameworks for the study of party politics. Findings from
political sociology on the cultural appeal of a counter-
revolutionary backlashmobilized by populists should not
only be linked to research on the political psychology
of authoritarianism to better theorize the scope and
depth of this appeal. Understanding the transformed en-
vironment engendering, reinforcing and polarizing the
divide on social values and cultural identity also means
paying attention to the role of social media and digi-
tal publics. It requires theoretically and empirically in-
tegrating research from media studies on changed com-
municative conditions of politics. Arguments on the rel-
evance of social media bubbles and fake news dissem-
inated through new digital media have gained promi-
nence in recent debates about populism. But these ar-
guments have yet to resonate in broader systematic re-
search on this link. While the precise relations of pop-
ulist communication and social media have hardly been
researched yet, first quantitative studies of populist com-
munication strategies show that populist parties make
disproportionate use of Facebook and Twitter (Ernst, En-
gesser, Büchel, Blassnig, & Esser, 2017; on initial work on
populism and new media see Coretti & Pica, 2015; Maz-
zoleni, 2008; Reinemann, Aalberg, Esser, Strömbäck, &
de Vreese, 2017; Wirth et al., 2016).
Three initial insights from research on the implica-
tions of new digital media on conditions of political com-
munication seem particularly relevant for both refram-
ing the study of populism and theorizing the profoundly
changed cultural conditions for its impact: First, dis-
intermediating technologies like Facebook and Twitter
increasingly replace newspapers and other media serv-
ing as intermediaries between politics and citizens. This
transforms patterns of political interaction and publicity
inmultiple ways. Social media can have democratizing ef-
fects on public discourse because they engender imme-
diate fact-checking by civil society actors, increasing the
political accountability of those who hold public office.
Social media also “have the potential to favor citizens’ ac-
tivism”, enable regular citizens to actively participate in
public debates and offer “free networked space” for and
between political actors and non-actors (Ceron, 2017, pp.
179, 197f.). Yet studies have shown that social media can
also, at least for ideologically and culturally predisposed
groups and audiences, generate non-pluralistic arenas:
self-referential and segregated publics in which particu-
lar world-views are affirmed and reinforced. Rather than
facilitating rational deliberation about policies across a
large public spectrum, social media can have constrain-
ing ideological effects and limit genuine debate between
competing views; favorable to populist rhetoric, which is
shaped by constructed group dichotomies, communica-
tion tends to be shaped by fragmentation and polariza-
tion (Ceron, 2017, p. 198). Digital media may thus add
to centrifugal tendencies of polarization in political life—
and the breakdown of the public into fragmented, non-
pluralistic, and biased micro-publics warped in closed
world-views.18
Second, recent communication studies show that the
rhetorics of horizontalism regarding social media plat-
forms often hide vertical structures and inequalities. This
has been demonstrated in the case of the Italian populist
movement-partyMovimento Cinque Stelle led by Beppe
Grillo. While glorifying social media technology, it masks
authoritarian, intransparent techniques (Coretti, 2014).
Moreover, both Facebook and Google have boosted, ar-
guably involuntarily, fake news sites in the past, including
prominently Sputnik and Russia Today, which spread dis-
information in the service of the authoritarian Russian
government. Communications scholars have analyzed in-
transparencies, including algorithms subject to manipu-
lation (Coretti & Pica, 2015, p. 316; Treré & Barassi, 2015,
p. 299). There is mounting evidence that Russia, in ad-
dition to overt support for European populists, used cy-
berwar techniques on social media, interfering with fake
news and “bots” (fake automatized accounts) on Twitter
and Facebook on behalf of populist electoral campaigns
in America, France, and Germany—with the presumed
goal of destabilizing democracies (Röpcke, 2017; Rotella,
2017; Shane, 2017).
Third, Dahlgren (2005) observed already more than
a decade ago negative effects of new digital media on
civic cultural norms, alongside effects of transnational
critical publicity. Recent studies validate the claim that
especially social media discourses have engendered the
growth of unfiltered hate speech and verbal violence, as
well as post-factual claims and conspiracy myths both
from below, or bottom up, and top down from spon-
sored (fake) news sites—often articulated anonymously
and spreading instantaneously (Ceron, 2017, p. 1). Cir-
cumventing traditional media and their discursive filters,
both social media and populist politics boost the poli-
tics of transgression (see Reinemann et al., 2017)—the
latter often with the help of social media, as a study
by Krämer (2017) on populist online practices shows.
In addition to evading established media and develop-
ing a populist identity and ideology, main functions in-
clude justifying the hitherto socially illegitimate exclu-
sion of outgroups (Krämer, 2017). Framing politics in
terms of friends and enemies, they constantly challenge
and have eroded the boundaries of “legitimate” or ac-
ceptable political discourse and civil norms. This includes
the expansion of vulgarity, fear-mongering, authoritar-
ian aggression and ad hominem intimidation, and for-
merly discredited social resentments.19 Stylizing them-
selves as audacious “taboo-breakers” of an allegedly sti-
fled public debate, populists often stage provocations
to draw attention while pretending to be the “voice of
the people” victimized by liberal media and “elite opin-
18 Catering to specialized audiences, social media and websites assess preferences and encourage citizens to narrowly filter information they receive
and speak only to the like-minded (Sunstein, 2009).
19 See for an analysis of these features within populist discourse Wodak (2015).
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 4, Pages 123–135 130
ion”. They frequently employ social media to “break the
rules”, which constitutes part of their cultural attraction
(Krämer, 2017; Reinemann et al., 2017).
Not surprisingly, populist actors often praise social
media for empowering the voice of the “real people” and
enabling them to speak “truth” directly to the people
without interference—in contrast to information from
the allegedly “lying” “establishment media”, in part por-
trayed as “enemies of the people” (D. Trump).20 Be that
as it may, the destabilization of facticity through new
digital media seems particularly beneficial to simplifi-
cations, falsehoods, and ideological binaries employed
by populist actors. The culture of post-factual claims on
proliferating fake news sites, which spread falsifications
and invented facts and benefit from wide-spread lack of
information literacy (Stanford History Education Group,
2016), undermines democratic political culture, which re-
quires factual grounding.21 It can be theorized that the
ubiquitous political relativization, inversion, and destabi-
lization of factual truth on social media also further ad-
vances the polarization of politico-cultural conflict, inso-
far as truth is increasingly seen as either unrecognizable
or irrelevant among groups of voters as long as claims
support one’s ideological cause or political convictions.
This process coincides with declining trust in established
news sources and mainstream media over the last two
decades (Swift, 2016).
How the changed media environment specifically in-
teracts with the rise of a populist and authoritarian-
nativist cultural counter-revolution needs to be further
theorized and studied, both in its micro-mechanisms
and broader cultural impact, i.e. to determine under
what specific conditions communication dynamics in
digital publics broaden the cultural opportunity struc-
tures of populist politics (Koopmans &Muis, 2009; Rens-
mann, 2011).
6. Conclusion: Towards a Cultural Turn in the Study of
Populist Politics
The article has argued for a cultural turn in the study
of populist politics in Europe. It proposed an ideologi-
cal reconceptualization of populist actors, focusing on
their long underestimated, yet constitutive cultural ap-
peal and identity. Synthesizing, linking and integrating in-
sights that originate in three adjacent fields—political so-
ciology, political psychology, and media studies—we fur-
thermore sought to advance a novel, multi-disciplinary
perspective to theorize cultural conditions and dynamics
at play in current trans-national populist successes.
The suggested theoretical framework conceives pop-
ulist parties primarily as expressions and facilitators of
a long lingering, now noisy, authoritarian-nativist cul-
tural counter-revolution. They thrive on and mobilize
a significant cultural backlash that is directed against
cultural inclusion and progressive cosmopolitan social
value change—as well as “others” and elites represent-
ing such change. As we have argued based on sociolog-
ical empirical indicators, this counter-revolution reflects
deep-seated, increasingly salient and politicized cultural
conflicts about values, identities, and loyalties in Euro-
pean democracies: a great divide grounded in cultural
and social values that largely trumps economic cleav-
ages. The proposed theoretical framework hereby at-
tributes a key explanatory role to the political psychol-
ogy of authoritarianism—longmarginalized in studies on
populism—and its cultural undercurrents within Euro-
pean societies. The populist surge can be theorized as
an authoritarian revolt forcefully expressing cultural dis-
content within and against modern liberal democracies.
New research from media studies contributes to under-
standing this revolt and its transgressions as engendered
by profoundly transformed communicative conditions in
the digital age: they help erode standards of civil and fac-
tual discourse and benefit populist mobilizations.
To be sure, research on changed cultural conditions
needs to take into account political factors that have con-
tributed to the accelerated rise of illiberal populist actors
and politics, and deserve further study. The sensed cri-
sis of democratic legitimacy, which populist actors seek
to exploit, may also be linked to mainstream parties’
technocratic or failed policy responses to societal chal-
lenges (Taub, 2017). These include neo-liberal welfare
state regress and widening social inequalities advanced
by mainstream parties over the last two decades, inade-
quate attempts to develop sound, humane refugee and
immigration policies, and failure to provide effective re-
sponses to political Islamism and terrorism—which do
constitute real threats to citizens, denizens, and immi-
grants seeking civil rights and freedom in cosmopoli-
tan immigration societies. Moreover, the reconfigured
politico-cultural conflicts analyzedmay have been fueled
by parts of a culturalist left and radical religious groups
who promote anti-cosmopolitan, illiberal politics that rel-
ativize human rights in the name of cultural identity, thus
displaying affinities with identity politics of authoritar-
ian populists.
The diagnosed noisy cultural counter-revolution mo-
bilized by populist actors and the cultural conditions that
contribute to their current success also need further,
multi-disciplinarily grounded theorizing, aswell as the ro-
bust operationalization and testing of hypotheses on dis-
tinct culture(s) of populism in the future. We still know
too little: about the scope and origins of the salient,
20 Within democracies, the Orwellian inversion in relation to news media is especially practiced by the authoritarian populist U.S. President Trump, who
primarily communicates via Twitter. Attacking renowned news sources as “the Fake News Media” (in capital letters) he, emblematic also for European
populists, suggests being victimized by news media: “Only the Fake News Media and Trump enemies want me to stop using social media (110 million
people). Only way for me to get the truth out” (as cited in Jackson, 2017).
21 Openness to processing factual information and accepting facts are arguably minimum requirements for democracy to work. Many populists and fake
news sites, however, seek leveling out differences between fact, opinion, and falsehood and promote “alternative facts” (Kellyanne Conway, Counselor
to the U.S. President).
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emotionally charged divide on socio-cultural values and
identities, the grievances and conflicting forces in play,
and the role of underlying socio-economic factors—such
as rising economic insecurity and inequality—potentially
contributing to the longing for cultural closure and value
change reversal. The same applies to the emotional grat-
ifications of what we have theorized as an authoritarian
revolt, anchored in wide-spread psychological disposi-
tions and amplified by transgressions of politico-cultural
boundaries on social media. However, we believe that
a better understanding of the cultural dynamics of pop-
ulism will also help to assess its potential effects on the
future of democracies in Europe and beyond.
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1. Introduction
Since the 1980s, populist parties have surged in Europe.
Right-wing populist parties such as the Front National
(FN) in France and the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in
theNetherlands, and left-wing populist parties like Syriza
in Greece and Podemos in Spain, have been electorally
quite successful. In a number of countries, populist par-
ties have governed, either as part of a coalition govern-
ment (e.g. Austria, Greece, Finland, Italy, the Nether-
lands and Norway) or by absolute majority (e.g. Hungary
and Poland). Also outside of party politics, populism has
become more pervasive. Rooduijn (2014), for example,
has found that as a consequence of the upsurge of pop-
ulist parties, the populist message has also become in-
creasingly widespread in the media (see also Manucci
& Weber, in press; Mazzoleni, 2008). Interestingly, in
media outlets populist claims are not only made by the
politicians that are being interviewed or cited, but also
by journalists themselves (Hameleers, 2017). As a result,
some scholars have spoken about a populist ‘Zeitgeist’ in
Europe (e.g. Mudde, 2004).
While much research exists on the causes of the per-
vasiveness of populism (for an overview see Mudde &
Kaltwasser, 2017), much less is known about the con-
sequences thereof. Some scholars have argued that the
rise of populism poses a threat to liberal democracy (e.g.
Abts & Rummens, 2007; Akkerman, 2003; Kaltwasser,
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2012; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). However, to empiri-
cally substantiate this claim, more knowledge is required
about the consequences of the rise of populism. More
particularly, we need to understand how the upsurge
in populism affects the attitudes and behaviour of citi-
zens. Our study focuses on one particular consequence,
namely whether populist messages fuel political cyni-
cism among citizens.
On the basis of cross-sectional data, Van der Brug
(2003) provides evidence for his claim that the right-wing
populist Pim Fortuyn fuelled political discontent by his
anti-elite rhetoric. In a more recent study Rooduijn, Van
der Brug and De Lange (2016) show that citizens who
switch their support to populist parties become more
discontented with politics. While these findings strongly
suggest that populist messages can fuel discontent, we
cannot know whether it is indeed the populist message
that leads to such discontent. It is important therefore to
test this causal claim in an experimental study, which is
what we do here.
Our study is not the first experiment to examine the
effects of exposure to populism. Bos, Van der Brug and
De Vreese (2013), for example, investigate how main-
stream right and radical right-wing populist politicians
are evaluated when they express messages that are pop-
ulist in nature. They find that only radical right-wing pop-
ulist politicians are positively evaluated when they ex-
press such messages. Moreover, the effect is restricted
to citizens who are already cynical about politics. Simi-
larly, Hameleers and Schmuck (2017) show that citizens
who are exposed to messages in which blame for nega-
tive developments is attributed to either the government
or immigrants become more strongly populist in their
attitudes. Yet, this effect is restricted to those that find
the source of the message credible. Both experiments
demonstrate that citizens’ attitudes are influenced by
the messages to which they are exposed, but that only
citizens with attitudes that are already in line with the
message are susceptible to be influenced. Sniderman,
Hagendoorn and Prior (2004) refer to this as a ‘galvaniz-
ing effect’.
We are not aware of experimental studies that fo-
cus on the effects of populist messages on political cyni-
cism. To further our understanding of populism’s impact,
we therefore examine the effect of exposure to populist
messages on political cynicism by means of a survey ex-
periment. In the experiment we assign participants at
random to a treatment or a control group. The partici-
pants in the first group are exposed to a text that con-
tains a populist message, whereas the participants in the
second group are exposed to a text that is highly simi-
lar in substance, but does not contain any populist mes-
sages. We assess whether individuals allocated to the
first group report higher levels of political cynicism than
individuals assigned to the second group. Moreover, we
assess to what extent the treatment effect is conditional
upon their support for populist parties.We find a clear ef-
fect of populist messages, but this effect is restricted to
supporters of populist parties. They become more cyni-
cal about politicians as a result of their exposure to the
populist message.
2. Populism and Political Cynicism
Many scholars define populism as a set of ideas in which
the good people are pitted against the evil elite (Alber-
tazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Canovan, 2004; Mudde, 2004;
Stanley, 2008). Mudde (2004, p. 543) describes pop-
ulism as ‘an ideology that considers society to be ulti-
mately separated into two homogeneous and antagonis-
tic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’,
andwhich argues that politics should be an expression of
the volonté générale (general will) of the people’. He ar-
gues that populism is not a full ideology, such as conser-
vatism, liberalism or socialism, but a ‘thin-centred’ ideol-
ogy. It does not offer an all-encompassingworldview, but
contains first and foremost ideas about the organization
of democratic decision-making processes. In line with,
for example, Canovan (2004), Hawkins (2010), Mudde
(2004), and Taggart (2000), we conceptualize populism
as a set of ideas, which consists of two related elements:
1) a negative portrayal of ‘elites’; and 2) a glorification
of ‘the people’. A message should contain both elements
in relation to each other to be qualified as populist. This
conceptualization is both moralistic and antagonistic. Ac-
cording toMüller (2016, pp. 19–20), populism is ‘a partic-
ular moralistic imagination of politics, a way of perceiv-
ing the political world that sets a morally pure and fully
unified…people against elites who are deemed corrupt
or in some other way morally inferior’.
According to many scholars, an important motive for
supporting populist parties is to express discontent with
the established parties. Betz (1994) argues that radical
right-wing populist voters, which he labels ‘protest vot-
ers’, cast a ballot against ‘the powers that be’, which are
held responsible for what goes wrong in society (see also
Bergh, 2004). In other words, citizens support populist
parties, because they are discontented with mainstream
politicians and political parties. Most studies into the re-
lationship between discontent and support for populist
parties are based on correlations in cross-sectional data
(e.g. Betz, 1994; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002;
Mayer & Perrineau, 1992; Norris, 2005). The interpreta-
tion of this correlation as a causal effect has been criti-
cized. In particular Van der Brug (2003) and Rooduijn et
al. (2016) have argued that the effect also runs the other
way: the populist message fuels discontent. Rooduijn et
al. (2016) refer to this as the ‘fuelling discontent logic’. Ac-
cording to this logic citizens become more discontented
with the functioning of politics as a consequence of being
exposed to the messages of populist parties. In this pa-
per we examine whether exposure to populist messages
indeed fuels discontent.
Here wewill focus on one specific form of discontent:
political cynicism. Various scholars have demonstrated
that we should distinguish various types of political dis-
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 4, Pages 136–145 137
content (Dalton, 2004; Easton, 1965; Norris, 1999). Be-
cause populist messages most often focus on the antag-
onistic relationship between political elites and ordinary
people, we assess the effects of the political message on
political cynicism—a concept that taps into voters’ dis-
content with politicians in general (see Agger, Goldstein,
& Pearl, 1961). In a recent study, Pattyn, Van Hiel, Dhont
andOnraet (2012) have shown that political cynicism can
(and should) be distinguished from related concepts like
political trust, and that it is related to voting for pop-
ulist parties.
The theoretical underpinning for the proposedmech-
anism can be found in the literature on voting behaviour,
preference formation, and media exposure. Studies of
public opinion indicate that the content of amessage has
a direct effect on the attitudes of those who are exposed
to thismessage. For instance, a growing body of research
has addressed the direct effects of media messages on
public opinion (see Brandenburg & Van Egmond, 2011).
Studies have focused, for instance, on the impact of mes-
sages on voting behaviour (Druckman & Parkin, 2005),
candidate preferences (Dalton, Beck, & Huckfeldt, 1998),
and policy preferences (Zaller, 1992, 1996). Hence, there
is ample evidence that citizens are directly influenced by
the messages they are exposed to.
If this line of reasoning is extended to exposure to
populism, it can be expected that if citizens are exposed
to the message that political elites are failing, they might
be inclined to incorporate this idea into their way of
thinking about politics and become more politically dis-
contented. This logic leads to our central expectation,
which is:
H1: Exposure to populist messages leads to higher levels
of political cynicism.
Our hypothesis is related to, but also distinct from, hy-
potheses that have been put forward in recent survey
experiments. More specifically, our study differs from
previous studies, such as Bos et al. (2013) and Hameleers
and Schmuck (2017), in the causal relationship that is
tested, as well as in the conceptualization of key terms.
We will briefly outline the main differences between
these studies and ours. Bos et al. (2013) investigate how
mainstream right and radical right-wing populist politi-
cians are evaluatedwhen they expressmessages that are
populist in nature. They find that only radical right-wing
populist politicians are positively evaluated when they
express such messages. Thus, Bos et al. (2013) look at
how populist messages affect the evaluations of the indi-
vidual politician expressing these messages. We, on the
other hand, focus on the effect of populist messages in
general on cynicism vis-à-vis politicians in general. More-
over, Bos et al. (2013) employ a different definition of
populism than the one we outlined above. Hameleers
and Schmuck (2017) show that citizens who support
populists are affected by their exposure to messages
in which either the national government or immigrants
are blamed for certain problems in society. As a result
of their exposure, these citizens become more populist
in orientation. Hence, Hameleers and Schmuck (2017)
are interested in the effect of blame attribution on pop-
ulist attitudes, and populism is the dependent variable in
their study.We, on the other hand, examine the effect of
populist messages on attitudes of cynicism, making pop-
ulism the independent variable in our study.1 Thus, while
related studies have been published, the impact of pop-
ulist messages on political cynicism has not been exam-
ined yet.
Research into the effects of messages on voting be-
haviour and attitudes conclude that not all citizens are
equally likely to be affected by their exposure. Based on
consistency theories like, for instance, Festinger’s (1957)
theory of cognitive dissonance, we argue that individuals
aim for consistency among attitudes and behaviours, and
therefore evaluate (or even select) new information that
is in line with their existing views and thereby tend to ig-
nore information that runs counter to their views. As a
consequence, we would expect to find a ‘galvanizing ef-
fect’, as Sniderman et al. (2004) called it, which means
that new messages affect particularly those who are al-
ready inclined to agree with the message. To their own
surprise, Sniderman et al. (2004) do not find evidence for
such a ‘galvanizing effect’. However, this may well be due
to ceiling effects: the groups that Sniderman et al. (2004)
study were already so negatively predisposed to immi-
grants that the experimental manipulation could not ex-
ert much effect any more.
Other studies do find evidence for a ‘galvanizing ef-
fect’. Bos et al. (2013) show that populist messagesmake
citizens more likely to support populist parties. Yet, this
effect is restricted to voters who are already cynical.
Hameleers and Schmuck (2017) find that only those citi-
zens who supported the source of the message to which
they were exposed were more likely to blame elites and
immigrants. Citizens who opposed the source became
actually less instead of more anti-establishment. In our
study, the galvanizing effect would suggest that citizens
who are already favourable to populist actors, such as
populist politicians and parties, are more likely to be-
comemore cynical than citizenswhodonot support such
actors.2 We therefore hypothesize that:
H2: The effects of the exposure to populist messages is
stronger for citizens who support populist parties than
for citizens who support non-populist parties.
1 Hameleers and Schmuck (2017) conceptualize populism in a way similar to ours, namely as a combination of glorification of ‘normal’ citizens and
denunciation of the elite.
2 Attitudes are not only affected by the messages to which individuals are exposed, but also by the source of those messages and by characteristics of
its recipients (see Olson & Zanna, 1993). In this study we keep the source of the message constant. We assess, however, to what extent the effect of
the populist message is different for audiences with diverging political preferences.
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3. Research Design
In order to test our hypothesis that exposure to pop-
ulist messages leads to more political cynicism, we con-
duct a survey experiment. More specifically, we use a
randomized post-test design in which participants read
a newspaper article created by the researchers and sub-
sequently answer questions concerning their attitudes
and behaviour. One (randomly selected) group of partic-
ipants is exposed to a newspaper article, which includes
populist messages. The other group of participants reads
an article which is highly similar in substance, but which
does not contain any populist messages. Survey experi-
ments have two advantages over other research designs.
First, we know to which messages the participants are
exposed (see Tilley & Hobolt, 2011). On the other hand,
when using non-experimental research designs, we can
ask people which newspapers they read regularly and
we can content analyse these outlets. Yet, we can never
knowwhether respondents actually read the newspaper
articles that were analysed. Secondly, because partici-
pants are randomly assigned to the experimental condi-
tions, alternative explanations for differences between
groups of participants can be ruled out. This is not pos-
sible in survey-based studies, where respondents make
their own selection of outlets.
Our survey experiment is carried out in the Nether-
lands. The Netherlands is an appropriate case, because,
in comparison with many other countries, the populist
discourse is relatively common in this country—both in
the political realm and in the mass media (Rooduijn,
2014). This is an important requirement, because in a
country where populism is not very common in the pub-
lic debate, a constructed populist article would not be
very credible as a ‘real life’ media message. Moreover,
in the Netherlands populism can be found both on the
left and the right of the political spectrum (De Lange &
Rooduijn, 2011), which makes it possible to examine the
impact of populism tout court, rather than only that of
radical right-wing populism.
Our stimulus is a (fictitious) newspaper article (cre-
ated by the researchers) about the electoral losses of
mainstream parties in the Dutch national elections of
2017. We constructed two different articles: one that
contains a populist message (experimental group) and
one that does not (control group).3 The first two para-
graphs of the newspaper articles are identical and con-
cern a description of the situation. The third paragraph
differs between the control and experimental groups and
contains the interpretation of the results by a political an-
alyst. In the text given to the treatment group this anal-
ysis includes populist messages. These are references
to ‘the establishment’, which has lost touch with ‘the
wishes of ordinary citizens’. The messages in the control
group are much more neutral in tone. The exact word-
ings of the last paragraphs of our texts can be found in
the Appendix.
Before we organized our survey experiment, we con-
ducted a pilot study. It was distributed in the Nether-
lands between August 25th and August 29th, 2014 by
means of social media (Facebook, E-mail and Twitter)
(N = 128). The newspaper article in the pilot study dis-
cussed the 2014 elections to the European Parliament,
but was in terms of the presented populist messages al-
most equal to the text presented in the Appendix. Al-
though as a result of our method of convenience sam-
pling the findings are not representative for the Dutch
population, the treatment effect turned out to be statis-
tically significant (at p < .10) and in the expected direc-
tion (results are available upon request). We therefore
proceeded with our experiment.
Our survey experiment was appended to the June
edition of the DNB Household Survey (DHS), conducted
by CentERdata at Tilburg University. This panel includes
approximately 2,000 households (from which one or
more household members take part), which are rep-
resentative of the Dutch population (see, e.g., Guiso,
Sapienza, & Zingales, 2008; Parlevliet, 2017). The survey
experiment was presented between June 5th and June
20th, 2017 to 3,035 individuals, out of which 2,381 com-
pleted the questionnaire (response rate of 78.5%).
We aimed to create two similar groups by randomly
distributing the two stimuli to the respondents. As a re-
sult of this procedure, 51% of the respondents ended
up in the experimental condition and 49% in the control
group (see Table 1). The two groups were compared on
various characteristics that may be correlated with polit-
ical cynicism, such as age, education, gender, subjective
class and religiosity.We do not find any statistically signif-
icant differences between the control and experimental
groups on these characteristics, which indicates that the
two groups are equivalent.4
To measure our dependent variable, political cyni-
cism, respondents were asked to express their agree-
ment or disagreement with eight statements: 1) politi-
cians are honest; 2) politicians are profiteers; 3) politi-
cians keep their promises; 4) politicians are corrupt;
5) politicians are reliable; 6) politicians are just smooth
talkers; 7) politicians do not understand what is going on
in society; and 8) politicians are capable of solving prob-
3 We decided to employ fictitious newspaper articles because this allowed us to fully control the messages participants were exposed to and thereby to
guarantee the internal validity of our study. However, to enhance external validity, we based the stimuli on existing newspaper articles following the
Dutch elections (see Hameleers, Bos, & De Vreese, 2017, p. 879).
4 To assess whether the respondents were aware of the experimental manipulation, we also conducted a manipulation check by asking the respondents
the following question: ‘In the commentary of the political sociologist, reference is made to a cleavage between what politicians and what ordinary
citizens find important’. A t-test (t = −1.03; df = 2356; p = 0.150) shows that the two groups differ from each other in the expected direction, but
that the differences are not statistically significant (also when distinguishing populist from non-populist voters). While our treatment did affect our
dependent variable ‘political cynicism’, we have no evidence that respondents were aware of the populist tone to which they were exposed. In the
concluding section we elaborate on the implications.
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lems in society. Respondents could answer on a 5-points
scale from ‘fully agree’ to ‘fully disagree’. We combined
these items into a scale, which ranges from 1 (not at all
cynical) to 5 (very cynical). The Cronbach’s Alpha for this
scale is 0.90, which is above the traditional cut-off point
for scale reliability.
To measure whether citizens supported a populist
party prior to participating in the experiment, we asked
them for which party they had voted in the national elec-
tions of March 15th, 2017. In line with research on pop-
ulism in the Netherlands, we subsequently coded a vote
for the Forum voor Democratie (FvD), Geen Peil, Partij
voor de Vrijheid (PVV), Socialistische Partij (SP), and Voor
Nederland (VNL) as support for a populist party (e.g. De
Lange & Rooduijn, 2011), while a vote cast for any of the
other parties that participated in the electionswas coded
as support for a non-populist party.5 Of the 2,381 par-
ticipants who completed the survey, 2,184 participants
voted in the 2017 elections. Of those voters 421 respon-
dents supported a populist party, while 1,643 respon-
dents supported a non-populist party.
Table 1 lists the descriptive statistics of the variables
for the entire group of respondents. Political cynicism
is our dependent index variable and ranges from 1 (not
at all cynical) to 5 (very cynical). Populist message is a
dummy variable taking the value of 1 when respondents
have been ‘treated’ with the populist message and tak-
ing the value of 0 when respondents have received the
neutral message. Populist vote is a dummy variable for
respondents who voted, where 1 indicates they voted
for one of the populist partiesmentioned above. The last
four rows show the four combinations of having received
the populist or the neutral message and having voted
for a mainstream or a populist party. The means repre-
sent the proportion of respondents in the four groups.
Since fewer respondents voted for a populist than for a
mainstream party the two conditions with populist vot-
ers both contain 10% of the respondents, while the other
two both contain roughly 39% and 41%.
4. Results
Our main expectation is that those who have been ex-
posed to the text containing populistmessageswill be on
averagemore cynical than thosewho have been exposed
to the neutral text (H1). In Table 2 we assess whether
the mean political cynicism scores are different for the
control and experimental groups. We conduct an inde-
pendent samples t-test for which we assume equal vari-
ances, since Levene’s test indicates that the hypothesis
that the variances in the two groups are equal cannot
be rejected. Participants that have not been exposed to
the populist messages have an average cynicism score
of 3.10, whereas participants that have been exposed
to the populist messages have an average score of 3.14.
This leads to amean difference score of 0.04, which is sig-
nificant at p < .10 (one-tailed). Hence, those who have
been exposed to the populist messages score, on aver-
age, higher on the scale of political cynicism than those
who have not been exposed to such messages.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Count mean sd min max
Political cynicism 2,360 3.12 0.68 1.1 5
Populist message (1 = yes) 2,381 0.51 0.50 0 1
Populist vote (1 = yes) 2,064 0.20 0.40 0 1
Populist message + populist vote 2,064 0.10 0.30 0 1
Populist message + non-populist vote 2,064 0.41 0.49 0 1
Neutral message + populist vote 2,064 0.10 0.30 0 1
Neutral message + non-populist vote 2,064 0.39 0.49 0 1
N 2,381
Table 2. Scores on scale of political cynicism.
Political cynicism
Mean Standard Error N
Without populist message −3.10 0.02 1,151
With populist message −3.14 0.02 1,209
Combined −3.12 0.01 2,360
Difference −0.04 ̂ 0.03
Note: Political cynicism is measured on a scale from 1–5, where 1 = not at all cynical, and 5 = very cynical
** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; ̂p < 0.10
5 As an alternative operationalization, we also included the elderly party 50+ in the group of populist parties. The analyses with this alternative opera-
tionalization yield largely identical findings and do not alter our conclusions.
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Our findings demonstrate an effect of the populist
message on participants’ level of cynicism, be it only sig-
nificant at the p < .10 level. The difference of 0.04 on
a 5-point scale is obviously small. However, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that we only manipulated the word-
ing of two sentences in a newspaper article. It would be
unrealistic therefore to expect much larger differences
between the two groups and in reality citizens are much
more frequently exposed to populist statements.Wewill
discuss this further in the concluding section.
We also tested whether the supporters of populist
parties were more strongly affected by their exposure to
the populist message than the supporters of other par-
ties (H2). Table 3 presents the results of a multiple re-
gression, which demonstrates that this effect is indeed
stronger for the supporters of populist parties. In fact,
the effect is only present for the supporters of populist
parties (b = .181; p = .008); the supporters of other par-
ties are not significantly more likely to be cynical after
being exposed to the manipulated message than when
being exposed to a more ‘neutral’ message.
Figure 1 presents these results graphically. The solid
line shows the two conditions in which respondents
were exposed to a neutrally worded newspaper article,
while the dotted line shows the conditions in which re-
spondents were exposed to populist messages. It shows
that the level of cynicism is already considerably higher
among populist voters than among non-populist voters,
also when they are exposed to a neutral message (com-
pare the two groups on the straight line). Yet, the dotted
line is steeper, and the difference between the groups
Table 3. Effects on political cynicism: Interaction be-












Note: Political cynicism is measured on a scale from 1–5, where
1 = not at all cynical, and 5 = very cynical
** p < 0.01;* p < 0.05; ̂p < 0.10
being exposed to a populist text and those being exposed
to a neutral text is only significant among populist party
voters (at the right hand side of the graph). Among main-
stream party voters the experimental treatment did not
exert a significant effect (see the left hand side of the
graph. Thus, after exposure to populist messages the gap
between the two groups of voters in terms of their level
of cynicism is larger than prior to their exposure. This
could point towards a spiral of cynicism among the sup-









Figure 1. Predicted values of political cynicism for supporters of populist (1) and non-populist parties (0), and those who
are exposed to a populist message (dotted line) and non-populist message (solid line).
6 We have also looked at the effects of our experimental treatment on other subgroups. First of all, we distinguished voters for the left-wing populist
SP and the various right-wing populist parties. While the effect was somewhat weaker among SP voters, the effect was not significantly different from
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5. Conclusion
There is a general concern that populism is not only a
corrective, but also a challenge to liberal democracy (e.g.
Abts & Rummens, 2007; Akkerman, 2003; Kaltwasser,
2012; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). In this study we in-
vestigate whether the pervasiveness of populism threat-
ens liberal democracy by affecting citizens’ attitudes in a
negative way. To this end we examine the ‘fuelling dis-
content logic’, which argues that exposure to populist
messages fuels cynicism about politics (Rooduijn et al.,
2016; Van der Brug, 2003). After all, according to populist
actors—such as populist politicians, parties, andmedia—
established politicians have no idea what ordinary peo-
ple find important and only focus on their own inter-
ests. Moreover, they point towards a failure of repre-
sentation and representative institutions, such as parties
and parliaments.
Based on a survey experiment, in which we have ran-
domly assigned participants to two different groups—
one group in which individuals have been exposed to a
text containing populist messages and another group in
which individuals have been exposed to a neutral text—
we conclude that exposure to populist messages indeed
fuels political cynicism. Yet, the main effect is small, and
marginally significant at the most, given the p-value of
0.091. When we distinguished respondents according to
their support for parties, it becomes clear, however, that
the effect takes place only among supporters of populist
parties. The effect in this group is highly significant (at
p < .01), while no effect was observed among the vot-
ers for other parties. We may thus conclude that voters
for populist parties becomemore politically cynical when
being exposed to populist messages, while other voters
are not affected.
What does thismean?On the one hand, this suggests
that the persuasiveness of the populist message should
not be overestimated. We asked respondents to report
their levels of political cynicism directly after we exposed
them to a treatment. And even immediately after the
treatment the effect is limited. It might therefore well
be the case that the effect quickly disappears when time
passes by. On the other hand, our study shows that even
a small manipulation of two ‘populist worded’ sentences
in a newspaper article do affect attitudes about politics.
It thus seems plausible that continued exposure to pop-
ulist messages brings about more cynicism.
One limitation of our study is that we focus on an
effect of one small manipulation of a text. Our manip-
ulation check suggests that the respondents did not re-
alize that these messages are populist. This could mean
that other differences between the texts presented to
the experimental and control group produced the differ-
ences in political cynicism, but given the slight manipula-
tion and the large similarities between the two texts, we
find that implausible. A more plausible reason could be
that populist messages have become so pervasive that
many citizens do not even notice them anymore. That
such messages nonetheless exert an effect on political
cynicism is therefore an important finding.
Another limitation of our study is that we look at
short-term effects only (of a change in the wording of
two sentences). However, in real life citizens are continu-
ously exposed tomany populist messages. In future stud-
ies researchers may wish to focus on long-term effects
of repeated exposure to populist messages. Yet, it may
not be feasible to study this in a controlled experiment.
Another obvious limitation of our study is that we have
assessed the effect of populist messages in only one spe-
cific country—the Netherlands. We have no theoretical
reasons to expect the effects to be different in other na-
tional contexts, but whether our findings can indeed be
replicated in other contexts remains to be shown empir-
ically. Finally, respondents with anti-elite attitudes may
also feel negatively disposed to academics who conduct
this type of research. However, if this would have caused
those who are most susceptible to the populist message
to opt out of the study, our findings are likely to err on
the conservative side.
Our findings contribute to the relatively young liter-
ature on the societal and political consequences of the
rise of populism. These studies indicate that populism is
spreading through a series of mechanisms of ‘contami-
nation’. The success of populist parties impacts onmedia
populism, while the pervasiveness of populism in politics
and media in turn affects the attitudes of specific groups
of citizens. As a result of their exposure to populist mes-
sages, citizens’ political cynicism becomes stronger. How-
ever, this ‘spiral of discontent’ is only present among
those voters who were already supportive of populist
parties to begin with. Because of their tendency to select
and evaluate information on the basis of their already ex-
isting convictions, they becomemore discontentedwhen
their beliefs about the failures of politics are confirmed.
Hence, we might be witnessing a vicious cycle of dis-
content among certain groups of citizens, which might
erode their support for liberal democracy in the long run.
The consequence is a further polarization of attitudes to-
wards politicians.
A certain level of scepticism towards politicians is
essential for a democracy to function well, so we do
not want our conclusion to sound too ‘alarmist’. As long
as cynicism is directed at politicians, rather than at the
democratic system as such, this is perfectly compatible
the effect among right-wing populist party voters. We also looked at the difference between voters and non-voters. The experimental treatment had a
weaker effect among the non-voters than among voters. Yet here also, the difference was not significant. In both cases we were looking at rather small
subgroups of our sample. So, the failure to reject the null-hypothesis could be the result of the small N, which is why we do not report the results of
these tests in detail. They are available upon request.
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with a healthy democracy. However, there is always a
risk of spill-over effects (Easton, 1965), where an erosion
of specific support leads to decreases in diffuse support.
This would bemuchmore harmful to democratic support
and legitimacy.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Miquelle Marchand of
CentERdata for her feedback on the questionnaire, and
the participants of the panel ‘The Study of Populism
Through Experiments’ at ECPR General Conference 2014
and the Team Populism Conference 2015 for their com-
ments on an earlier version of this manuscript.
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
References
Abts, K., & Rummens, S. (2007). Populism versus democ-
racy. Political Studies, 55(2), 402–424.
Agger, R. E., Goldstein, M. N., & Pearl, S. A. (1961). Polit-
ical cynicism: Measurement and meaning. The Jour-
nal of Politics, 23(3), 477–506.
Akkerman, T. (2003). Populism and democracy: Chal-
lenge or pathology? Acta Politica, 38(2), 147–159.
Albertazzi, D., & McDonnell, D. (2008). Introduction: The
sceptre and the spectre. In D. Albertazzi & D. McDon-
nell (Eds.), Twenty-first century populism. New York,
NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Bergh, J. (2004). Protest voting in Austria, Denmark, and
Norway. Scandinavian Political Studies, 27(4), 3367–
3389.
Betz, H.-G. (1994). Radical right-wing populism in West-
ern Europe. Houndsmill and Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Bos, L., Van der Brug, W., & De Vreese, C. (2013). An ex-
perimental test of the impact of style and rhetoric
on the perception of right-wing populist and main-
stream party leaders. Acta Politica, 48, 192-208.
Brandenburg, H., & Van Egmond, M. (2011). Pressed
into party support? Media influence on partisan atti-
tudes during the 2005 UK general election campaign.
British Journal of Political Science, 42(2), 441–463.
Canovan, M. (2004). Populism for political theorists?
Journal of Political Ideologies, 9, 241–252.
Dalton, R. J. (2004). Democratic challenges, democratic
choices. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dalton, R. J., Beck, P. A., & Huckfeldt, R. (1998). Partisan
cues and the media: Information flows in the 1992
presidential elections. The American Political Science
Review, 92(1), 111–126.
De Lange, S. L., & Rooduijn, M. (2011). Een Populistis-
che Tijdgeest in Nederland? Een Inhoudsanalyse van
de Verkiezingsprogramma’s van Politieke Partijen [A
populist zeitgeist in the Netherlands? A content anal-
ysis of the election programs of political parties].
In R. Andeweg & J. Thomassen (Eds.), Democratie
Doorgelicht: Het Functioneren van de Nederlandse
Democratie [Democracy investigated: How Dutch
democracy works] (pp. 319–334). Leiden: Leiden Uni-
versity Press.
Druckman, J. N., & Parkin, M. (2005). The impact of me-
dia bias: How editorial slant affects voters. The Jour-
nal of Politics, 67(4), 1030–1049.
Easton, D. (1965). A systems analysis of political life. New
York, NY: Wiley.
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2008). Trusting the
stock market. The Journal of Finance, 63(6), 2557–
2600.
Hameleers, M. (2017). They did it! The content, effects,
andmechanisms of blameattribution in populist com-
munication. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam.
Hameleers, M., Bos, L., & De Vreese, C. H. (2017). “They
did it”: The effects of emotionalized blame attribu-
tion in populist communication. Communication Re-
search, 44(6), 870–900.
Hameleers, M., & Schmuck, D. (2017). It’s us against
them: A comparative experiment on the effects of
populist messages communicated via social media.
Journal of Information, Communication & Society,
20(9), 1425–1444.
Hawkins, K. A. (2010). Venezuela’s Chavismo and pop-
ulism in comparative perspective. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Kaltwasser, C. R. (2012). The ambivalence of populism:
Threat and corrective for democracy. Journal of De-
mocratization, 19(2), 184–208.
Lubbers, M., Gijsberts, M., & Scheepers, P. (2002). Ex-
treme right-wing voting in Western Europe. Euro-
pean Journal of Political Research, 41, 345–378.
Mannuci, L., & Weber, E. (in press). Why the big picture
matters: Political and media populism in Western Eu-
rope since the 1970s. Swiss Political Science Review.
Mayer, N., & Perrineau, P. (1992). Why do they vote for
Le Pen? European Journal of Political Research, 22,
123–141.
Mazzoleni, G. (2008). Populism and the media. In D.
Albertazzi & D. McDonnell (Eds.), Twenty-first cen-
tury populism (pp. 49–64). New York, NY: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. Government
and Opposition, 39, 541–563.
Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C.R. (Eds.). (2012). Populism
in Europe and the Americas: Threat or corrective for
democracy? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). Populism: A very
short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Müller, J.-W. (2016).What is populism? Philadelphia, PA:
University of Pennsylvania Press.
Norris, P. (Ed.). (1999). Critical citizens: Global support
for democratic government. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 4, Pages 136–145 143
Norris, P. (2005). Radical right: Voters and parties in the
electoral market. New York, NY: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Olson, J. M., & Zanna, M. P. (1993). Attitudes and at-
titude change. Annual Review of Psychology, 44(1),
117–154.
Parlevliet, J. (2017). What drives public acceptance of re-
forms? Longitudinal evidence from a Dutch pension
reform. Public Choice, 173(1/2), 1–23.
Pattyn, S., Van Hiel, A., Dhont, K., & Onraet, E. (2012).
Stripping the political cynic: A psychological explo-
ration of the concept of political cynicism. European
Journal of Personality, 26(6), 566–579.
Rooduijn, M. (2014). The mesmerising message: The dif-
fusion of populism in public debates in Western Eu-
ropean media. Political Studies, 62(4), 726–744.
Rooduijn, M., Van der Brug, W., & De Lange, S. L.
(2016). Expressing or fuelling discontent? The rela-
tionship between populist voting and political discon-
tent. Electoral Studies, 43, 32–40.
Sniderman, P. M., Hagendoorn, L., & Prior, M. (2004).
Predisposing factors and situational triggers: Exclu-
sionary reactions to immigrant minorities. American
Political Science Review, 98(1), 35–49.
Stanley, B. (2008). The thin ideology of populism. Journal
of Political Ideologies, 13, 95–110.
Taggart, P. (2000). Populism. Philadelphia, PA: Open Uni-
versity Press.
Tilley, J., & Hobolt, S. B. (2011). Is the government to
blame? An experimental test of how partisanship
shapes perceptions of performance and responsibil-
ity. The Journal of Politics, 73(2), 316–330.
Van der Brug, W. (2003). How the LPF fuelled discontent:
Empirical tests of explanations of LPF support. Acta
Politica, 38, 89–106.
Zaller, J. (1992).Nature and origins ofmass opinion. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zaller, J. (1996). The myth of massive media impact re-
vived: New support for a discredited idea. In D. Mutz,
R. Brody, & P. Sniderman (Eds.), Political persuasion
and attitude change (pp. 17–79). Ann Arbor, MI: Uni-
versity of Michigan Press.
About the Authors
Matthijs Rooduijn is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Am-
sterdam. Previously, he was Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at Utrecht University
and a postdoctoral researcher at the Amsterdam Centre for Inequality Studies (AMCIS). His research
examines the causes and consequences of the rise of populist and radical political parties and attitudes.
He recently co-edited the book Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe (Routledge).
Wouter van der Brug is Professor of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam. His research
focuses on electoral processes in international comparative perspective, including voting behaviour,
changes in party systems, and the rise of right-wing populist parties. He publishes regularly on these
topics in international journals. In 2016, Oxford University Press published a volume that he edited
together with Claes de Vreese, (Un)intended Consequences of EU Parliamentary Elections.
Sarah L. de Lange is Professor by special appointment at the Department of Political Science at the Uni-
versity of Amsterdam. Since 2016 she holds the Dr. J. M. Den Uyl chair. Her main research interests
concern parties, party families, and party systems, and in particular the rise of radicalism, populism,
and extremism in contemporary democracies. Her latest edited volume, entitled Radical Right-Wing
Populist Parties in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream? has appeared in 2016 with Routledge.
Jante Parlevliet is head of the Economic Policy Department of De Nederlandsche Bank. Prior to joining
DNB in 2011, she worked at the Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands and the OECD. She
obtained MSc. degrees in Political Science and Economics at the University of Amsterdam, where she
is currently also pursuing a part-time PhD in Economics on the political economy of economic reforms.
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 4, Pages 136–145 144
Appendix
The first two paragraphs of the text in the survey experiment concern the results of the elections to the national parlia-
ment in the Netherlands in March 2017. The third (and last) paragraph in both texts contains an analysis of a political
commentator. In the first text populist messages are included in the analysis, in the second text the analysis is neutral.
Text 1 (does include populist messages)
“According to political sociologist Matthijs Rooduijn this development sends an important message. ‘The gains made by
parties such as UKIP and Front National clearly show that the establishment has no idea of what the man in the street
finds important. The voter has the feeling that established parties barely take into account what ordinary citizens want’.
According to Rooduijn, the establishment could win its lost seats back if it would listen better to hardworking citizens”.
Text 2 (does not include populist messages)
“According to political sociologist Matthijs Rooduijn this development sends an important message. ‘The gains made by
parties such as UKIP and Front National clearly show that the message of these parties appeals to a large share of the
electorate. A substantial number of voters believe that parties do not offer proper solutions to important social problems’.
According to Rooduijn, parties could win their lost seats back if they took more account the ideas of their own grassroots”.
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1. Introduction
Populist actors around the world have gradually evolved
into influential political forces in various countries and
regions. Independent of the region, they share the ideas
of anti-elitism and people centrism. On this basis, they
can challenge common democratic rules, including those
of liberal democracy (Plattner, 2010), according to which
powermust be restrained and individual rights protected.
Through the populist lens, features of liberal democ-
racy, such as systems of checks and balances, undermine
the proper implementation of the general will, which
they claim to be the only true representative of. Thus,
their presence can have a negative impact on the quality
of democracy if populist parties challenge these institu-
tions, particularly when they are in government (Alber-
tazzi & Mueller, 2013).
Populist parties, however, are not only characterized
by their populist element but also by their host ideology
(Mudde, 2004). Thus, they can take the form of right-
wing populist parties (Mudde, 2007), left-wing populist
parties (March, 2011), or centrist populist parties (Havlík
& Stanley, 2015). In other words, populist parties dif-
fer on a wide-ranging set of issues such as the promo-
tion of exclusive (right-wing populist parties) or inclusive
(left-wing populist parties) societies (Mudde & Rovira
Kaltwasser, 2013). These differences have been shown
to manifest themselves in the behavior of populist par-
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ties, for instance with regards to parliamentary voting
where the populist element plays little to no role (Otjes &
Louwerse, 2015). Despite these well-known differences,
however, there is little debate in the literature about
whether the postulated relationship between populist
parties and democracy is a function of their host ideol-
ogy, their populist element, or both. This article seeks to
fill this void, taking as its starting point the discussion be-
tween populism and liberal democracy (Mudde & Rovira
Kaltwasser, 2012).
We adopt the proposition that the host ideology, like
the populist element, is central to the actions that par-
ties take. We argue that the role of ideology is essen-
tial to understandingwhy populist parties of varying host
ideologies relate differently to subdimensions of liberal
democracy, namely political inclusion (minority rights)
and mutual constraints. Focusing on left-wing and right-
wing populist parties, we anticipate the host ideology to
be the deciding factor for how these parties relate to the
dimension of political inclusion. In comparison to right-
wing populist parties, we expect left-wing populist par-
ties to be associated withmore positive effects onminor-
ity rights. For the second dimension, mutual constraints,
we expect the populist element to play the central role
and in consequence, expect no differences in associa-
tions between populist parties of different host ideology.
Empirically, we test our propositions against data
from 30 European countries from 1990 to 2012. This
dataset, although limited to one region, allows us to test
our arguments for a diverse set of populist parties. The
results lend support to our argument that host ideologies
matter for how certain populist parties relate to democ-
racy and liberal democracy in particular as differences in
effects of left and right-wing populists occur for minor-
ity rights. At the same time, the results do not suggest a
strong association between populist parties and mutual
constraints. Therefore, this study highlights the need to
investigate subdimensions of (liberal) democracy (Houle
& Kenny, 2016; Immerzeel & Pickup, 2015) to generate
a better understanding of the complex relationship be-
tween populist parties and democracy.
2. Populism and (Liberal) Democracy
Following the ideational approach (Hawkins, 2009), pop-
ulism constitutes a set of ideas. Despite varying defi-
nitions that can be subsumed under the ideational ap-
proach,most studies consider at least four attributes cen-
tral to populism: people centrism, the perception of the
people as a homogenous entity with a general will, anti-
elitism, and thedepiction of a permanent crisis (Rooduijn,
2014). Mudde (2004, p. 543; italics original) summarizes
the central attributes in his widely referenced minimal
definition of populism, which we draw on in this arti-
cle, calling populism a thin-centered “ideology that con-
siders society to be ultimately separated into two homo-
geneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and
‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should
be an expression of volonté générale (general will) of
the people”. The view of populism as an ideological con-
struct, however, remains at the center of many debates.
Another large branch in the literature, for instance, dis-
cusses populism as a discourse (or frame) (e.g., Aslanidis,
2016, 2017; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). However, even
among those that speak of populism as a discourse, some
acknowledge that populists ultimately may implement
their idea of politics as an expression of the general will
(Müller, 2016). Furthermore, both branches in the litera-
ture share the view that populism can appear across the
ideological spectrum giving populism its chameleon char-
acteristic (Taggart, 2000). In the ideological approach, for
instance, populism as a thin-ideology is said to attach it-
self to different host ideologies (Stanley, 2008).
Because “populism indirectly questions the procedu-
ral minimum that lies at the heart of our current defi-
nitions of democracy” (Hawkins, 2010, p. 37), scholars
using different conceptualizations discuss the relation-
ship between populism and (certain forms of) democ-
racy. Most notably, they focus on how populism re-
lates to democracy in general (Müller, 2016), represen-
tative democracy (Canovan, 1999), and liberal democ-
racy (Kriesi, 2014;Mudde&Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Plat-
tner, 2010). These studies share a focus on populism’s
homogenous view of society in which the common will
of the people is to be articulated in an unmediated way
and implemented without any restrictions (Caramani,
2017).1 Perhaps for this reason, there has been a recent
focus on populism and the quality of liberal democracy
(cf. Huber & Schimpf, 2016a, 2017; Pappas, 2014, 2016).
After all, the essence of liberal democracy is that power
can never be absolute as it is characterized by “the intrin-
sic importance of transparency, civil liberty, the rule of
law, horizontal accountability (effective checks on rulers),
and minority rights” (Coppedge et al., 2011, p. 253).2 Mi-
nority rights and horizontal accountability in particular
are two features of liberal democracy that run counter
to the populist understanding of how democracy ought
to function. Populist actors depict a homogenous soci-
ety (the people) and highlight the necessity for politics
to follow the general will without any unnecessary re-
strictions, implemented by the populists themselves as
the only true representatives of the people.3 Therefore,
some scholars argue that populist actors can have a neg-
ative impact on democracy, and in particular, on liberal
1 In contrast to extremist parties, radical populist parties are not considered anti-constitutional per se (Mudde, 2007; Rensmann, 2006) although they
present the system they operate in as “undemocratic” (Abts & Rummens, 2007).
2 Democratic quality in this case refers to the degree—and not the existence—of these criteria, that is, how well standards for aspects such as trans-
parency, legality, and good governance are implemented (Beetham, 2004; Diamond & Morlino, 2005).
3 For this reason, too, Canovan (1999) argues that populism is at odds with representative democracy in which institutions mediate any societal conflicts.
Populist actors, however, consider society to be homogenous to begin with and also, may argue in favor of a more direct form of politics (but seeMüller,
2016, p. 29 for a different view).
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democracy (e.g. Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Ruth,
2017). For as long as populists are not in power, they
are rarely in a position to implement their ideas. Instead,
they may even have a corrective function as they high-
light institutional shortcomings (e.g. Müller, 2002), mobi-
lize otherwise unrepresented groups of voters (e.g. Han-
ley, 2012), and articulate issues or protest (e.g. de Lange
& Akkerman, 2012).4
From this debate, we can derive the expectation
that populist actors may have positive side effects but
generally, relate negatively to (liberal) democratic qual-
ity, in particular when they are in government (Alber-
tazzi & Mueller, 2013). Here, their presence can result in
changes or even the erosion of important components
such as the system of checks and balances, as can be
seen in countries governed by populist parties, such as
contemporary Poland (Markowski, 2016) and Hungary
(Batory, 2016). However, the argument hinges on the
assumption that all populist actors must share a simi-
lar understanding of a homogenous society whose gen-
eral will functions as the guiding principle for political
decisions and shall not be infringed by unnecessary in-
stitutional boundaries. In this scenario, the people con-
stitute the sovereign. Yet Mény and Surel (2002) iden-
tify two further conceptions of the people, namely the
people as a nation (cultural) and the people as a class
(economic). Both are linked to specific forms of pop-
ulism, the former to right-wing populism and the latter
to left-wing populism (Kriesi, 2014, p. 362). Studies that
compare these two types of populist parties find that
their behavior, such as their parliamentary voting behav-
ior (Otjes & Louwerse, 2015) for instance, differs as a
consequence of the host ideology. The questions that
arise then are: which of the two elements, host ideology
or populism, determines the relationship between pop-
ulism and liberal-democracy? And, does this relationship
play out differently depending on the subdimensions of
liberal democracy? In what follows, we discuss the dif-
ferences between left- and right-wing populism in detail.
We focus on two aspects of liberal democracy, minority
rights and mutual constraints, to highlight possible com-
monalities and differences in the relationships between
populist parties and democracy.
3. Populism Left, Right, and Center: Differences and
Commonalities
Populist parties, independent of their host ideology, are
united in their critique against the political establishment
(Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017). Yet, it is the host ideology
that determines against whom the people should rally
(Katsambekis, 2017, p. 205). Left-wing populist parties
define the people on a class basis, referring mostly to the
poor. In contrast, right-wing populist parties define the
people on a cultural, nativist base (March, 2011; Mudde,
2004). In other words, whereas left-wing populist par-
ties frame their criticisms economically and seek to pro-
tect the proletariat from exploitation by capitalists, right-
wing populist parties champion nativism (Mudde, 2007,
p. 19) and seek to protect “the nation from dangerous
others” (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017, p. 196), stressing
cultural issues above the rest. Thus, left-wing populist
parties differ from right-wing populist parties in that they
embrace an inclusive as opposed to an exclusive view of
society (Katsambekis, 2017; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser,
2013).5 More importantly though, despite left-wing pop-
ulist being inclusive on the society level, this does not
necessarily imply that they are not anti-pluralistic on the
political level. Essentially, the question of how democ-
racy is organized is political and differences between left-
wing and right-wing populism can be illustrated focus-
ing on central aspects of democracy, namely political
inclusion and political contestation (Dahl, 1971). While
left-wing populist parties generally neither discredit mi-
nority groups nor object to granting these groups polit-
ical rights, they do not accept political competition for
that they, and only they, are the true representatives
of the people. Consequently, they consider political con-
trol through effective opposition and institutional power
check mechanisms as obstacles that prevent them from
implementing the people’s will. In this sense, left-wing
populists are inclusive on the society level and the dimen-
sion of political participation. Yet, they are exclusive and
essentially anti-pluralistic with regards to public contes-
tation and the control of power (Mudde & Rovira Kalt-
wasser, 2013, p. 162). In contrast, right-wing populist par-
ties are generally exclusive with regards to all of these as-
pects for that they object the extension of political partic-
ipation rights to minorities in addition to claiming to be
the only true representatives of what they consider to be
the people. In short, left- and right-wing populism differ
with regards to political inclusion but share similarities in
their ideas of political contestation and control of power.
It is for this reason that we choose two subdimensions of
liberal democracy to highlight differences and common-
alities between left- and right-wing populism, minority
rights and mutual constraints.
3.1. Minority Rights
We define minority rights as descriptive representation
of minorities in the political system, that is, the absence
4 This positive view, however, is not shared by all authors (e.g., Müller, 2016). After all, any new party in opposition is likely to mobilize new voters and
critique established political actors, possibly increasing accountability. Thus, these byproducts can be positive but are not necessarily a function of
populism (Huber & Schimpf, 2016a, p. 109).
5 Between these two types, we can also observe a third category. Havlík and Stanley (2015) write that some populist parties are non-ideological because
their positions on economy issues and the common GAL/TAN scales are too fuzzy with various mutually inconsistent policy proposals. They therefore
refer to these parties as centrist populist. We take an empirical approach to this matter and add this third category when assigning parties the label
of left-wing and right-wing parties in our operationalization. It allows us to avoid categorizing parties as left or right when their proposals are too
incoherent. We return to this point in our research strategy section.
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of systemic exclusion of groups considered minorities
from exercising central power or other political rights
(Merkel et al., 2016).
Here, we expect the populist element to interactwith
the host ideology. As written above, left-wing populist
parties typically consider ethnic minorities as part of the
people and hence, demand equal rights as part of their
socially egalitarian tradition. In Europe as in Latin Amer-
ica, left-wing populist parties tend to be inclusive. In
contrast, right-wing populist parties tend to be exclusive
(Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013), particularly in gov-
ernment where they have a lower incentive to reach out
tominorities as part of a vote-maximizing campaign strat-
egy. March (2011, p. 134), for example, shows that the
left-wing Scottish Socialist Party (SSP) and the allied Re-
spect coalition raised awareness about theMuslim popu-
lation in the United Kingdom and initiated a pro-Muslim
discourse. In contrast, the Slovak National Party (SNS)
routinely targeted Hungarian minority parties and went
as far as to propose a ban of all ethnic parties in Slovakia
(Koev, 2015, p. 652).
H1. The presence of left-wing populist parties is posi-
tively associated with minority rights, whereas the pres-
ence of right-wing populist parties relates negatively to
minority rights.
3.2. Mutual Constraints
Mutual constraints inhibit absolute power in a democ-
racy by balancing the power of the executive vis-à-vis the
judiciary and the legislature (Plattner, 2010).
In contrast to minority rights, where the host ideol-
ogy is central, we argue that in the case of mutual con-
straints, the populist element determines the direction
of the relationship. The strong focus of populist parties
on the people can delegitimize the indirect aggregation
of the volonté générale via the representative system.On
the one hand, populist parties demand either stronger
or more frequently employed measures of direct democ-
racy to ease the implementation of the general will. On
the other hand, if populist parties enter government,
they see no need for a check on power, as they repre-
sent the peoples’ will (Mudde&Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012).
One such example is the attempt by the Polish Law and
Justice Party (PiS), which assumed governmental power
in 2015, to reform the Polish Supreme Court. Among the
proposed changes, was the suggestion that judgeswould
be appointed by the National Council of the Judiciary in
which half the members would also be members of the
parliament, effectively weakening the court’s power to
oversee political decisions (Walsh, 2017). And although
the law was partially rejected by Poland’s President An-
drzej Duda at first, Poland’s Premier Beata Szydlo (PiS)
in reaction to the rejection said that, just like the parlia-
ment, the court should be under the control of the peo-
ple (Waldoch, Krajweski, & Bartyzel, 2017).
This association does not depend upon the host ide-
ology. Most populist parties regularly call for changes to
the constitution to empower the executive. Parties on
the left, such as Fico’s Smer in Slovakia (Malová & Učeň,
2010), have voiced similar demands to those on the
right, for example, Haider’s Austrian Freedom Party (Aus-
trian Freedom Party, 2011; Fallend, 2012) and the Czech
Rally for the Republic/Republican Party of Czechoslo-
vakia (Hanley, 2012). Each of them has demanded more
power for the ruling executive to shift power away from
parliaments and courts. Since the volonté générale is the
rationale for decisions made and actions were taken by
all populist parties here, we expect no differences among
them regarding their influence on mutual constraints.
H2. The presence of populist parties is negatively asso-
ciated with mutual constraints, regardless of the parties’
host ideology.
4. Research Strategy
To test our theoretical arguments, we use a twofold strat-
egy. First, we assess the differences between populist
parties in government and opposition. Second, we dis-
tinguish between left-wing, center and right-wing pop-
ulism to investigate the expected associations with mi-
nority rights and mutual constraints.
Empirically, we use a pooled cross-sectional design.
Since we use the role within a political system as well
as a party’s host ideology, we opted for cabinets as the
temporal unit of analysis. This approach allows us to
determine whether a party is in government or opposi-
tion with great precision, while other approaches such
as country-years are considerably more imprecise. Our
data includes information from 30 European countries
between 1990 and 2012.6 This time span captures ma-
jor events for European populist parties, from their es-
tablishment through their rise. We exclude cabinets with
duration of fewer than six months as we assume that any
measurable impact is only evident after some time.
4.1. Dependent Variable
To measure democratic quality based on our concept of
liberal democracy, we draw on three different sources.
We measure aggregated liberal democratic quality by us-
ing the liberal democracy score (v2x_libdem) of the Va-
rieties of Democracy Project (Coppedge et al., 2011).7
To capture the two subdimensions, mutual constraints,
and minority rights, we rely on the Democracy Barom-
eter. For mutual constraints, we use the aggregated di-
6 We chose 2012 as our cut-off point as data for most of our most dependent variables was not available beyond that year at the time of the data
collection. For an overview of all countries included, see Table A1 in the Appendix A.
7 In order to ease presentation, we multiplied the v2x_libdem by 100. This makes the results comparable to the Democracy Barometer which usually
applies scales ranging from 0 to 100.
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mension of horizontal checks (MC_CHECKS,Merkel et al.,
2016, p. 29) which measures the balance between ex-
ecutive and legislative (ratio of parliamentary seats con-
trolled by government to parliamentary seats controlled
by opposition), the balance of checks between executive
and legislative (ratio of control instruments of legislative
over executive to control instruments of executive over
legislative), and the power of judicial branch to review
political decisions.8 This measure taps into the checks-
and-balances aspect. For minority rights, we use an in-
dicator for the effective access to power for minorities
(REP_DR3, Merkel et al., 2016, p. 53) that measures the
descriptive representation of minorities and the extent
to which they have access to central power.
4.2. Independent Variables
For testing our hypotheses, we use dummies to i) cap-
ture the presence of populist parties in opposition and
government and ii) to capture either the presence of
left-wing or right-wing populist parties. We further use
a middle category for ambivalent cases that would not
fit either of the right- or left-wing categories based on
our coding procedure, which followed a three-step ap-
proach. First, we surveyed the existing secondary litera-
ture on populist parties in Europe to categorize parties in
populist and non-populist parties.9 In the next step, we
determined the role of populist parties in the political
system, applying the following coding scheme: populist
parties in government had to hold some position in the
cabinet and populist parties in opposition had to hold at
least one seat in the national parliament. Thus, we ex-
cluded parties identified as populist but without a seat
in parliament during the relevant cabinet from our anal-
yses. Table A1 in Appendix A lists all parties analyzed.
Finally, to determine whether a populist party be-
longs to one of our three categories (left, right, cen-
ter), we code populist parties in relation to their country-
specific party system. The procedure is the following.
First, we calculate a weighted party system’s ideology
mean for each cabinet. This average takes into consider-
ation the ideological positions of all parliamentary par-
ties in one particular country. We use the seat share of
the respective parties to weight the mean. For each cabi-
net, we then classify populist parties as left, right, or cen-
ter according to their relative distance to this weighted
mean.We code every populist partywithin oneweighted
standard deviation of this reference as centrist, while
parties further to the left or right are coded respectively
(also see Huber & Ruth, 2017).10
4.3. Control Variables
In addition to our central variables, we include a selected
set of covariates that, in theory, may relate to both the
presence of populist parties as well as the levels of our
democratic measures. These variables are the level of
democratic consolidation (time in years since democrati-
zation), cabinet duration (in years), cabinet composition
(surplus governments, minimal winning coalitions, and
minority governments), economic development (GDP
per Capita in 1,000 US Dollar), and a dichotomous vari-
able to distinguish between post-communist countries
and other countries. A detailed rationale for the inclusion
of these variables can be found in Appendix C.
4.4. Empirical Model
To control for country-specific effects, we apply a linear
mixed-effects model with cabinets nested under each
country (Gelman & Hill, 2007).11 The respective coun-
tries serve as groups. This particular model also allows
us to compare both intra- and cross-country variance.
Given our interest in the change in democratic quality as
a consequence of the presence of populist parties, mod-
eling intra-country variance allows us to approximate this
process.12
5. Empirical Results
In Figure 1, we plot the coefficients from the results.13
To start with the aggregatemeasure of liberal democ-
racy (left panel in Figure 1), we observe that in Europe,
there is no general association between populist par-
ties and democracy, independent of their status (gov-
ernment or opposition). While we find the anticipated
direction of correlation, that is negative for populists in
government and positive for those actors in opposition,
they are not statistically significant. However, a different
picture emerges when distinguishing populist parties ac-
cording to their host ideology. First, we see that right-
wing populist parties are associated with lower levels of
8 An extension of this instrument also measures vertical checks, i.e. the degree of federalism and subnational fiscal autonomy. We did not include these
in our central analyses given the focus on political contestation and power checks. However, we did include them in a robust check (see Appendix B).
The substantial results are robust.
9 We base our case selection on Mudde (2007), Arter (2010), March (2011) and Van Kessel (2015), all of whom rely to a great extent on the Mudde
(2004) definition of populism we have adopted here. Following these authors, we also considered changes in a party’s level of populism. For example,
the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) was considered populist prior to Simitis becoming the party’s leader in 1996 (March, 2011). However,
thereafter it took a different course. PASOK was thus only coded as populist up until 1996.
10 We illustrate this, using the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria. Since Haider took over the party in 1986, the FPÖ has been classified as populist
(seeMudde, 2007). They held a position in government in the cabinet Schuessel I (February 4, 2000–February 28, 2003), and for this period, were coded
as “populist in government”. In a next step, we calculate the party systems mean for the period of the cabinet, which is 5.7 on a ten-point scale for
Schuessel I. All parties within one standard deviation of the mean (2.1 [3.6 to 7.8]) are coded as central. Because the FPÖ was coded as 8.3 by ParlGov,
it is coded as “right-wing populist in government” for the cabinet period of Schuessel I.
11 A comparison between Null and Empty model (see Table A3 in Appendix A) suggests using hierarchical models.
12 Table A2 in Appendix A shows descriptive statistics for all variables.
13 For the full regression output in table format, see Tables B2 and B3 in Appendix B.
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Figure 1. Effect of Populism on Liberal Democracy and two Subdimensions (Minority Rights andMutual Constraints). Notes:
Gov = Populist Party in Government (Reference: No Populist Party in Government); Opp = Populist Party in Opposition
(Reference: No Populist Party in Opposition); R = Right-Wing Populist Party present (Reference: No Right-Wing Populist
Party present); C = Centrist Populist Party present (Reference: No Centrist Populist Party present); L = Left-Wing Populist
Party present (Reference: No Left-Wing Populist Party present); Coefficients are plotted with 90% Confidence Intervals
quality of liberal democracy. Second, both center and
left-wing populist parties are associated with higher lev-
els of quality of liberal democracy. Third, while the center
and left-wing populist parties are statistically different
from right-wing populist parties, there is no significant
difference between those two categories. These findings
provide a first idea about potential differences in the
association between populist parties and liberal democ-
racy as a consequence of varying host ideologies. For a
detailed look, we now turn to the results from the two
subdimensions, minority rights, and mutual constraints.
From the middle panel in Figure 1, we can first ob-
serve that populist parties in government are not as-
sociated with any particular direction regarding minor-
ity rights. In contrast, populist parties in opposition are
associated with a positive development. Upon taking
into consideration host ideology, however, we find that
this does not apply to all populists equally. For minor-
ity rights, we expected a more negative effect of right-
wing populist parties and a positive influence of left-wing
populist parties, both in comparison to the absence of
populist parties. The empirical results lend support to
our argument. First, on average we observe a substan-
tial positive relationship between left-wing populist par-
ties andminority rights, whereaswe find negative effects
for right-wing populist parties. The presence of centrist
populist parties is neither negatively nor positively corre-
lated with minority rights.
For mutual constraints, we expected no differences
between the different type of populist parties but on av-
erage, small negative associations for all of them. Figure
1 confirms these expectations. We observe no system-
atic effect of a populist parties’ host ideology. However,
populist parties in government and opposition are neg-
atively associated with mutual constraints compared to
instances where no populist parties are in government
or opposition. This effect is in line with our expectation
that populists undermine the separation of power.14
We conducted two types of robustness checks. First,
we reran our analysis using a continuous variable that
measures the logged seat share of populist parties in-
stead of dummies (See Tables B9 and B10 in the Ap-
pendix).15 Second, we used alternative model specifica-
tions (lagged dependent variablemodels—See Tables B5,
B6 and B7 in the Appendix).16 The most consistent find-
ing across these additional checks is the positive asso-
ciation between left-wing populist parties and minority
rights in comparison to right-wing populist parties, par-
ticularly in opposition.17 Other findings, such as populist
parties’ relationship with mutual constraints, are less
consistent as they aremetwith greater uncertainty in our
statistical models. Overall, these findings further support
our idea that substantive differences in the relationship
between populist parties can arise from host ideologies.
14 Figure B2 in Appendix B includes all combinations of host ideology and government status, which leaves us with six dummies. Substantially, it confirms
the findings of Figure 1.
15 As a logarithm of zero (“0”) is not possible, we added 1 to all values to guarantee numeric values, which are necessary to process the data.
16 Results for these and further robustness checks can be found in Appendix B (Figures B3 and B4, Tables B5, B6, B7, B8, B9 and B10).
17 We also ran a third analysis in which we coded parties that were not formally part of a government but supported government parties in parliamentary
elections as “populist parties in government”. This was the case for the Danish People’s Party (2001–2011) and the Dutch Freedom Party (2010–2012).
These results are also included in the Appendix B (Table B8).
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6. Discussion and Conclusion
Populist parties, because of their central ideas of anti-
elitism, the belief in a general will, and their people cen-
trism, challenge some of the commonly accepted rules
of democracy, especially those of liberal democracy (Plat-
tner, 2010). However, a series of studies have identified
not only negative but also positive effects of populist
parties on democratic quality (Canovan, 1999; Mudde &
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). Largely absent from the debate
surrounding populism and its relationship to democracy,
however, has been the role of host ideologies. This arti-
cle sought to initiate such discussion. We proposed that
the host ideology, focusing on left- and right-wing pop-
ulism, has consequences for how these parties relate to
the dimension of political inclusion and minority rights
in particular. However, we expected the host ideology to
be irrelevant for a populist parties’ association with mu-
tual constraints. The empirical findings lend support in
particular to the first of our propositions. The main take-
away from our article, therefore, is that populism should
not be examined in isolation from its host ideology when
considering the relationship between populist actors and
democracy. This finding, of course, should not diminish
the role populism plays in this relationship, particularly
in the wake of temporary developments in cases such
as Poland and Hungary. In some cases, however, pop-
ulism may matter less or even only constitute as an ad-
ditional qualifier of radical right parties rather than be-
ing a steady feature (cf. Rydgren, 2017). Future studies
thus could explore under which conditions ideology and
populismmay play a greater role for populist parties and
how they relate to specific aspects of democracy, an is-
sue in which fundamental differences in historical lega-
cies between East- and West-Europe may well play into
(Gherghina & Soare, 2013). Furthermore, right-wing pop-
ulist parties have been shown to mobilize certain voter
groups which have been neglected by other political par-
ties, such as citizens who are lower educated or poor
(e.g., Huber & Ruth, 2017; Rooduijn, 2017). At the same
time, they may also discourage certain voters from turn-
ing out in elections (Immerzeel & Pickup, 2015). Future
research, by focusing on the dimension of political par-
ticipation, may therefore also explore whether left-wing
populist parties exert similar effects or, whether mobi-
lization and de-mobilization effects depend on a populist
party’s host ideology.
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Appendix
Appendix A. Descriptive Information
Table A1. List of populist parties in dataset.
C Party Populists Host Ideology
AT Freedom Party Austria (FPÖ) since 1986 R
AT Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) since 2005 R
BE Flemish Block (VB) 1979–2004 R
BE Flemish Interest (VB) since 2004 R
BE National Front (FNb) 1985–2012 R
BE List Dedecker (LDD) 2007–2010 C
BG Attack (Ataka) since 2005 C
BG Law, Order and Justice (PPS) 2009–2013 R
BG National Movement Simeon the Second (NDSV) 2001–2005 C
BG Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) since 2009 C (2009)
HR Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) since 1989 C
HR Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) since 1990 R
CH Swiss Democrats (SD) since 1961 R
CH Freedom Party of Switzerland (FPS) since 1984 R
CH Swiss People’s Party (SVP) since 1971 R
CH League of Ticinesians (LdT) since 1991 R
CZ Rally for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSC) since 1989 R
CZ Public Affairs (VV) since 2001 C
DK Progress Party (FPd) since 1972 R
DK The Danish People’s Party (DFP) since 1995 R
EE Estonian Citizens (EK) 1992 R
EE Estonian National Independence Party (ERSP) 1988–1995 C
EE Estonian United People’s Party (EUR) 1994–2006 L
FI Finnish Rural Party (SMP) 1959–1995 C
FI Finns Party (PS) since 1995 C
FR National Front (FN) since 1972 R
GE Party for Democratic Socialism (PDS) 1990–2005 L
GE The Left / PDS 2005-2007 L
GE The Left since 2007 L
GR Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) until 1996 C
GR Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) since 2000 R
GR Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) since 2004 L
GR Independent Greeks (AE) since 2012 R
HU Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP) since 1993 R
HU Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) since 2006 R (2006), C(2010)
IR Sinn Féin (SF) since 1970 L
IT Lega Nord (LN) since 1991 R (1992, 1996, 2001, 2006,
2008), C (1994, 1996)
IT Come on Italy/ People of Freedom Party (FI-PdL) 1995–2009 C
LV For Fatherland and Freedom (LNNK) 1993–2001 C
LI Young Lithuania (JL) since 1994 R
LI Order and Justice (TT) since 2002 C
LI Labour Party (DP) since 2003 C (2004), L (2008)
LU Alternative Democratic Reform (AR|ADR) since 2004 R
NL Party for Freedom (PVV) since 2006 R
NL Socialist Party (SP) Until 2008 L
NL The List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) 2002–2006 R
NL Liveable Netherlands (LN) 2002–2003 R
NO Progress Party (FrP) since 1973 R
PL Law and Justice (Pis) since 2001 C (2005, 2007), R (2011)
PL League of Polish Families (LPR) since 2001 R
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Table A1. List of populist parties in dataset. (Cont.)
C Party Populists Host Ideology
PL Self-Defense of the Republic Poland (SRP) since 1992 C (2001), L(2005)
RO Greater Romania Party (PRM) since 1991 R
RO Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR) 1990–2006 C
RO Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR) 1993–2001 L (1992, 1996), C (2000)
RO People’s Party-Dan Diaconescu (PP-DD) 2011–2015 L
SK Slovak National Party (SNS) since 1989 C (1990, 1998, 2002, 2006,
2010), R (1992, 1994)
SK Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) 1998–2003 L
SK Smer (Direction), the Third Way 1999–2005 L
SK Smer (Direction), Social Democracy since 2005 L (2006, 2010), C (2012)
SK Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) 2002–2012 C
SK Ordinary People and Independent Personalities Party (OLaNO) since 2011 R
SL Slovenian National Party (SNS) since 1991 C
SE New Democracy (NyD) 1991–2000 R
SE Sweden Democrats (SD) since 1988 R
UK Sinn Féin (SF) 1905–today L
Note: Sources for these parties are Mudde (2007), Arter (2010), March (2011) and Van Kessel (2015). We should note that the Progress
Party (FPd) in Demark and the Swedish party New Democracy (NyD) are borderline cases for that they may fit the category of neoliberal
populist parties better. This is the case, as Mudde (2007, p. 48) writes, because “their xenophobic rhetoric is primarily informed by their
liberalism”. We kept these parties in our analyses nonetheless as a) they still fit the category of populist parties and b) would only be
relevant for the analyses of minority rights in which case our results are more conservative given the inclusion of two cases that do not
share the strong focus on nativism with other cases included here.
Table A2. Descriptive statistics.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Liberal Democracy (VDem) 255 78.56 19.83 –37.32 190.36
Liberal Democracy (UDS) 265 11.34 10.45 –10.10 112.25
Liberal Democracy (DB) 255 56.44 17.53 –39.60 174.48
Minority Rights 270 61.94 31.00 1−5.56 100.00
Mutual Constraints 269 70.00 12.73 –39.72 193.99
Robustness Check: Mutual Constraints 259 46.45 19.42 –28.15 175.41
Government 270 10.13 10.34 –10 111
Opposition 270 10.53 10.50 –10 111
Right 270 10.35 10.48 –10 111
Center 270 10.24 10.43 –10 111
Left 270 10.14 10.35 –10 111
Right Government 270 10.05 10.22 –10 111
Right Opposition 270 10.32 10.47 –10 111
Center Government 270 10.08 10.27 –10 111
Center Opposition 270 10.17 10.38 –10 111
Left Government 270 10.02 10.15 –10 111
Left Opposition 270 10.12 10.33 –10 111
Democratic Consolidation 263 32.95 32.47 –10 161
Cabinet Duration 270 26.79 15.23 –16 161
Government Type (surplus) 270 10.22 10.41 –10 111
Economic Development 270 21.49 15.95 –12.48 183.41
Post-Communist Country 270 10.46 10.50 –10 111
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Table A3. Comparison of empty and null model using VDem.
Model AIC BIC logLik L.Ratio p-value
Null 1891.3 1898.4 –943.6
Empty 1362.2 1372.8 –678.1 531.1 <.0001
Appendix B. Additional Regression Figures and Tables and Robustness Checks (RBC)
The table below provides an overview of all abbreviations used for the various populist party dummies in the Appendix
included in the models, their meaning (when coded as “1”), and the reference category (when coded as “0”).
Table B1. Abbreviations of populist party dummies, meaning and reference categories.
Abbreviation Meaning Reference Group
Gov Populist Party in Government No Populist Party in Government
Opp Populist Party in Opposition No Populist Party in Opposition
R Right-Wing Populist Party Present No Right-Wing Populist Party Present
C Centrist Populist Party Present No Centrist Populist Party Present
L Left-Wing Populist Party Present No Left-Wing Populist Party Present
RG Right-Wing Populist Party in Government No Right-Wing Populist Party in Government
RO Right-Wing Populist Party in Opposition No Right-Wing Populist Party in Opposition
CG Centrist Populist Party in Government No Centrist Populist Party in Government
CO Centrist Populist Party in Opposition No Centrist Populist Party in Opposition
LG Left-Wing Populist Party in Government No Left-Wing Populist Party in Government
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Figure B1. Effect of populism on liberal democracy subdimensions (regression results: Tables B2 and B3). Note: Figure B1
additionally includes two more measures of liberal democracy by the UDS (Pemstein, 2010) and Democracy Barometer
(Merkel et al., 2016)
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Figure B2. Effect of populismon liberal democracy subdimensions by combinations of host ideology and government status
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Figure B3. RBC—Effect of populism on liberal democracy subdimensions using a lagged dependent variable (regression
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Figure B4. RBC–effect of populism on liberal democracy subdimensions by combinations of host ideology and government
status using a lagged dependent variable (regression results: Table B7).
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Table B2. Populism and liberal democracy by government status.
VDem UDS DB Minority Mutual Robustness CheckRights Constraints Mutual Constraints
Government −0.30 −0.002 0.26 2.52 −2.70** −1.56**
(0.48) (0.04) (0.45) (1.85) (1.34) (0.73)
Opposition 0.21 0.05* 0.62* 3.39** −2.19** −1.20**
(0.39) (0.03) (0.35) (1.51) (1.10) (0.59)
Democratic Consolidation 0.19*** 0.003** 0.002 0.40*** 0.13* 0.18***
(0.03) (0.002) (0.03) (0.11) (0.07) (0.04)
Cabinet Duration 0.01 0.002* 0.02 0.08* 0.04 0.02
(0.01) (0.001) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Government Type (surplus) 0.19 0.02 −0.56 1.24 1.87* 1.61***
(0.40) (0.03) (0.36) (1.56) (1.13) (0.60)
Economic Development −0.03 0.01* 0.10** −0.30 −0.05 −0.06
(0.06) (0.003) (0.04) (0.19) (0.12) (0.07)
Post-Communist Country 1.50 −0.35*** −5.65** −23.57** 11.41* 2.39
(3.59) (0.11) (2.47) (10.81) (5.71) (4.66)
Constant 71.73*** 1.21*** 55.97*** 62.91*** 62.22*** 41.18***
(2.53) (0.10) (1.74) (7.77) (4.51) (3.20)
Observations 251 263 251 263 262 255
Log Likelihood −616.74 18.28 −578.01 −987.48 −892.15 −721.81
AIC 1,253.49 −16.57 1,176.02 1,994.96 1,804.30 1,463.62
BIC 1,288.42 18.84 1,210.95 2,030.37 1,839.67 1,498.72
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table B3. Populism and liberal democracy by host ideology.
VDem UDS DB Minority Mutual Robustness CheckRights Constraints Mutual Constraints
Right −1.39*** −0.04 −0.81** −4.22*** −1.63 −0.56
(0.42) (0.03) (0.39) (1.59) (1.21) (0.69)
Center 0.75* 0.05 0.82** 1.94 −1.55 −0.38
(0.41) (0.03) (0.39) (1.61) (1.22) (0.67)
Left 1.71*** 0.07* −0.12 8.99*** 0.03 −0.11
(0.54) (0.04) (0.53) (2.05) (1.55) (0.88)
Democratic Consolidation 0.19*** 0.003** 0.003 0.42*** 0.14* 0.17***
(0.03) (0.002) (0.03) (0.11) (0.07) (0.05)
Cabinet Duration 0.01 0.001 0.01 0.08** 0.03 0.01
(0.01) (0.001) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Government Type (surplus) −0.16 0.002 −0.69* 0.37 1.67 1.47**
(0.39) (0.03) (0.36) (1.51) (1.15) (0.62)
Economic Development −0.06 0.005 0.11*** −0.39** −0.06 −0.07
(0.06) (0.003) (0.04) (0.18) (0.13) (0.07)
Post-Communist Country 0.68 −0.36*** −5.45** −25.18** 11.36* 2.03
(3.59) (0.12) (2.52) (10.90) (5.87) (4.64)
Constant 72.91*** 1.24*** 56.12*** 66.99*** 61.94*** 41.17***
(2.51) (0.11) (1.76) (7.76) (4.63) (3.21)
Observations 251 263 251 263 262 255
Log Likelihood −605.24 17.84 −575.31 −975.35 −892.49 −724.25
AIC. 1,232.48 −13.68 1,172.61 1,972.70 1,806.99 1,470.50
BIC 1,270.85 25.23 1,210.99 2,011.61 1,845.85 1,509.06
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table B4. Populism and liberal democracy by combinations of host ideology and government status.
VDem UDS DB Minority Mutual Robustness CheckRights Constraints Mutual Constraints
Right Government −2.51*** −0.20*** −2.58*** −9.15*** −0.80 −0.46
(0.86) (0.07) (0.88) (3.34) (2.55) (1.52)
Center Government −0.04 0.03 0.91* 1.87 −2.22 −1.24
(0.52) (0.04) (0.50) (2.05) (1.57) (0.86)
Left Government 3.24*** 0.28*** 0.33 13.40*** 1.50 1.67
(1.01) (0.08) (1.45) (3.91) (3.01) (1.97)
Right Opposition −1.12*** −0.04 −0.60 −3.50** −2.51** −1.00
(0.42) (0.03) (0.39) (1.59) (1.22) (0.68)
Center Opposition 0.52 0.03 0.38 1.79 −0.67 −0.14
(0.50) (0.04) (0.49) (1.96) (1.49) (0.84)
Left Opposition 1.34** 0.02 −0.06 7.68*** −0.53 −0.48
(0.58) (0.05) (0.56) (2.23) (1.69) (0.95)
Democratic Consolidation 0.21*** 0.004** 0.01 0.44*** 0.14* 0.18***
(0.03) (0.002) (0.03) (0.11) (0.07) (0.05)
Cabinet Duration 0.02 0.002* 0.02* 0.09** 0.03 0.02
(0.01) (0.001) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Government Type (surplus) −0.19 −0.01 −0.54 0.26 1.36 1.30**
(0.40) (0.03) (0.36) (1.55) (1.18) (0.63)
Economic Development −0.07 0.005 0.10** −0.40** −0.06 −0.07
(0.06) (0.003) (0.04) (0.18) (0.13) (0.07)
Post-Communist Country 0.95 −0.34*** −5.31** −24.96** 11.25* 2.31
(3.62) (0.12) (2.54) (10.78) (5.81) (4.70)
Constant 72.52*** 1.22*** 55.82*** 66.11*** 62.33*** 41.05***
(2.53) (0.11) (1.78) (7.71) (4.62) (3.25)
Observations 251 263 251 263 262 255
Log Likelihood −601.04 19.31 −570.74 −966.41 −885.56 −718.38
AIC. 1,230.09 −10.62 1,169.48 1,960.82 1,799.12 1,464.75
BIC 1,278.76 38.74 1,218.15 2,010.18 1,848.42 1,513.65
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table B5. RBC–association of populist parties with democratic quality by government status (lagged dependent variable
model).
VDem UDS DB Minority Mutual Robustness CheckRights Constraints Mutual Constraints
Government −0.20 −0.02 −0.41 2.18* −1.22 −0.36
(0.37) (0.03) (0.31) (1.31) (1.27) (0.68)
Opposition 0.0000 0.0003 0.25 2.40*** −1.25 −0.53
(0.27) (0.02) (0.21) (0.91) (0.89) (0.48)
Democratic Consolidation 0.01 0.0001 0.005 −0.03 −0.02 0.003
(0.01) (0.0005) (0.005) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Cabinet Duration 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.02 0.03 0.02
(0.01) (0.001) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Government Type (surplus) 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.64 0.70 0.51
(0.30) (0.02) (0.24) (1.07) (1.06) (0.57)
Economic Development −0.001 0.003** 0.003 −0.01 −0.005 0.01
(0.02) (0.001) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Post-Communist Country 0.36 −0.01 0.26 −1.84 0.17 0.18
(0.44) (0.04) (0.32) (1.47) (1.45) (0.75)
Lagged DV 0.96*** 0.82*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 0.81*** 0.94***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 3.21*** 0.17*** 2.22** 3.06 14.34*** 2.56*
(1.14) (0.06) (0.99) (1.92) (3.23) (1.40)
Observations 243 253 237 249 249 242
Adjusted R2 0.96 0.88 0.96 0.95 0.74 0.88
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table B6. RBC–association of populist parties with democratic quality by host ideology (lagged dependent variablemodel).
VDem UDS DB Minority Mutual Robustness CheckRights Constraints Mutual Constraints
Right −0.32 −0.03 −0.13 0.11 −0.44 −0.01
(0.28) (0.02) (0.22) (0.93) (0.91) (0.48)
Center −0.23 0.02 −0.04 0.30 −0.70 −0.48
(0.29) (0.02) (0.25) (1.05) (1.03) (0.55)
Left 0.35 −0.01 −0.06 2.84** −0.50 0.12
(0.33) (0.03) (0.30) (1.20) (1.17) (0.63)
Democratic Consolidation 0.004 0.0001 0.004 −0.02 −0.03 0.0004
(0.01) (0.0005) (0.005) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Cabinet Duration 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.02 0.03 0.02
(0.01) (0.001) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Government Type (surplus) 0.13 0.03 0.04 1.30 0.60 0.59
(0.30) (0.03) (0.26) (1.12) (1.10) (0.59)
Economic Development 0.01 0.003*** 0.01 0.02 −0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.001) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Post-Communist Country 0.46 −0.01 0.36 −0.81 −0.29 −0.06
(0.43) (0.03) (0.32) (1.45) (1.42) (0.73)
Lagged DV 0.96*** 0.82*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 0.81*** 0.93***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 3.48*** 0.17*** 1.85 2.79 14.57*** 2.89**
(1.15) (0.06) (0.99) (1.93) (3.26) (1.41)
Observations 243 253 237 249 249 242
Adjusted R2 0.96 0.88 0.96 0.95 0.74 0.87
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table B7. RBC–association of populist parties with democratic quality by combinations of host ideology and government
status (lagged dependent variable model).
VDem UDS DB Minority Mutual Robustness CheckRights Constraints Mutual Constraints
Right Government −0.34 −0.05 −0.24 0.41 0.91 1.11
(0.60) (0.05) (0.55) (2.27) (2.17) (1.29)
Center Government −0.88** −0.01 −0.67* −0.28 −1.55 −0.97
(0.43) (0.04) (0.38) (1.61) (1.56) (0.84)
Left Government 2.28*** 0.05 0.82 2.74 2.53 1.83
(0.80) (0.07) (1.58) (2.93) (2.87) (1.86)
Right Opposition −0.34 −0.03 −0.05 0.15 −1.13 −0.27
(0.28) (0.02) (0.22) (0.96) (0.94) (0.50)
Center Opposition −0.20 0.02 0.10 0.85 −0.95 −0.58
(0.33) (0.03) (0.29) (1.24) (1.22) (0.65)
Left Opposition −0.03 −0.02 −0.10 2.85** −1.07 −0.09
(0.36) (0.03) (0.30) (1.33) (1.28) (0.69)
Democratic Consolidation 0.01 0.0003 0.005 −0.02 −0.03 −0.002
(0.01) (0.001) (0.005) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Cabinet Duration 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.001) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Government Type (surplus) −0.03 0.02 0.05 1.11 0.35 0.45
(0.31) (0.03) (0.26) (1.18) (1.14) (0.61)
Economic Development 0.002 0.003** 0.005 0.01 −0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.001) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Post-Communist Country 0.39 −0.01 0.33 −0.96 −0.21 −0.08
(0.43) (0.03) (0.32) (1.48) (1.44) (0.75)
Lagged DV 0.96*** 0.82*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 0.82*** 0.93***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Constant 3.16*** 0.17*** 2.12** 2.97 14.69*** 3.15**
(1.14) (0.06) (1.01) (1.98) (3.34) (1.52)
Observations 243 253 237 249 249 242
Adjusted R2 0.96 0.88 0.96 0.95 0.74 0.88
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table B8. RBC–populism and liberal democracy by government status using alternative coding (see notes below the table).
VDem UDS DB Minority Mutual Robustness CheckRights Constraints Mutual Constraints
Government −0.41 −0.004 0.37 2.38 −3.08** −1.81***
(0.45) (0.04) (0.42) (1.76) (1.27) (0.69)
Opposition 0.28 0.05* 0.56 3.47** −1.96* −1.05*
(0.38) (0.03) (0.34) (1.46) (1.06) (0.57)
Democratic Consolidation 0.19*** 0.003** 0.001 0.41*** 0.13* 0.18***
(0.03) (0.002) (0.03) (0.11) (0.07) (0.05)
Cabinet Duration 0.01 0.001* 0.01 0.08* 0.04 0.02
(0.01) (0.001) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Government Type (surplus) 0.20 0.01 −0.57 1.24 1.90* 1.63***
(0.40) (0.03) (0.36) (1.56) (1.12) (0.60)
Economic Development −0.03 0.01* 0.10** −0.30 −0.05 −0.07
(0.06) (0.003) (0.04) (0.19) (0.12) (0.07)
Post-Communist Country 1.60 −0.35*** −5.62** −23.45** 11.55* 2.47
(3.60) (0.11) (2.47) (10.82) (5.73) (4.67)
Constant 71.59*** 1.21*** 55.95*** 62.73*** 61.99*** 41.05***
(2.54) (0.10) (1.74) (7.79) (4.53) (3.20)
Observations 251 263 251 263 262 255
Log Likelihood −616.35 18.41 −578.27 −987.51 −892.00 −721.55
AIC 1,252.71 −16.83 1,176.54 1,995.02 1,804.00 1,463.09
BIC 1,287.64 18.59 1,211.47 2,030.44 1,839.37 1,498.19
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
For this robustness check, we recoded two cases where populist parties supportedminority governments. These two cases
were the Danish Peoples Party from 2001 to 2011 and the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) from 2010 to 2012.
Table B9. Populism and liberal democracy by government status using seat share.
VDem UDS DB Minority Mutual Robustness CheckRights Constraints Mutual Constraints
Government 0.62 0.16 0.40 8.91 0.42 −0.09
(1.82) (0.15) (1.65) (7.06) (5.14) (2.86)
Opposition 1.94 0.35** −2.04 18.53** −5.08 −1.50
(2.07) (0.17) (1.90) (8.03) (5.86) (3.30)
Democratic Consolidation 0.18*** 0.003* 0.01 0.35*** 0.12 0.17***
(0.03) (0.002) (0.03) (0.12) (0.07) (0.05)
Cabinet Duration 0.01 0.001* 0.02 0.08* 0.03 0.01
(0.01) (0.001) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Government Type (surplus) 0.20 0.02 −0.58 2.00 1.38 1.40**
(0.40) (0.03) (0.36) (1.55) (1.13) (0.61)
Economic Development −0.02 0.01* 0.11** −0.24 −0.05 −0.06
(0.06) (0.003) (0.04) (0.19) (0.12) (0.07)
Post-Communist Country 1.25 −0.37*** −0.19** −24.56** 10.62* 1.80
(3.59) (0.11) (2.49) (10.68) (5.81) (4.61)
Constant 71.92*** 1.23*** 55.87*** 64.46*** 62.05*** 41.21***
(2.53) (0.10) (1.76) (7.72) (4.58) (3.19)
Observations 251 263 251 263 262 255
Log Likelihood −613.73 22.18 −575.95 −984.76 −892.25 −722.53
AIC 1,247.45 −24.35 1,171.89 1,989.51 1,804.50 1,465.05
BIC 1,282.38 11.06 1,206.82 2,024.93 1,839.87 1,500.15
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table B10. Populism and liberal democracy by host ideology using seat share.
VDem UDS DB Minority Mutual Robustness CheckRights Constraints Mutual Constraints
Right −7.94** 0.03 −5.72* −5.42 0.36 1.57
(3.32) (0.27) (3.03) (13.20) (9.84) (5.33)
Center 1.16 0.16 1.42 9.30 −2.23 −0.86
(1.74) (0.14) (1.60) (6.98) (5.19) (2.80)
Left 19.48*** 1.13*** −9.37 62.57*** 0.93 −0.43
(4.60) (0.36) (5.96) (17.80) (13.17) (10.39)
Democratic Consolidation 0.17*** 0.003 0.02 0.33*** 0.11 0.16***
(0.03) (0.002) (0.03) (0.11) (0.07) (0.05)
Cabinet Duration 0.01 0.001 0.01 0.08* 0.03 0.01
(0.01) (0.001) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Government Type (surplus) 0.02 0.02 −0.66* 1.57 1.49 1.46**
(0.38) (0.03) (0.36) (1.54) (1.15) (0.62)
Economic Development −0.02 0.01* 0.11** −0.23 −0.06 −0.07
(0.05) (0.003) (0.04) (0.18) (0.12) (0.07)
Post-Communist Country 0.49 −0.39*** −4.96* −26.19** 10.13* 1.63
(3.50) (0.12) (2.51) (10.62) (5.80) (4.59)
Constant 72.71*** 1.25*** 55.69*** 66.45*** 62.34*** 41.30***
(2.46) (0.10) (1.76) (7.67) (4.60) (3.18)
Observations 251 263 251 263 262 255
Log Likelihood −598.83 25.72 −569.98 −975.75 −888.53 −718.80
AIC 1,219.67 −29.43 1,161.96 1,973.49 1,799.07 1,459.59
BIC 1,258.04 9.48 1,200.34 2,012.40 1,837.93 1,498.15
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Appendix C. Description of Control Variables and Rationale for Inclusion
In our empirical model, we include a set of covariates that may relate to the presence of populist parties as well as to
our democratic measures. This section in the Appendix explains the detailed rationale for the inclusion of each of the con-
trol variables. First, we include democratic consolidation as a control variable. We anticipate that both the existence of
populism as well as the level of democracy might depend on how long a country is democratic. Furthermore, it has been
argued elsewhere that the effect of populists is stronger when democratic institutions are less established (see Huber &
Schimpf, 2016b; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). To capture this logic, we use the time that has passed since democra-
tization in each country was reached (in years) and use data from Polity IV (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2017). Second, we
control for cabinet duration. The shorter a cabinet lasts, the less likely it is that a cabinet can realize its agenda. Third, we
include a measure for cabinet composition. We distinguish between surplus governments and other governments such as
minority or minimal winning coalitions. Albertazzi and Mueller (2013) as well as Huber and Schimpf (2016a) highlight that
this might moderate the effect of populist parties in government. At the same time, long time surplus governments such
as in Austria have been argued to provide fertile grounds for populist’s anti-elite rhetoric. The ParlGov dataset contains
information on, both, the cabinet duration and composition (Doering & Manow, 2015). Fourth, we control for economic
development. Some scholars have argued that populists are especially successful in garnering support from “losers of
globalization” (Kitschelt, 1995, Kriesi et al., 2012). Thus, we anticipate that populist parties might be more successful in
less developed countries. On the other hand, a long-lasting discussion has emerged on whether democracy and economic
circumstances are connected or not (e.g. Boix & Stokes, 2003, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000). To capture
this, wemeasure economic development withWorldbank data on the gross domestic product per capita (GDPpc) in $1000
to ease interpretation. Finally, we include a dummy for post-communist countries as we anticipate that this distinction
might play a role, both in the existence of different populist parties and levels of democratic quality (Gherghina & Soare,
2013, p. 7).
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1. Introduction
On October 19, 2017, a 54-year old chemist set himself
on fire in Warsaw to protest the dismantling of democ-
racy in Poland. Piotr Szczęsny died from his injuries ten
days later (Dyke, 2017; Nalepa, 2017). His death symbol-
izes the decay of the democratic order in the so-called
Visegrad Four (V4)—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland
and Slovakia—the symptoms of which include declin-
ing trust in democratic institutions, emboldened uncivil
society, the rise of oligarchs and populists as political
leaders, assaults on an independent judiciary, the colo-
nization of public administration by political proxies, in-
creased political control over media, civic apathy and na-
tionalistic contestation.1 These processes signal that the
liberal-democratic project in these polities has been ei-
ther stalled, diverted or reversed.2
Although the extent of democratic decay in each of
the V4 countries varies, the notion of a turn from liber-
alism and pluralism (an “illiberal turn”) presumes the ex-
istence of a more or less linear trajectory and a consoli-
dated democratic system from which recent events are
1 On disruptions see Bernhard and Karakoç (2011); Hanley and Sikk (2016); Deegan-Krause and Haughton (2009); Haughton and Deegan-Krause (2015);
Stanley and Czesnik (2016); Stanley (2008); cf. Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski and Toka (1999).
2 On backsliding see Dawnson and Hanley (2016); Greskovits (2015); Huq and Ginsburg (in press); Rupnik (2007); Hanley and Vachudova (2017); cf.
Grzymala-Busse (2017); Levitz and Pop-Eleches (2010); Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017).
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seen as backsliding. We challenge this view. Rather than
seeing the V4 as having made a decisive break from an
inexorably liberal trajectory—an illiberal turn—we sug-
gest that recent developments in the political systems
of the V4 countries bear out a different—albeit no less
meaningful and consequential—model of change, char-
acterized by a sequence of “episodes”, some of which
can be characterized as “illiberal swerves”. In those cases
in which swerving has persisted, we can speak about
an “illiberal turn”. In developing this argument, we build
on Bernhard’s concept of chronic instability (Bernhard,
2015),which allows us to investigate the limits of path de-
pendence. If we hone in on shorter temporal sequences,
marked by elections, rather than on tectonic shifts in
regimes, we can better distinguish illiberal swerves from
outright turns, thereby sharpening our analytical lens on
recent developments in the V4.
We view the sequences of electoral cycles as a se-
ries of inherently unstable liberal-illiberal pushes and
pulls, which signal shifts in domestic and international
factors (Thelen, 2003). Discussions of the so-called “illib-
eral turn” often rely on the concept of backsliding (cf.
Greskovits, 2015; Jasiewicz, 2007), which can be distin-
guished from swerving in at least two ways. First, back-
sliding implies falling off a liberal democratic trajectory
and gives the impression that the liberal project has been
largely implemented and stable. The concept of swerv-
ing allows for the possibility that the commitment to
democratic pluralism has weakened, without implying
an idealized anchor-point. Swerving recognizes volatility
and uncertainty as an integral part of democracy, with-
out necessarily drawing an immediate link to a regime
change. Second, backsliding assumes the independence
of a string of observed sequences like a Markov process.
But the trajectory of illiberal swerving depends on pre-
vious episodes, and indeed is often a reaction to the
previous punctuated episode(s) of a liberal expansion
(Bustikova, 2014). Moreover, the current revolt against
liberalism is not only a revolt against the values of liber-
alism but also a reaction to (some of) the hypocritical ad-
vocates of liberalism who used it as a cover to steal and
to amass influence.
At a time when considerable attention is devoted to
the agency of political leaders and elite manipulation of
the masses, it is crucial to acknowledge that shifts to-
wards less liberal polities are often enacted by popular
demand and enthusiastically supported by illiberal “un-
civil” society (Chambers & Kopstein, 2001; Kopecky &
Mudde, 2003). The tail is also wagging the dog. Politi-
cal leaders do not typically “hijack” polities. Instead, they
modify them within the constraints imposed by legacies,
institutions, the political opposition and the voters.
By recalibrating the focus from backsliding and illib-
eral turns towards swerves, we can more easily see how
and when all four countries have converged or diverged
over time. From a historical perspective, the immedi-
ate post-1989 period gave rise to an episode of “imi-
tative modernization”, in which all four countries mim-
icked the idealized template of the liberal democratic,
pluralistic polity of the West. Sovereignty issues were
suppressed in pursuit of a “return to Europe”. Slovakia
tested the boundaries of illiberal swerving first. It swiftly
diverged from liberalism when it embraced the author-
itarian nationalism of Mečiar (1994–1998), but has re-
bounded. Facing a serious threat of being left behind
during the first wave of enlargement in 2004, along with
potential negative economic consequences, Slovakia has
seen darker days already and may therefore be more
inoculated from a future illiberal turn than Poland, the
Czech Republic, and Hungary, which did not experience
anything comparable in the 1990s. Whereas the Octo-
ber 2017 Czech elections saw growing support for pop-
ulist (almost 30%) and radical right (10.6%) forces, the
November 2017 Slovak regional elections saw the victory
of a coalition of right-leaning forces defeating both the
populist center-left and the extreme right. Slovakia re-
turned to the liberal path with a vengeance and is cur-
rently swerving the least among the V4 countries.
Executive aggrandizement (Bermeo, 2016) has also
succeeded the least in Slovakia and the Czech Repub-
lic compared to Poland and Hungary, which have gone
much further in degrading democratic institutions, such
as courts and public administration. In Poland, the first
Polish Law and Justice (PiS)-led government (2005–2007)
attempted to impose its centralized and illiberal vision
of the state but struggled to overcome political issues
within the governing coalition and the staunch opposi-
tion of the Constitutional Tribunal. The Polish swerve
lasted one electoral cycle and was reversed. The second
PiS government (2015–) has been more successful in re-
alizing this vision but faces opposition from civil society
and to a lesser degree from the President, who vetoed
two bills designed to control the Constitutional Tribunal.
However, the strength of illiberal civil society was man-
ifest on October 11, 2017, when some 60,000 patriots
marched in Warsaw to celebrate the Day of Indepen-
dence, calling for a “white Europe” and a “Poland with-
out Jews and Muslims”.
In Hungary, executive aggrandizement and swerving
over two electoral cycles (2010 and 2014) has resulted
in the only fully illiberal turn in the V4. The Orbán gov-
ernment has used its supermajority to raise issues of na-
tional sovereignty and to attack liberal civil society. This
has facilitated a concentration of executive power, en-
abling the ruling party FIDESZ to mold the country and
polity in its image, while keeping its political opponents
down. Already in 2012, Hungary amended its constitu-
tion to significantly weaken the ability of the Constitu-
tional Court to strike out laws. In 2017, the government
set impossible conditions for Central European Univer-
sity to remain in the country.
The notion of swerves—defined as volatile episodes
—permits us to identify both similarities and differences
across time and countries. After distinguishing between
illiberal swerves and illiberal turns, we suggest that Hun-
gary is the only country in the V4 at the brink of an il-
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liberal turn, whereas Poland and to a significantly lesser
degree the Czech Republic and Slovakia are engaged in
illiberal swerving. It is too early to tell whether these
will transform into fully illiberal turns. For a country’s se-
quence of swerves to become a turn, our framework sug-
gests that three conditions must be satisfied:
1) Executive aggrandizement;
2) Contested sovereignty that increases polarization;
3) Dominant party winning two consecutive elections.
The next section describes these three conditions in fur-
ther detail.
2. Illiberal Swerves and Turns
We define illiberal swerving using the first two con-
ditions: executive aggrandizement and contestation of
sovereignty. Aggrandizement refers to an increase in the
concentration of political power (Bermeo, 2016). It un-
dermines the constitutional order and reduces checks
and balances. If sovereignty becomes contested, often
with the help of populist appeals, ethnic, religious and
social minorities can face exclusion from the sovereign.
This limits pluralism in political deliberations. An illiberal
turn follows if the first two conditions are present and
a dominant party confirms its course in two consecu-
tive elections.
Attempts to concentrate power are not new to the V4
region. In Slovakia, Mečiar’s attempt at establishing a na-
tionalist, centralized and illiberal political system failed as
a result of domestic and international pressure. This took
place before Slovakia’s accession to the EU, giving the EU
significant leverage in thwarting it (Vachudova, 2005). In
the Czech Republic, one episode of a failed power grab
is particularly important: the Opposition Agreement of
1998, an attempt by twomajor parties to strengthen the
majoritarian character of the Czech polity. This gambit
failed due to political opposition and the Constitutional
Court (2000). Similarly, in Poland, the first PiS-led govern-
ment’s (2005–2007) swerving was blocked by the Consti-
tutional Tribunal.
Sovereignty becomes contested if a polity perceives
itself to be under threat, whether real or fabricated by
swerving elites. The sovereign is often a native ruler,
defined in ethnic terms, but the boundaries of the
sovereign are fluid. The views of who does—and does
not—constitute the sovereign changes over time and dif-
fers across countries (Basta & Bustikova, 2016; Shelef,
2010; Siroky & Cuffe, 2015). Non-politicized minorities
(for example, Vietnamese or Chinese minorities in the
V4) can be subsumed by the sovereign. For example,
the Czech far-right leader Okamura is ethnically half
Japanese. Social, religious and sexual minorities can be
excluded frommembership in the sovereign, especially if
they seek an expansion of rights (Bustikova, 2014, 2015).
The boundaries of the sovereign are contextual, defined
by historical experiences and shaped by domestic and in-
ternational constraints.
When sovereignty becomes contested, support for
radical right parties often follows. An illiberal swerve can-
not be accomplished without access to power, which is
limited for most niche parties. Radicalized mainstream
parties, on the contrary, are in a prime position to com-
bine exclusionary identity politics with executive aggran-
dizement (Bustikova, in press). However, if mainstream
parties are perceived as having betrayed the sovereign,
new, niche parties gain support. This implosion mani-
fests itself in a decrease in support for existing political
parties and the emergence of new, populist parties (e.g.,
ANO 2011, SMER).
Contested sovereignty has therefore contributed to
the success of radical right parties, including Okamura’s
Dawn of Direct Democracy, which entered the Czech Par-
liament in 2013, Okamura’s Freedom and Direct Democ-
racy, which entered in 2017, Kotleba’s Our Slovakia,
which entered Slovak Parliament in 2016 and Hungary’s
Jobbik, which is poised to win seats, again, in the 2018
Hungarian elections.3 In the 2017 Czech elections, the
radical right increased its presence in the Parliament and
is pushing for a Czexit—a referendum on the EU mem-
bership. The nationalist Eurosceptic, Václav Klaus Jr., ran
on the ballot of his father’s former party (ODS) and won
the second highest number of preferential votes (after
Andrej Babiš). The leader of ANO, Babiš, however, like
all other mainstream parties, expressed clear support
for EU membership. Poland has seen two waves of a
populist and radical right insurgency. First, the radical-
right Catholic nationalist League of Polish Families (LPR)
and the agrarian populist Self-Defence (SRP) emerged in
2001. The nationalist, conservative and economically lib-
ertarian Kukiz’15 movement followed in 2015.
Uncivil society (illiberal civil society) is an important
ally of the Polish, Hungarian and to a lesser degree Slovak
and Czech swerving leaders.4 Government-controlled
media outlets in Poland, Hungary and Slovakia—and
Babiš’s media in the Czech Republic—regularly attack or-
ganizations of civil society as “foreign agents” intent on
undermining national sovereignty (Guasti, 2016). In Hun-
gary, Orbán pioneered attacks on civil society by tighten-
ing rules on NGOs, often with foreign links and funding
sources.5 Orbán also launched a campaign against Cen-
tral European University and its founder George Soros.
In a “national consultation” about the future of Hun-
gary, George Soros was linked to the refugee crisis and Is-
lamization of Europe. FIDESZ hopes that xenophobic mo-
bilization, and the votes of Hungarians living abroad, will
help the party towin the upcoming elections in 2018. Un-
3 Jobbik has however recently moved to the center, runs on an anti-corruption platform that targets FIDESZ. On refugees, Jobbik embraces a more cen-
trist view, to distance itself from FIDESZ. Paradoxically, Jobbik might present a challenge to FIDESZ’s desire to capture a supermajority in the 2018
parliamentary elections.
4 Anti-Semitism has also grown in V4 and has been strategically adopted over time to portray Jews as a “fifth column” (Bustikova & Guasti, 2012).
5 Than and Dunai (2017); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2017).
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civil society has created an atmosphere in which racists,
nationalists, and ethno-populists can articulate exclu-
sionist narratives targeted at vulnerable groups, such as
ethnic minorities and refugees, raise militias to protect
the borders, promote extreme religious conservatism
(anti-abortion, anti-LGBT rights), and attack the “EU’s
multiculturalist propaganda”.
In Slovakia, uncivil society had focused much of its
attention initially on the Hungarian minority but shifted
to social and religious issues. This resulted in initiatives
like the 2009 language law and the 2015 referendum
on gays and lesbians (Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko).6
For the time being, the Hungarian minority is being ac-
commodated. In Hungary, the main targets of the rad-
ical right have tended to be Roma, and from 2015 on-
wards refugees, with the crisis of 2015 ramping up the
mobilization of uncivil society against refugees and facili-
tating general expressions of racism. The Hungarian gov-
ernment stokes fear and sanctions physical attacks and
abuse of refugees by border guards, especially at the Ser-
bian border.7
In Poland, the most successful organization in this re-
spect is the Catholic-nationalist network around the Ra-
dio Maryja radio station, which has forged a synergis-
tic political-economic relationship with PiS. As a main-
stream radicalized party, PiS is powerful enough to put
the religious conservative agenda into legislation. PiS has
also capitalized on the organizational capacities of far-
right organizations, such as the National-Radical Camp
(ONR) and the All-Polish Youth (Młodzież Wszechpol-
ska). But rather than co-opting them into mainstream
politics, PiS has been content to benefit from associ-
ating themselves with the actions of these organiza-
tions, while keeping sufficient distance to deny respon-
sibility for some of the more overtly racist elements of
their agenda.8
In the Czech Republic, uncivil society currently man-
ifests itself in the “Block against Islam” (established in
2015) and in the 2017 “Manifesto of the White Het-
erosexual Man”. Unlike in the remaining three V4 coun-
tries, Babiš has so far resisted open cooperation with
such organizations. Before the elections, Babiš rejected
a governing coalition of ANO with the far right and unre-
formed communists. However, after the election, ANO
has aligned its votes with them and placed far right rep-
resentatives and communist MPs in charge of key parlia-
mentary committees.
All four V4 political leaders (Babiš and Kaczyński) and
Prime Ministers (Fico and Orbán) differ in the degree
to which they embrace executive aggrandizement and
emphasize sovereignty. The major dividing line between
Babiš, the designated Prime Minister as of the Octo-
ber 2017 election, and the leaders of Slovakia, Poland
and Hungary is the absence of an exclusionary approach
to ethnic and social minorities, which indicates that
sovereignty is not at the core of Babiš’s political platform.
However, Babiš is aligned with President Zeman who
strategically polarizes the electorate using nativist hate
speech against refugees and Islam. Babiš’s hesitation
to fully embrace the rhetoric of contested sovereignty
stands in stark contrast to the other V4 members, where
the issue of sovereignty has beenmore politically salient.
At present, Slovakia stands out as the only country
of the V4 in which calls for a significant expansion of
executive power are absent. This is at least in part at-
tributable to the need to build coalitions to govern ef-
fectively, which makes the concentration of power much
less feasible. Mobilization against Hungarians has sub-
sided over the past five years, and the focus has shifted
to Roma, LGBT, and refugees. In contrast to Poland and
Hungary, the leadership in Slovakia is currently not on
a mission to concentrate executive power and modify
majority–minority relations. Despite the prominence of
Catholic faith and a politically active Catholic church, Slo-
vakia is not bitterly divided over social and religious is-
sues to the degree in Poland. The current Prime Minis-
ter Robert Fico is ruling over an ideologically incoherent
coalition that represents the radical right and ethnic Hun-
garians in the same cabinet. Fico is therefore content
with the status quo and has no grandiose plans other
than to keep two far-right parties at bay by strategically
adopting their rhetoric.
In the Czech case, Andrej Babiš’s populist political
party ANOwon in a landslide with almost 30% of the vote
inOctober 2017. Babiš views politics in technocratic terms
and sees the “state as a firm” in which the business of gov-
ernment is not impeded by democratic deliberation in the
parliament. He envisions a polity where executive power
is highly centralized, preferably in his hands. He aims to
run a “semi-technocratic government”, constituted by a
mixture of ANO ministers and experts. So far, most ex-
perts that have been offered ministerial posts have de-
clined. Civil society has also pushed back. Constitutional
scholars have rebuked the President Zeman’s attempt to
interpret the Constitution in a way that would allow Babiš
to run a minority government without winning a vote of
confidence and thereby subvert the parliament.
The major difference between Poland and Hungary
is that the Law and Justice party (PiS) faces a more signif-
icant parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition
to its vision of a homogenous sovereign. While the gov-
ernments of Poland and Hungary share a similar desire
for a power grab, Kaczyński is an ideologue aligned with
the church, whereas Orbán is a corrupt ideological en-
trepreneur aligned with oligarchs.9 Orbán has been ex-
plicit in his view that ethnic, religious and sexual minori-
ties should not have an equal opportunity to determine
the direction of the Hungarian state: “Hungary is a se-
6 Passed in 2009 by, PM Fico government, the law declared that the Slovak language is an articulation of national sovereignty, Slovak must be used in all
official settings, including at the local government level, and severely restricted the use of minority languages (Bustikova, 2015).
7 Medecins Sans Frontieres (2016); Dearden (2017). Discussions with Aron Suba.
8 Personal communication by Benjamin Stanley.
9 On inquiry into Orbán by the EU anti-corruption body, OLAF see Nolan (2016).
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rious country. It is fundamentally based on traditional
values. Hungary is a tolerant nation. Tolerance, however,
does not mean that we would apply the same rules for
people whose lifestyle is different from our own. We dif-
ferentiate between them and us”.10
Current developments in Poland are serious. The
leader of the PiS party, Jarosław Kaczyński, already holds
executive power despite having no formal executive ti-
tle. PiS deputy, Beata Szydło, who came to power after
PiS won a majority of seats in the October 2015 parlia-
mentary election, is widely regarded as a prime minis-
ter in name only. Szydło’s government swiftly embarked
on a path of concentrating power in the hands of the
PiS—attacking the independence of the Constitutional
Tribunal and the judiciary, and undermining the impar-
tiality of the public administration and public media. The
implementation of this project has generated a signifi-
cant backlash on the part of Polish civil society, exter-
nal institutions (in particular, the European Commission)
and the Polish President, Andrzej Duda (PiS), who vetoed
two governmental bills aimed at increasing control over
the judiciary. It is not clear whether Jarosław Kaczyński
will succeed in implementing his illiberal vision into a fully
illiberal turn, or whether Polish swerving will ultimately
be diluted, as a result of either opposition or internal PiS
power struggles.
Orbán in Hungary has made the most significant
steps in an illiberal direction. Orbán and his party FIDESZ
have been able to concentrate power gradually over the
past seven years, and have successfully reshaped the
Hungarian polity. Orbán’s playbook (Zalan, 2016) has pro-
vided a blueprint for the other V4 countries, particularly
for Poland.11 Orbán seized control of the Constitutional
Court and the Central Bank, politicized public admin-
istration, and intimidated FIDESZ’s political opponents.
Orbán’s centralization of power and the establishment
of an “illiberal democracy” in Hungary has proceeded
largely unchecked by opposition forces. Orbán has also
been able to skillfully use the EU structural funds to shore
up the Hungarian economy, his dominant party FIDESZ,
and its oligarchic cronies.
Having characterized the extent of illiberal swerving
and turning in the V4, we next turn our attention to the
relationship between illiberal swerving and the EU.
3. Illiberal Swerving and the EU
The EU represents the most significant external power
to influence the polities of the V4 countries after 1989.
Using both positive incentives and conditional pressures,
the EU has influenced Central and Eastern European
(CEE) countries in political, economic and constitutional
terms. This has been both directly via legislation (ac-
quis communautaire), and indirectly, via agenda-setting
and institutional adaptation (Lewis, 2006; Malová et al.,
2010). To the extent that the EU has been effective,
the asymmetrical relationship between the CEE appli-
cant countries and the EU seems to have provided it
with its leverage (Vachudova, 2015; cf. Grzymala-Busse
& Innes, 2003; Guasti, Siroky, & Stockemer, 2017). In
particular, EU conditionality and leverage was applied
differentially—weaker pressure was put on the leaders
and stronger pressure on the laggards (Schimmelfen-
nig, 2005).
It is tempting to see the current illiberal swerving
as a “natural correction” to the “overshooting” of Euro-
pean liberalism. It would be erroneous to suggest that
the reforms of the past two decades constituted an at-
tempt to impose upon Central Europe a set of solutions,
which were somehow “alien” to the region, and not re-
flective of what at least some of the political class and
the broader public desired. Rather than impugning the
EU for the illiberal turn (Schlipphak & Treib, 2017), or for
its inability to thwart it (Jenne & Mudde, 2012; Rupnik,
2016), we should consider the possibility that the acces-
sion process empowered political elites and civil society
in V4 to take ownership of the European integration pro-
cess. Some have embraced it; others seek more distance.
As an elite-driven process, however, the EU enlargement
facilitated both liberal and illiberal power grabs.
To illustrate episodic swerving over time, we turn
to the World Governance Indicators, which offer the
longest view on the V4 countries (Figure 1). We recode
the data using Hagopian’s (2005) three dimensions of
strength, effectiveness, and constitutionalism of democ-
racy to highlight the similarities and the differences be-
tween the V4 countries over time.12 Figure 1 shows the
pre-accession (2004) divergence between the V4 and an
overall improvement over time, but the development is
not linear in any of the four countries. Figure 1 also shows
that illiberal swerving is not new: there have been previ-
ous dips in the governance metrics. Finally, it also shows
that illiberal swerving is temporary. Only Hungary has ar-
guably made an illiberal turn.
Epstein and Sedelmeier (2008) contend that the EU
accession improved the general institutional infrastruc-
ture and the legislative capacity of CEE countries.We find
supportive evidence in three out of four cases in the V4.
10 May 2017 speech, available at http://hungarianspectrum.org/2015/05/22/viktor-orban-hungary-is-a-serious-country-where-gays-are-patiently-tole
rated
11 Zalan outlines a guidebook for an illiberal democracy. It consists of these following steps: win elections promising glory, dismantle courts, modify the
constitution, take over the state media, eliminate the power of foreign investors, discredit the opposition and the civil society, change the electoral
rules (Zalan, 2016).
12 To demonstrate the effect of EU conditionality we follow Hagopian (2005) and measure three dimensions of democratic quality—strength, effective-
ness, and constitutionalism. We transform the six governance dimension of theWorld Governance Indicators (WGI) into three dimensions: WGI’s voice
and accountability and political stability as a strength of democracy; governance effectiveness and regulatory quality as democratic effectiveness; the
rule of law and control of corruption as constitutionalism. We select WGI as it offers the longest sequence of indicators for the CEE region. The period
between 1996 to 2015 encompasses both the pre-accession, accession and post-accession. We acknowledge that quality of democracy and quality of
governance are overlapping concepts.
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 4, Pages 166–176 170
Figure 1. Comparison of Governance in V4 countries between 1996 and 2015. Source:World Governance Indicators. Notes:
New member states averages is based on calculations of the authors. All new member states average includes all new
member states of the EU (enlargements 2004, 2007 and 2013: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). Lower scores are associated with swerving.
In Hungary, all democratic indicators decreased between
1996 and 2015. Over time, Hungary performed best in
2002 and 2003 (the height of the EU pre-accession lever-
age) and worst in 2015 as PM Orbán continued his con-
struction of an “illiberal democracy”. In Poland and Slo-
vakia, all indicators have strengthened over time. Slo-
vakia was the second weakest of the V4 in 2015, but the
reason lies in its unfavorable 1996 ranking—significantly
lower than that of the other V4 countries. Slovakia
started as a laggard, and over time experienced signif-
icant growth and improvement. Its strongest year was
2005 (the “catch-up” period) and its weakest year was
2000 (Fico’s first government).
Poland seems to be immune to swerves, but its devel-
opment has been exceedingly volatile: negative between
2004 and 2006 (first PiS term) and positive in 2014 (be-
fore the crumbling of the Civic Platform). Given the signif-
icant progress that the Law and Justice government has
made in implementing its illiberal reform program, the
2016–2017 data for Poland will certainly reflect this de-
cline.13 The Czech Republic was the strongest performer
of the V4 group in both 1996 and 2016. The dip between
1996 to 1998 is due to the Opposition Agreement, which
was a failed attempt by the two major political parties
to transform the Czech political system by strengthening
its majoritarian elements. Similar to Poland, we expect a
sharp downward trajectory after the October 2017 elec-
toral victory of ANO.
Illiberal swerves are episodic, temporary and re-
versible, whereas illiberal turns represent more perma-
nent shifts in the state’s political orientation. While
Poland, the Czech Republic and especially Slovakia have
improved over time, whether despite or because of illib-
eral swerving, Hungary has worsened over time.
4. Illiberal Swerving and Refugee Crisis
The refugee crisis increased contestation over
sovereignty issues and polarized the electorate. Driven
by populist political voices and unbalanced media re-
porting, public opinion in all V4 countries is strongly
opposed to the reception and integration of refugees
(Guasti, 2017). Opposition to the EU refugee reloca-
tion quotas is usually couched in logistical terms—CEE
countries are not prepared to integrate migrants, it is
argued. Others argue that Muslim immigration repre-
sents a security threat and a health risk. These argu-
ments persist in spite of the fact that V4 countries have
previously integrated migrants without significant diffi-
culties. The Czech Republic integrated thousands of mi-
grants from Bosnia (Muslims) and Ukraine and Moldova
in the 1990s. Poland has taken in thousands of Chechen
refugees (Muslims) over the last two decades. Hungary
was the second largest recipient of refugees from the
Yugoslav wars. None of these actions led to political po-
larization. The number of refugees seeking asylum in the
all V4 countries after 2015 seemswell within these limits.
And still, the salience of the national sovereignty issues
has increased significantly, and national politicians have
turned against the EU to stay in power.
In 2016, the EU tried to introduce quotas for the dis-
tribution of refugees to various countries but met with
strong opposition from Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Re-
public (and Romania). In May 2017, the Hungarian and
Slovak governments disputed the EU refugee quotas at
the European Court of Justice, arguing that the quotas
are a pull factor for refugees, that they exceed the pow-
ers of the EU and that they undermine the sovereignty
of CEE states. In July 2017, the European Court of Justice
13 We expect most indicators to decrease significantly, reflecting the multi-faceted character of the PiS project, targeting the country’s Constitutional
Tribunal, judiciary, public media, public administration and the armed forces, and indication private media and non-governmental organizations will
become targets in the near future.
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upheld themandatory refugee relocation quotas and the
EU Commission sent a formal request to the Czech Re-
public, Hungary, and Poland—the three countries cur-
rently in breach of their legal obligations—to begin com-
plying with the quotas. Poland and Hungary have so far
refused to take any asylum-seeker under the EU scheme,
while Slovakia and the CzechRepublic have taken in some
refugees, but continue to cite security concerns.
Populists and radical right groups have been at the
forefront of developing negative narratives about the
consequences of accepting refugees. Many V4 politi-
cians (for example, Czech President Zeman and Polish PiS
leader Kaczyński) have drawn a clear link between the
presence of refugees in Europe and the increased risk
of terrorist attacks. Every terrorist attack in Western Eu-
rope is presented as proof of a security threat. In January
2016, then Czech Minister of Finance Andrej Babiš sum-
marized these arguments on his Twitter account: “When
you see today that more advanced countries, with a dif-
ferent tradition of receivingmigrants, are not able to inte-
gratemigrants from theMiddle East and Africa, then you
cannot be surprised that I do not accept any refugees.
I honestly do not believe that they can integrate into
our society”.
Populists and radical right actors grasp this oppor-
tunity to strengthen their anti-establishment rhetoric—
presenting the disease (governmental elites as corrupted
by the EU, and unable to defend national interests) and
the cure (populist representatives of the people, who
will effectively push back against “Brussels” and the dan-
gers of multiculturalism). The 2015 elections in Poland
demonstrated the potency of the refugee issue as an
electoral asset for mainstream parties in Poland. PiS
exploited public anger at the outgoing Civic Platform
government—which had voted in favor of the refugee
quotas—to increase its appeal to voters on the right and
also to center-right voters whose concerns were rooted
in fears about the consequences of immigration.
Campaigning against refugees backfired against the
mainstream SMER in Slovakia when it tried to outbid
the far right on the refugee issue. The increased salience
of refugees strengthened far-right parties, which cumu-
latively obtained 16% of the vote.14 The strategy of
Fico’s SMER weakened his dominant position in Slo-
vak politics. In the 2017 Czech elections, campaigning
against refugees also backfired on themainstream Social
Democrats, who lost 70% of their support, and strength-
ened the radical right, who went from 6.9% in 2013 to
10.6% in 2017.
The illiberal swerve has a less off mentioned lib-
eral twin, characterized by an embrace of the European
project and its democratic values. Amid the populist anti-
refugee rhetorical storm, Slovak President Andrej Kiska
was alone among the V4 leaders in his appeal to the pub-
lic to show openness, solidarity, and humanity, and to
refrain from racism. More importantly, Kiska said: “I per-
ceive the debate we lead about migrants and refugees
as an important struggle for the heart and character
of Slovakia”. The same can, of course, be said for the
other V4 countries, but major politicians defending lib-
eral cosmopolitan values are in short supply in the rest
of the CEE.
Still, the European project has not been rejected.
Most citizens in the V4 trust the EU more than their gov-
ernments. Second, V4 citizens trust the EU more than
the citizens of an average EU country (Figure 2). In Octo-
ber 2004, several months after the accession of the first
CEE wave, more than half of V4 citizens trusted the EU.
Hungarians trusted the EU the most (63.5%), followed
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Figure 2. Trust in the EU in V4 countries between 2004 and 2017. Source: Eurobarometer.
Note: Trust to EC used here as a proxy for trust to EU.
14 On voter volatility in Slovakia see Gyárfášová, Bahna and Slosiarik (2017).
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least (51.4% and 51.2% respectively). Between 2004 and
2017, trust in the EUdecreased in all V4 countries but the
Hungarians still have the highest levels of trust in the EU.
Overall, trust in Poland and Hungary is above the EU28
average, while the trust in the Czech Republic and Slo-
vakia is comparatively low.
The refugee crisis undermined trust in the EU (be-
tween 2015 and 2017), but it also transformed the
nature of Euroscepticism. Initially, Euroscepticism was
fueled by fears about the consequences of ceding
sovereignty. In 2009, Euroscepticism manifested itself in
opposition to the Lisbon Treaty, particularly in Poland
and the Czech Republic. During the economic crisis,
Euroscepticism was economically driven and directed
against the oversight of the European Central Bank in
Hungary. Slovak’s far-right opposed bailing out Greece,
since Slovakia was expected to contribute as a member
of the eurozone, unlike the other three countries that are
outside the eurozone. From 2015 onwards, Euroscepti-
cism has been framed around the perception that new
member states are being treated as “second-class mem-
bers”, particularly concerning the alleged “imposition” of
refugee quotas against their will.
In the Czech Republic, the twomost vocal opponents
of the refugee quotas are the ANO leader Andrej Babiš
and President Zeman. In Poland, PiS and the radical-
right opposition Kukiz’15 are at the forefront of reject-
ing the EU refugee quotas. However, even the opposition
party Civic Platform is luke-warm about accommodating
refugees. Hungary, which has the highest level of trust
in the EU among the V4 and much higher than the EU
average, shows that illiberal swerving is fully compatible
with positive attitudes towards the EU. Further research
would be needed, however, to ascertain whether Hun-
garians value the EU as an idea or as a pocketbook.
Slovakia is a poster child for the positive effects of
Europeanization. The country is the only Euro adopter
among the V4. In August 2017, PrimeMinister Fico broke
with the V4 countries to openly articulate Slovakia’s
place at the core of deepening European integration (Jan-
cirova, 2017). At the same time, the Slovak government’s
staunch opposition to migrant quotas is completely in
line with the other V4 countries.
The EU playbook to thwart illiberal swerving is lim-
ited to recommendations and sanctions under Article 7
of the Lisbon Treaty. The vote must be unanimous, how-
ever. Kaczyński and Orbán have neutralized the threat of
sanctions by forging a coalition to veto any Article 7 vote
against each other’s country. This stalemate can be only
changed domestically. For now, the main focus of both
Kaczyński and Orbán is to maintain public support and to
limit domestic opposition.
5. Illiberal Swerving and the Global Economic Crisis
Looking back over the last two decades, it is tempting
to associate the illiberal turn in CEE with the global eco-
nomic crisis. Economic anxiety can lead to the destabi-
lization of political systems, and prompt voters to pun-
ish parties by opting for anti-establishment, populist chal-
lengers (Hawkins, Read, & Pauwels, 2017).
But with the data in hand, we can now ask about the
impact of the global economic crisis on illiberal swerv-
ing in CEE. The economic crisis and the subsequent Euro
crisis varied across the region. There was virtually no
negative impact in terms of GDP or labor market indica-
tors in Poland. The Czech Republic experienced a mod-
erate economic contraction and a mild weakening of
the labor market. Slovakia’s labor market experienced
a harsh shock coupled with a moderate economic con-
traction. Finally, Hungary suffered through a severe eco-
nomic contraction and moderate labor market impact
(Verick & Islam, 2010, p. 29). The economic crisis was
an economic stress test, but it also tested the depth of
democratic consolidation.
During the economic crisis, trust in the EU in EU28
countries decreased by 8%. It is no surprise that trust
decreased in three of the four V4 countries: the Czech
Republic (−6.5%), Poland (−5.6%) and Slovakia (−2.3%).
Paradoxically, in Hungary, where the effects of the cri-
sis were the most severe, trust in the EU has strength-
ened (+1.4%).
Kriesi and Pappas (2015, p. 323) argue that the eco-
nomic crisis generated populist challenges to the status
quo roughly commensurate with the extent of the im-
pact of the crisis. Populism significantly rose in Hungary,
a country that experienced dramatic economic contrac-
tion. Where the crisis was not as severe—such as in the
Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia—populismwas very
limited, they argue. This was certainly the case until a
few years ago. The rise of PiS in Poland, unaffected by
the crisis, and the electoral landslide of ANO in the Czech
Republic, a country with the lowest unemployment rate
in Europe, show that populists can thrive in decent eco-
nomic conditions. Hungary, however, has undergone a
sharp economic downturn, exacerbated by the existence
of corrupt oligarchic networks tied to FIDESZ that have
penetrated the state administration. The economic crisis
certainly fueled illiberal swerving in the V4 but appears
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for it.
6. Conclusion
This article investigates the “illiberal turn” in the V4 coun-
tries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia). We dis-
tinguish “turns” from “swerves”, with the former rep-
resenting more permanent political changes. Three rea-
sons underline this distinction. First, despite similarities
in democratic and economic performance, the V4 is a
diverse group, and the broad “illiberal turn” brush ob-
scures more than it illuminates. Second, V4 countries
have demonstrated that they can overcome authoritar-
ian inklings in the recent past (the Czech Republic after
2000, Slovakia after 1998, Poland between 2005 to 2007).
Third, we remain cautiously optimistic about the state of
democracy in the V4, but we consider the current situa-
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tion in Hungary to be grave.15 Moreover, we are alarmed
by efforts to undermine democratic institutions and the
rule of law in Poland and by the authoritarian inklings of
Babiš in the Czech Republic. Yet, none of the V4 coun-
tries seem to be at immediate risk of a regime reversal
to a full-blown autocracy.
Viewing recent developments in the V4 through the
lenses of temporary episodic swerves offers a more nu-
anced perspective on the state of democracy. For illiberal
swerving to become a full turn, the key conditions would
need to recur over at least two electoral cycles: 1) politi-
cal polarization that prevents viable consensus about the
character of the democratic polity; 2) the capture of the
courts that seeks to dismantle the rule of law and bal-
ance of power; 3) political control of the media that in-
volves increased control of the state media, and elimina-
tion or subjection of private media; 4) legal persecution
of the civil society to disable mobilization and protest;
and most importantly 5) change in electoral rules and
of the Constitution to permanently weaken the politi-
cal opposition.
As of 2017, Hungary has fulfilled most of these condi-
tions, whereas the Polish PiS has been only partially suc-
cessful. Some swerving has occurred in the Czech Repub-
lic and Slovakia, but there is still plenty of distance from
an illiberal turn. Time will soon tell whether these illib-
eral swerves become full-fledged illiberal turns. If FIDESZ
in Hungary, PiS in Poland and ANO in the Czech Repub-
lic decisively win another election, they will implement
irreversible changes that will take these countries out
of the orbit of European democracies. Unpacking the il-
liberal turn into a series of episodes of illiberal swerves
that combine executive aggrandizement and contesta-
tion of sovereignty, provides a new way of understand-
ing current developments in the V4. Small shifts need not
cause alarmism about an “illiberal turn”. It is true that big
trees from small acorns grow, but not all seeds bloom,
and not all roots grow—for the same reason, not all il-
liberal swerves will become illiberal turns—because the
necessary conditions are not satisfied and countervailing
forces show resistance.
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After a period of quiescence in the postwar decades,
the appeal of right-wing populist movements and parties
has increased steadily in Europe and the U.S. since the
1980s. Although this appeal has ebbed and flowed, the
Great Recession of 2008 reinforced these tendencies, as
demonstrated subsequently by the rise of Tea Party and
Donald Trump’s shocking victory in the 2016 presidential
election in the U.S.; the successful British referendum to
leave the EU; the continued growth and stunning elec-
toral performances of established right-wing populist
parties in Western Europe, such as the French National
Front and the Austrian Freedom Party; and, in Eastern
Europe, the rise to power of right-wing populist parties
in Poland and Hungary. These dramatic events have in-
spired a plethora of new scholarship on populism, which
has moved beyond older debates about the agrarian vs.
urban roots of populism, or whether or not populism is
even a useful term for social scientists (e.g. Gellner &
Ionescu, 1969). More recent scholarly debates have fo-
cused on how to define populism; whether it expands
democracy or represents a threat to it; how new forms
of media abet or inhibit populist movements; whether
or not a charismatic leader is a necessary for a success-
ful populist movement; and whether or not populists are
capable of maintaining power once elected. Not surpris-
ingly, this new literature on populism has been domi-
nated by political scientists, with less frequent contribu-
tions from sociologists and media scholars. In contrast
to the older debates about populism, historians have
been—with some exceptions (e.g. Abromeit, Chesterton,
Marotta, & Norman, 2016; Finchelstein, 2017)—notably
absent. Although scholars who study populism in differ-
ent regions have produced solid comparative studies (e.g.
Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012), truly interdisciplinary ap-
proaches to populism have also been lacking. In what fol-
lows, I will survey a few of the most significant recent
works on populism, with a view to some of the blind
spots produced by the aforementioned peculiarities of
this new wave of scholarship. I will also refer through-
out to the studies of fascism and right-wing populismpro-
duced in the middle decades of the twentieth century by
the Frankfurt School critical theorists. Their truly inter-
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disciplinary approach still offers many valid insights into
the socio-economic roots and social-psychological mech-
anisms that underlie populist movements. Largely forgot-
ten or caricatured today, their studies of populist and
authoritarian movements could still provide an excellent
point of departure for new, interdisciplinary approaches
to populism.
In her study, The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing
Populist Discourses Mean, Ruth Wodak draws upon the
“discourse-historical approach” (DHA) to analyze the
main rhetorical strategies used by right-wing populist
parties and politicians. She focuses primarily on Europe,
but also casts an occasional glance at theU.S. and the Tea
Party. Her book was published in 2015, before Donald
Trump’s rise to political power. She spells out briefly the
methodological and theoretical assumptions of the DHA
in the third chapter, thereby justifying her focus through-
out on texts (written, spoken or visual) and the mean-
ings they attain only within specific contexts. She argues
repeatedly that there can be no one single overarching
explanation of the resurgence of right-wing populism in
Europe and the U.S. in the past two decades, and that
right-wing populist discourses have completely different
meanings in different local contexts. At the same time,
however, she does identify certain tendencies that tran-
scend what she calls the “micro-politics” of right-wing
populism. For example, among the books under consid-
eration here, she provides the richest analysis of the
“re-nationalization” of politics in Europe that right-wing
populist parties have both spearheaded and benefited
from. After providing her reader with some basic back-
ground information about right-wing populism and schol-
arly discussions of it in the first two chapters, and her
own theoretical assumptions in chapter three, Wodak
focuses in the next four chapters on four of the most
important content areas of right-wing populist rhetori-
cal “topoi”, namely, nationalism, anti-Semitism, perfor-
mance and the media, and gender. In the concluding
chapter, she ties the various strains of her arguments
together, but also presents an original and provocative
argument about the “Haiderization” of European poli-
tics, to which I will return below. Interspersed unevenly
throughout these eight chapters are a series of 15 “vi-
gnettes”, in which Wodak provides more detailed analy-
sis of right-wing populist texts from specific instances or
debates, such as an interview with British National Party
politician Nick Griffin, in which he discusses accusations
of Holocaust denial, or a series of racist and xenopho-
bic posters supporting the Swiss People’s Party. These
vignettes are undoubtedly one of the main strengths of
Wodak’s study, not only because they give her a chance
to provide the close textual analysis favored by DHA, but
also as a source of empirical case studies, which shed
much light on the differences and similarities between
various right-wing populist parties in Europe.
It is perhaps not a coincidence that Wodak’s discus-
sion of themain content areas of right-wing populism be-
gins with nationalism. Following Theodor Adorno, whose
statement, “identity is the prototype of ideology”, she
cites, Wodak illustrates the creeping “re-nationalization”
of European politics in the past two decades with a dis-
cussion of language, immigration and naturalization poli-
cies. She notes, for example, that in 1998 only six Eu-
ropean states had language and/or citizenship exams,
whereas by 2010 that number had increased to 18, and
by 2013 to 23 (Wodak, 2016, p. 88). She argues that
such tests are repressive insofar as they deny the “ob-
vious fact” that “Europe and the EU have become coun-
tries of immigration, diverse, multilingual and multicul-
tural” (Wodak, 2016, p. 186). Even when right-wing pop-
ulist parties’ success at the ballot box has been limited,
they have had an outsized influence in the resurgence
of nationalism, insofar as mainstream parties have of-
ten taken over their language and even policy propos-
als in order to outflank them politically. This is one as-
pect of what she describes as a “normalization of right-
wing populist policies”, which has had as a consequence
“that almost the entire political spectrum moves to the
right” (Wodak, 2016, p. 184). In the final chapter of her
book she illustrates this process in more detail with an
illuminating discussion of the electoral breakthrough of
the Austrian Freedom Party, which received 27.2% of
the vote in national elections in October 1999—enough
to form a governing coalition the following February
with the Christian-Democratic Austrian People’s Party.
In response, 14 EU member states imposed sanctions
on Austria, but these sanctions were soon lifted and
an EU panel concluded that the new governing coali-
tion did not violate EU law. Wodak argues that these
events were a decisive turning point: “his [Haider’s] as-
cension marks the threshold when right-wing populist
parties started to become acceptable for being inte-
grated into a national government in an EU member
state” (Wodak, 2016, p. 178). Although Wodak makes a
strong case for the “Haiderization of Europe”, her almost
complete neglect of right-wing populism in France and
Italy, begs the question of how Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Na-
tional Front and Silvio Berlusconi’s Forward Italy parties,
which were both influential—albeit in different ways—
before Haider’s electoral breakthrough, also anticipated
and normalized right-wing populist politics in Europe.
In the fifth chapter Wodak makes an intervention in
the ongoing debate about the role of anti-Semitism in
right-wing populist parties and whether or not it has—
as some commentators have recently claimed—been
displaced by Islamophobia among “second-generation”
leaders, such as Marine Le Pen or Heinz Christian Stra-
che, who have arguably distanced their respective par-
ties from the open anti-Semitism of their successors and
have instead moved toward a chauvinistic concept of
“Western Civilization” allegedly under attack by Islam.
Wodak convincingly criticizes this thesis and argues that
anti-Semitism is just as important as ever for right-wing
populist parties in Europe, even if it must now be ex-
pressed in coded forms. She makes clear that Islamo-
phobia and anti-Semitism can and do continue to exist
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side by side. In chapter six Wodak examines the right-
wing populist politics of charisma and their use of tradi-
tional and newer social media. Although she criticizes a
purely psychological concept of charisma, which locates
its source in the exceptional “gifts” of the populist leader,
her own definition of term as mastering specific perfor-
mances in specific contexts remains rather formalistic
and points to the limits of her predominantly linguistic
and text-based approach. In this same chapter she nods
approvingly to the analysis of the “Führer personality” by
Leo Lowenthal—Theodor Adorno’s erstwhile colleague
at the Institute for Social Research. What sets Lowen-
thal and Adorno’s analyses of charisma and authoritar-
ianism apart from her own, however, was their much
more fully developed social-psychological conceptual ap-
paratus. Their combination of the psychoanalytic con-
cept of “identification” with an analysis of the histori-
cally shaped character structures that exist in any given
society, made it possible for them to grasp the actual
emotional mechanisms at work in charisma in a way that
linguistic and textual analysis alone cannot. That said,
Wodak’s careful analysis here of the mendacious rhetori-
cal techniques used by right-wing populist leaders sheds
much light on the subject—and continues felicitously the
tradition of earlier studies along the same lines, such as
Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman’s Prophets of Deceit:
A Study of the Techniques of the American Agitator. In
chapter seven Wodak turns her attention to an aspect
of right-wing populist rhetoric that has often been ne-
glected by other commentators: gender. She notes that
moremen—andmore working-class men, in particular—
vote for right-wing populist parties than do women, es-
pecially in Western Europe. At the same time, she offers
a nuanced and compelling explanation of why women
occupy important leadership roles in many of the par-
ties in both Europe and the U.S. In more secular West-
ern Europe, Marine Le Pen and Pia Kjaersgaard focus
on the hijab or burqa wearing Muslim as the primary
symbol of the threat Islam poses to “Western” ideals
of gender equality, whereas in the more Christian U.S.
populist politicians like Sarah Palin and Michelle Bach-
man view abortion and even contraception as threats to
the traditional, white patriarchal family. Drawing once
again on Adorno,Wodak argues that the reactionary atti-
tudes towards gender characteristic of many right-wing
populist male voters are linked—in both Europe and the
U.S.—to the real and perceived loss of status of white
working-class men since the 1970s and that these atti-
tudes co-exist and reinforce other aspects of the “syn-
drome” of the authoritarian personality, such as ethno-
centrism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia.
In The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Politi-
cal Style, and Representation, BenjaminMoffitt (2016) at-
tempts to stake out an innovative interpretation of pop-
ulism as a political style, whose essence lies primarily in
mediated performances by leaders and not in specific
content or ideology. Moffitt also attempts to move be-
yond the limits of most recent commentary on populism
by addressing it as a truly global phenomenon, with com-
mon characteristics everywhere. To make good on his
claim for global coverage, he uses as case studies 28 pop-
ulist leaders from around the world. The other main way
in which Moffitt tries to set his study apart from the vo-
luminous older and newer literature on populism lies in
his focus on the dramatic transformation of the media in
the past two decades and its effects upon politics. Mof-
fitt argues that populism is qualitatively different today
because of the new media, and that the new media has
benefited and advanced populism more than any other
form of politics.
Moffitt begins with an overview of the literature on
populism, in which he discerns four distinct approaches:
populism as an ideology, a political strategy, a discourse
or rhetoric, or a political logic. He proceeds to explain
how his own interpretation of populism as a political
style differs from these approaches. According to him, all
forms of populism appeal to “the people” against “the
elite”; they flaunt bad manners and flout politically cor-
rect forms of behavior; and they seek to mobilize sup-
porters with hyperbolic warnings about existing or immi-
nent crises and threats. Furthermore, populism differs
from genuine political ideologies, such as liberalism or
socialism, in that it relies much less on stable principles
than on specific ways of performing politics. He argues
that, for populists, politics is more about how the mes-
sage is delivered than the actual message itself. Mof-
fitt cites approvingly the “constructivist” and “performa-
tivist” turns in the social sciences as informing his posi-
tion. He notes as an advantage of his approach the abil-
ity to recognize “the populist style in politics” in many
different contexts, and across the traditional divisions
between the left and the right. Consequently, Moffitt
makes no effort to distinguish left- and right-wing forms
of populism. Instead, he contrasts populism as a whole
to non-populist forms of politics, such pluralism and es-
pecially technocracy, whose appeal to expertise, good
manners and stability he views as the diametric opposite
of populism.
In chapter four of his study, Moffitt turns his atten-
tion to the much-debated role of the leader in populism.
He argues—against Cas Mudde and others—that down-
playing the role of the leader betrays a Eurocentric ap-
proach to populism; the centrality of the leader to pop-
ulist movements and parties is the rule, rather than the
exception, when one views populism as a global phe-
nomenon. For Moffitt, “it is the leader that should be
our main focus when studying the phenomenon, given
that they are the figures that ultimately ‘do’ populism”
(Moffitt, 2016, pp. 51–52). Populism differs from tradi-
tional political ideologies also in that the leader does
not represent but actually embodies “the people”. But,
as Moffitt points out insightfully, charisma is not nec-
essary to become a living symbol of the “general will”;
more important are convincing “performances of ordi-
nariness and outsiderness”, which make it possible for
people to identify with the leader. Moffitt states that
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he agrees with Freud’s theory of group psychology, ac-
cording towhich such “symbolic unification of the group”
functions as a process of identification, although he does
not discuss the process of introjection, which leads to
the formation of libidinal bonds between the leader and
his/her followers.1 Moffitt’s reference to Freud here is
isolated and social-psychological categories of any kind
are absent in the remainder of his book. As withWodak’s
discourse-analytical approach,Moffitt’s emphasis on the
media and performance provides few conceptual tools
that could explain why certain political techniques are
successful, while others fail. To his credit, Moffitt at-
tempts to address this problem in chapter six, which
focuses on the audience for populism. Qualifying his
claim in chapter four somewhat about the primacy of the
leader, Moffitt admits here that not all attempts to per-
form populism are successful and the populist subject is
not simply “interpellated” in a passive way, but has an
active role in choosing which performances it accepts,
through individuals’ decision to listen or not, or to join
or vote for specific parties. Although Moffitt is certainly
correct to emphasize that the relationship between the
populist leader and his or her supporters is thoroughly
mediated—not direct—his own concept of mediation re-
mains unmediated insofar as it focuses solely on me-
dia performances and not the larger social and histori-
cal context in which those performances occur. His in-
vocation of Guy Debord’s Society of the Spectacle here
to support his claims demonstrates clearly Moffitt’s in-
adequate mediation of media appearance with social re-
ality. For Debord—thoroughly schooled in Hegel, Marx
and Lukács—the “spectacle” was precisely not just the
media, but rather the most advanced form of a capital-
ist society, in which even images have been seized by
the commodity form. Moffitt has good insights into the
key role that carefully constructed, mythical images of
“the people” play in the populist ideological repertoire,
but he lacks the conceptual tools to decipher such so-
cial heiroglyphics.
In chapter seven, Moffitt shifts back to a more con-
structivist argument, with a critique of commentators
who posit a strong, or even weak causal link between
crises and populism. Against them, Moffitt views “crisis
as a phenomenon that can be experienced only through
mediated performance” (Moffitt, 2016, p. 118) and he
avers that “a crisis only becomes a crisis when it is per-
ceived as a crisis” (Moffit, 2016, p. 120, emphasis his
own). One wonders if the legions of persons who lost
their jobs and homes after the Great Crash in 1929 or
the Great Recession in 2008—which led directly to an
upsurge of left- and right-wing populist movements in
Europe and the U.S.—just needed to adjust their percep-
tions.Moffitt does have aworthwhile point tomake here,
namely, that the performance of crisis is essential to the
populist’s cultivation and manipulation of fear among
its audience, but severing the link completely from real
social crises and populism goes too far. In the penul-
timate chapter Moffitt turns his attention to debates
about whether populism is good or bad for democracy.
After a brief, but lucid outline and analysis of the main
positions of the threemain camps—thosewho view pop-
ulism as a threat to democracy, those who view it as a
deepening of democracy, and those who take an equiv-
ocal approach—Moffitt sides with those who remain ag-
nostic and insists that populism will have different con-
sequences in different contexts. Incongruously, he criti-
cizes Cas Mudde—whom he correctly places in the third
camp—for not making his normative commitment to lib-
eral democracy and pluralism clear enough, while at the
same time arguing that populism often serves as a cor-
rective to overly liberal conceptions of democracy. Mof-
fitt’s elaboration of the positive and negative effects pop-
ulism can have in different contexts is illuminating, but it
would seem that his own normative commitments are
weaker than Mudde’s. Moffit concludes with the unde-
niable observation that populism has experienced a re-
vival on a global scale in the past few decades and that
it is here to stay. His other parting claim, that analyses
of populism must keep pace with times, is well taken, al-
though his own passing and underdeveloped reference
to Freud can also serve as a reminder that “older” con-
ceptual approaches to populism and group psychology
should not be consigned to the proverbial dustbin of his-
tory. As anyone who has suffered through The Triumph
of theWill knows, right-wing populists’ discovery of “new
media” long predates the twenty-first century.
In Populism: A Very Short Introduction, one can find a
useful distillation of the reflections of two veteran schol-
ars of populism, Cas Mudde and Cristobál Rovira Kalt-
wasser (2017). The former is a leading authority on right-
wing populist parties in Europe and the latter an expert
on populism in Latin America, although both have also
published comparative studies of populism in different
regions. Parting ways immediately with those who re-
ject populism as a merely polemical term, or one too
vague to be helpful for scholarly analysis, the authors ar-
gue that it is possible to provide a minimal definition of
populismwhich grasps its common features across space
and time, and distinguishes it from other political move-
ments, parties and/or ideologies. Accordingly, they de-
fine populism as a “thin-centered ideology” which neces-
sarily includes three core concepts. They use “ideology”
as a neutral, not an inherently pejorative term,more akin
to a “worldview” than “false consciousness”. By “thin-
centered” they refer to the fact that populism is less com-
prehensive than other political “ideologies”, such as liber-
alism or socialism,whichmakes it possible, indeed neces-
sary, for populism to be combined with other ideologies
in order to become an effective political force. The three
core concepts that define populism, according to them,
are “the people”, “the elite”, and “the general will”. Fol-
lowing or alluding to Ernesto Laclau, they refer to the first
1 For an insightful discussion of the pyschoanalytic concept of identification and its relevance to contemporary right-wing populist movements, see (Leeb,
in press).
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two concepts as “empty signifiers”, which means that
onemust examine the particular incarnation of populism
in a local context to determine how the opposition be-
tween “the people” and “the elite” is constructed. With
the concept of “the general will”, they allude, of course,
to Rousseau and his critique of representative govern-
ment, but also to what they refer to as the “monist core
of populism” (p. 18), which brings populism into close
proximity with the later, right-wing and (proto-)fascist
political theory of Carl Schmitt. Mudde and Kaltwasser’s
choice of Rousseau and Schmitt to illustrate the theo-
retical underpinnings of populism raises the question of
the relationship of populism to classical republicanism,
but also the question of the historical transformation of
populism from a left- to a right-wing ideology between
the French Revolution and the emergence of fascism and
other new, radical right-wingmovements in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century; but they don’t pur-
sue these important questions here.2 In any case, the
“monist” character of populism highlights its inherent
preference for a purported “general will” over any indi-
vidual or minority rights. Later in the book, they also de-
fine populism as compatible with democracy, but a po-
tential threat to liberal democracy. Finally, they also de-
fine their approach to populism as “ideational”; for them,
in other words, “populism is first and foremost a set of
ideas” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 62), which can be
used in different ways by different actors. This approach
has the advantage of permitting them to move beyond
sterile debates about whether populism is primarily a
movement or a party, or whether populism is tied to a
specific type of leader, or to a leader at all.
In the second chapter the authors examine briefly
the changing forms of populism that have existed in dif-
ferent regions of the globe in the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries. They provide a good overview of the
transformation of populism in the U.S. over the course
of the twentieth century from a predominatly progres-
sive, to a predominantly reactionary movement—here
again, however, without any attempt to explain why this
shift occurred. They also helpfully point to the central-
ity of producerism, which defines “the people” as vir-
tuous producers and “the elite” as immoral parasites,
to both progressive and reactionary forms of populism
in the U.S. They approach Latin American populism
by way of a historical periodization that distinguishes
threemainwaves: classical populism (1929–1969), repre-
sented paradigmatically by Juan Peron; neo-liberal pop-
ulism (the 1990s), represented by Alberto Fujimoro and
Carlos Menem; and left-wing populism (1998 to the
present), represented by Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales.
Their historical narrative of European populism begins
with the Russian narodniki movement, which was itself
unsuccessful, but which inspired several successful agrar-
ian populist movements in Eastern Europe. Problemati-
cally, they erect a firewall between fascism and populism
by claiming rather simplistically that fascism was an eli-
tist movement. Here they overlook the crucial anti-elitist
elements of fascist ideology, which set it apart from tra-
ditional European conservatism and made it so appeal-
ing the new radical nationalist movements that had be-
gun to emerge in France, Germany and other European
countries at the end of the nineteenth century. These
movements should be seen as key sources of twentieth-
century European populism—and not just the Russian
narodniki. They point out correctly that populism disap-
peared almost entirely in Europe in the prosperous post-
World War II decades, and did not reemerge as a force
to be reckoned with until the end of the 1990s. Strik-
ing from our perspective today in relationship to both
Europe and the U.S., where populism also languished
in relative obscurity in the post-war period, is the cor-
relation between the Keynesian economic policies and
stronger welfare state, on the one hand, and the notable
absence of populism, on the other. The correlation be-
tween the resurgence of populism in the 1990s and the
spread of neo-liberal ideas that preceded and accom-
panied it, is equally striking. It is even more striking if
one views the conservative shift in Western European
politics in the late 1970s and early 1980s—represented
by Thatcher in Britain or Kohl and the Tendenzwende
in West Germany—as the watershed moment in the re-
crudescence of populism, rather than the late 1990s, as
do the authors. Who would deny that the former shift
was also characterized by a powerful resurgence of the
xenophobia that would figure so prominently in later Eu-
ropean populist movements?Mudde and Kaltwasser are
open to arguments that posit not merely correlation, but
causal links between the rise of neo-liberalism and right-
wing populism in Europe and the U.S., but it is—as we
shall see—John Judis who explores these links most com-
pellingly. Mudde and Kaltwasser also mention in pass-
ing populist movements in other parts of the globe—
thereby agreeing with Moffitt that populism is truly a
global phenomenon—but with the limited amount of
space allotted to them in a “very short introduction”,
their discussion remains necessarily superficial.
Chapter three provides an analytically sharp and use-
ful discussion of the three main types of populist mo-
bilization: top–down personalist leadership, bottom–up
social movements and the mixed form of the politi-
cal party. Mudde brings his formidable knowledge of
European right-wing populist parties to bear here, to
demonstrate—pace Moffitt—that populist parties can
not only thrivewithout charismatic leaders, but that such
charisma is often a function of the much more durable
party form. In chapter four Kaltwasser offers a plausible
explanation of how and why the charismatic strongman
has been so successful in the Latin American context, but
he and Mudde also explain that such a leader is one of
several types that have proven successful in populist par-
ties and movements. Other types include women, en-
trepreneurs, ethnic leaders or “insider-outsiders” who
can succeed in gaining acceptance as the “vox populi”.
2 For an examination of this problem, see (Abromeit, 2016).
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Although they distinguish helpfully between different
types of leaders, they seem to agree with Wodak and
Moffitt that all forms of populist leadership involve a
process of identification between the supporters and
the leader. Mudde and Kaltwasser point out that not
all populist leaders are charismatic. And sometimes, it is
precisely this lack of charisma which facilitates the pro-
cess of identification. But Mudde and Kaltwasser do not
possess any sophisticated psychological concepts to ex-
plain such processes of identification, any more than do
Wodak or Moffitt.
In the last two chapters of their short study, the au-
thors turn to debates about populism and democracy,
and to the causes of and possible responses to populism.
In contrast to Jan-Werner Müller, they do believe that
populism can enhance democracy under certain circum-
stances. Displaying once again their analytical acumen,
the authors distinguish between four different types
of regimes—full authoritarianism, competitive authori-
tarianism, electoral democracy and liberal democracy—
and demonstrate how populism is more likely to bene-
fit democracy under repressive conditions than in a fully
open society. They also identify the many ways in which
populism can strengthen anti-liberal-democratic tenden-
cies. One problem, however, with this typology is that it
posits liberal democracy as the most perfect form of gov-
ernment possible.With this approach, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to understandwhy powerful anti-democratic
populist forces develop within liberal democracies. This
approach may reflect the limits of political science itself,
as a discipline, to provide a comprehensive explanation
of right-wing populism, and the need for a more inter-
disciplinary approach, such as that pioneered by Frank-
furt School Critical Theorists in the 1930s and 1940s.3 On
this same note, Mudde and Kaltwasser begin the sixth
and final chapter with the rather surprising statement
that, despite the recent explosion of research and writ-
ing on populism, “surprisingly few established theories
about the success (and failure) of populist forces exist”
(Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 97). Like Wodak, they do
not seem to believe that there is any single explanation
for populism, or even for its global resurgence in the
past few decades. They provide a laundry list of condi-
tions, whose existence facilitates populism, such as a per-
ception of threat or crisis, economic downturn, system-
atic corruption, a weak state unable to collect taxes or
redistribute wealth, and an increasingly diversified and
competitive media market that focuses more on the sen-
sational issues favored by populists. One of the other
causes they mention, namely, the “neo-liberalization of
social democracy”, that is, the tendency of Socialists and
Social Democrats on the Continent, Labor in Britain, and
the Democratic Party in the U.S. to embrace neo-liberal
economic policies and thereby to abandon any princi-
pled opposition to the root cause of growing inequality
and insecurity in modern capitalist societies, points to a
more comprehensive explanation of the resurgence of
populism, but the authors do not develop this idea. The
closest they come to a general explanation of the causes
of populism is that “many citizens interpret political real-
ity through the lens of populism” (Mudde & Kaltwasser,
2017, p. 97), which of course begs the question of why.
To come back once more to the Frankfurt School theo-
rists, at least they realized that questions of perception
could be linked to socially and historically formed char-
acter structures, which were widespread among groups
of individuals who shared common experiences.4 Such
an approach offers the possibility of studying and ex-
plaining the reasons why specific forms of perception,
and beyond that, specific emotional dispositions, exist
among numerically significant groups. These perceptions
and dispositions can provide the cement that holds so-
cieties together, or—in the case of populist rebellions—
the destructive energy that can transform or tear them
apart. Mudde and Kaltwasser end their study with some
sound recommendations on how best to counteract the
negative effects of populism, which include adequate
prosecution for corruption; a stronger state able to col-
lect taxes and redistribute wealth; political and civic ed-
ucation in liberal-democratic values; support for domes-
tic and international institutions that monitor and pro-
tect minority rights; and defense of free media. But they
also caution that it is a mistake to overreact to the per-
ceived threat of populism, thereby playing into their self-
presentation as victims of powerful forces and violat-
ing oneself the democratic principle of the “freedom of
those who think differently”.
Jan-Werner Müller’s What is Populism? (2016) parts
ways from the other books under consideration here pri-
marily in its attempt to define populism as an exclusively
negative phenomenon, which always represents a poten-
tial threat to democracy. To make this argument Müller
must also rely on an atypical concept of democracy,
in which liberal safeguards to individual and minority
rights are included in the definition of the term.Whereas
Mudde and Kaltwasser distinguish between democracy
and liberal democracy, viewing populism as compatible
with the first and a potential threat only to the sec-
3 As Adorno put it: “It cannot be disputed that formal democracy, under the present economic system, does not suffice to guarantee permanently, to
the bulk of the population, satisfaction of the most elementary wants and needs, whereas at the same time the democratic form of government is pre-
sented as if…it were as close to an ideal society as it could be. The resentment caused by this contradiction is turned by those who fail to recognize its
economic roots against the form of democracy itself. Because it does not fulfill what it promises, they regard it as a ‘swindle’ and are ready to exchange
it for a system which sacrifices all claims to human dignity and justice, but of which they expect vaguely some kind of guarantee of their lives by better
planning and organization” (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950, p. 678).
4 See, for example (Horkheimer, 1995a). Erich Fromm’s very substantial introductory essay to the Institute’s Studies on Authority and Family (Fromm,
1936) also provides an excellent and still relevant model for a sophisticated understanding of the social psychological mechanisms at work in right-wing
populist movements. Unfortunately, this important essay has never been translated into English. For a brilliant socio-historical analysis of populist
movements in early modern Europe, see also (Horkheimer, 1995b). Horkheimer and Fromm’s writings in the 1930s laid the theoretical groundwork for
the Institute’s path-breaking empirical studies of right-wing populism and authoritarianism in the 1940s and 1950s.
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ond, Müller denies the claims of populists in power—
such as Viktor Orban, Hugo Chavez, or Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan—to be truly democratic. Müller introduces a
new term, “defective democracies”, to refer to these
regimes,whose success inwinning elections is, according
to him, not enough to earn them democratic legitimacy.
Müller also parts ways frommost other commentators—
such as Moffitt, who argues that populism is successful
only in the opposition and tends to collapse if it gains
power—in his much greater attention to what populists
do when they are in power. Also in contrast to many
other scholars of populism, Müller emphasizes the sim-
ilarities between fascist and populist ideology. Regard-
ing these last two points of divergence, Müller’s analy-
sis of populism is informed in illuminating ways by his
impressive earlier research on Carl Schmitt, the history
of political ideas in twentieth-century Europe, and his
more recent work on the Orban regime in Hungary. For
example,Müller convincingly demonstrates that contem-
porary right-wing populists operate with a monolithic
and imaginary concept of “the people”, which echoes
both Schmitt’s definition of the political in terms of a
binary “friend–enemy” opposition and the National So-
cialists’ appeal to amythical Volksgemeinschaft. Contem-
porary populists’ appeals to such imagined communities
allow them to claim that they represent the “real” peo-
ple and to exclude those defined as outsiders. ForMüller,
the “logic” of populism always rests on the self-righteous
assumption by populist leaders and followers that “we
are the 100%”. In most cases, however, it is—according
to him—the populist leader who speaks in the name of
the people. One additional consequence ofMüller’s thor-
oughly critical approach to populism is that progressive
populism becomes a contradictio in adjecto; for example,
he argues that the People Party in the U.S. in the 1890s
was social democratic, not populist, and he says basically
the same thing about Bernie Sanders. No doubt, Mudde
and Kaltwasser’s approach, which makes room for pro-
gressive, bottom–up forms of populism, is more supple
here. But Müller’s approach has the advantage of captur-
ing one decisive aspect of right-wing populism thatmany
commentators have overlooked, namely, its tendency to
depoliticize its followers and to reduce democracy to
a spectacle, in which passive citizens do nothing more
than watch or listen to their leaders. Populism can be as
much about demobilizing, as mobilizing “the masses”, as
Schmitt and the Nazis also knew. For populists, popular
sovereignty is more acclamatory than participatory. This
also helps explain why populism often appeals to people
who hate politics.
There is much to recommend in Müller’s study, par-
ticularly in regard to his trenchant and sobering analysis
of populism in power. But I would like briefly to discuss
two weaknesses I see in his approach, which he shares
with Mudde and Kaltwasser. The first is his positing of
liberal democracy as the unquestionable telos ofmodern
politics. Here, Müller goes even further thanMudde and
Kaltwasser by uttering some cautious words of praise for
Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” argument, that is,
“that there were no more rivals to liberal democracy at
the level of ideas” (Müller, 2016, p. 5). As he sees it, the
main danger to liberal democracy comes not from rival
ideologies, but from within democracy itself, in the form
of populism. Although Müller does recognize through-
out his study the link between increasing inequality and
the resurgence of populism—he goes so far to say that
the U.S. “requires deep structural reform in this respect”
(Müller, 2016, p. 93)—the question is whether or not he
possesses the conceptual tools to grasp the reasons why
liberal democracy has come increasingly under threat,
from within, during the past few decades. Here, an ever-
renewed emphasis on the virtues of liberal democracy
itself does not get us very far. Adorno’s famous state-
ment in 1959 that the survival of authoritarian tenden-
cies within democracy is more menacing than groups
openly opposed to democracy, is still relevant—despite
the different social and historical context in which we are
living today (Adorno, 1998, p. 90). Müller is too quick to
caricature and dismiss social-psychological explanations
of populism, such as Adorno and his colleagues’ analy-
ses of the authoritarian personality. As is the case with
the other books considered here,Müller accepts that the
psychological mechanism of identification is decisive in
the dynamic interaction of the populist leader and his
or her supporters. What does liberal democratic polit-
ical theory have to tell us about this mechanism? Not
much, I claim. Furthermore, here also like Mudde and
Kaltwasser, Müller does not pay enough attention to the
fundamental differences and incompatibility between
democratic socialist andMarxist theory, on the one hand,
and populism, on the other. While it would take us too
far afield to discuss this complex point in any detail here,
the case of Ernesto Laclau is very instructive in this re-
gard. In his brilliant early work, Laclau sought to develop
a synthesis of critical Marxist theory and populism. But
as his work developed, and Laclau’s defense of populism
as the “ontological” foundation of politics, went hand in
hand with a rejection of Marxist and socialist theory, in-
sofar as they insisted that politics must always be the-
orized within a larger social and historical context. This
insistence upon the primacy of the “social”, and the com-
patibility of socialism and populism was precisely what
the later Laclau rejected. Not surprisingly, Müller is him-
self explicitly critical of Laclau, yet he—like Mudde and
Kaltwasser—approach populism as a fundamentally po-
litical phenomenon, and make little effort to systemat-
ically explore the socio-historical and social psychologi-
cal factors that have determined its success. To his credit,
Müller emphasizes that not all criticisms of liberalism are
populist. Presumably he is leaving the door open here for
a criticalMarxist critique of theways inwhich social dom-
ination reproduces itselfwithin liberal democracy—a cri-
tique which is not populist, but democratic socialist. But
one will not find such a critique in Müller’s own work. In-
sofar as many people on the left—including Laclau and
those influenced by him—have been drawn to populism,
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the development of such a critique remains an impor-
tant task.
Of all the books under consideration here, John
Judis’s The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession
TransformedAmerican and European Politics (2016), con-
tributes most to the development of such a critique. Al-
though somewhat misleading, insofar as Judis’s discus-
sion of populism extends back historically far beyond
the Great Recession of 2008, the title of his book high-
lights one of its main strengths, namely, an approach to
the recent resurgence of populism that is more histori-
cal and historically specific than any of the other books
under consideration here. Although Judis draws upon
political theory—most notably, Ernesto Laclau’s empha-
sis on the fundamentally antagonistic nature of populist
politics—to flesh out some of his arguments, at the cen-
ter of his analysis are deeper socio-economic tendencies
and ideologies that have accompanied and reinforced
them. He focuses, in particular, on the transition in Eu-
rope and the U.S. in 1980s and 1990s from industrial so-
cieties governed by more or less Keynesian policies, to
post-industrial societies in which neo-liberal ideas and
policies had become hegemonic, even among the main-
stream leftist parties. Judis views the resurgence of pop-
ulism in the past few decades primarily as an expres-
sion of discontent with neo-liberal policies. So, during
periods when neo-liberalism seemed to function well,
such as the late 1990s, populism lost support. At other
times—most notably in the wake of the 2008 crisis—
left and right-wing populist movements exploded in Eu-
rope and the U.S. Judis argues compellingly that pop-
ulist movements “often function as warning signs of
a political crisis” and that they arise “only under very
special circumstances” (p. 16), which explains why—as
most of the other authors also noted—populism was so
weak in Europe and the U.S. during the prosperous post-
war decades. The populist movements and parties that
did exist in Europe during this time—such as the Pou-
jadistes in France—were libertarian, anti-tax parties sup-
ported by the petty bourgeoisie. Judis shows interest-
ingly how many European right-wing populist parties—
such as the National Front in France, which had its roots
in Poujadisme—followed a trajectory from libertarian-
ism to economic nationalism and pro-welfare state posi-
tion.With the numbers of immigrants and refugees rising
steadily, especially in Northern Europe, right-wing pop-
ulist parties insisted that the benefits of welfare state
policies accrue solely to the “real” people, namely, those
within the imagined ethno-nationalist community. Judis
also demonstrates a more general tendency in the shift-
ing composition of supporters of European right-wing
populist parties, with the petty bourgeois being increas-
ingly outnumbered by workers, and especially workers
in regions hit hardest by neo-liberal economic reforms of
the 1980s and 1990s. Even relative latecomers to the Eu-
ropean right-wing populist scene, such as UKIP in Britain,
offer a clear example of this larger pattern outlined by
Judis. He argues that UKIP’s electoral breakthrough in the
2014 EU election, in which it came in first with 27.5%
of the vote, was predicated upon Nigel Farage’s aban-
donment of the party’s commitment to laissez-faire eco-
nomics, which increased support from workers, espe-
cially older, white male workers in former industrial ar-
eas. He identifies similar tendencies in other right-wing
populist parties in Northern Europe. He argues, for exam-
ple, thatMarine Le Pen—whose home district is a former
mining region in Northern France—is more of an eco-
nomic nationalist than her father and that her economic
policies aremore important to the current success of the
National Front than anti-immigration.
Equally impressive and persuasive is Judis’ discussion
of the role of the “neo-liberalization of social democracy”
in the rise of right-wing populism in Europe and the U.S.
Although, as he points out, both center-left and center-
right mainstream parties embraced the neo-liberal poli-
cies that became hegemonic in the 1980s and 1990s,
such a shift had different implications for the left. Ev-
eryone is familiar with Bill Clinton and Tony Blair, as the
paradigmatic cases of such a shift, but Judis also shows
how Continental Social Democracy and Socialism par-
ticipated in the same dynamic from the early 1980s to
the present. From Francois Mitterrand’s major conces-
sions to neo-liberalism in the early 1980s, to Gerhard
Schroeder’s defense of the so-called Hartz laws in 2003,
which made it easier to fire workers, to the Spanish
and Greek socialist parties’ more recent embrace of EU-
mandated austerity policies, Judis demonstrates a consis-
tent and recurring pattern of the neo-liberalization of So-
cial Democratic parties across Western and Southern Eu-
rope. This pattern was reinforced by the EU, which “wit-
tingly or not…institutionalized the rule of neo-liberalism”
(Judis, 2016, p. 105) and thereby exerted heavy pressure
on Social Democratic and Socialist parties to toe the line.
Implied, but never explicitly stated in Judis’ argument, is
the rather obvious point that if traditional leftist parties,
with deep roots in the European universalist traditions of
emancipation going back to the French Revolution and
socialist movements of the nineteenth-century, fail to ar-
ticulate a robust critique of neo-liberal global capitalism,
then the door is thrown wide open to right-wing pop-
ulist parties, who are more than willing to criticize neo-
liberal globalization from a particularist—that is, ethno-
nationalist and xenophobic—point of view. Thus, if one
takes Judis’ arguments seriously—as one should—much
of the responsibility for the rise of right-wing populism
in Europe and the U.S. must be placed squarely at the
feet of the Democratic, Labor, Social Democratic and So-
cialist parties that have failed in this regard. As Judis also
points out, such a dynamic also explains the seemingly
“surprising” success of left-wing populist movements in
the U.S and Europe since 2008—such as Syriza in Greece
(before it accepted austerity policies), Podemos in Spain,
and Bernie Sanders in the U.S.—which have articulated
robust critiques of neo-liberal capitalism and the mas-
sive inequality it has created. The election of Donald
Trump, who ran his campaign on economic populism
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and promised to transform the Republican Party into a
“workers’ party”, is also much less surprising if one is
willing—unlike Hillary Clinton and the Democratic Party
leadership—to accept the obvious fact that the Great
Recession thoroughly discredited neo-liberal policies. As
Judis points out, the success of both Trump and Sanders
“showed how much the Great Recession had radicalized
significant parts of the electorate…the contrast couldn’t
have been sharper with Clinton’s campaign that lacked
any visionary component” (Judis, 2016, pp. 83–84, 86).
Judis concludes his study by arguing—correctly—
that we should not simply dismiss right-wing populists
asmisguided, because they are addressing genuine prob-
lems. The problem, however, is to understand why the
manner in which they address these genuine problems is
indeed misguided, and why such a misguided approach
has become so appealing. I have suggested here that
contemporary approaches to the study of populism that
rely predominantly on discourse analysis, new media, or
even political theory are not adequate to the task. Prefer-
able, in my view, would be a return to the sophisticated,
interdisciplinary approach to the study of populism that
was pioneered by the Frankfurt School Critical Theorists
in the 1930s and 1940s, in which a non-dogmatic Marx-
ist critique of capitalism, psychoanalytically based social
psychology and empirical social research were combined
to grasp the powerful right-wing populist tendencies that
emerged in the twentieth century. To be sure, their ideas
would need to be updated to reflect contemporary so-
cial conditions, and should also draw upon theoretical in-
sights gained by othermore recent approaches. But, with
the partial exception of John Judis, contemporary studies
of populism seem better at describing than actually ex-
plaining the ominous resurgence of right-wing populism
in Europe and the U.S. in recent times.
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